The intervenors cite to In re Marriage of Thatcher , where we appeared to limit rule 1.953 by stating that the court may not "enter serial final judgments at different times in a single action between two parties, except for collateral matters such as cost or fee awards." 864 N.W.2d 533, 540 (Iowa 2015). Therefore, according to the intervenors, the district court erred in purporting to enter a final judgment on the specific performance and affirmative defense parts of the case because it had not resolved the rest of the case between HES and Retterath.
The dissolution decree is the final order adjudicating the parties' property rights. See In re Marriage of Thatcher, 864 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Iowa 2015). The orders on appeal, which determined the appropriate form of the QDRO and the QDRO, are supplemental orders to enforce the property division and are not a part of the underlying decree.
467 N.W.2d at 249-50; see also Villarreal v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 873 N.W.2d 714, 728 (Iowa 2016) (providing that Rule 1.914 authorizes bifurcated trials); In re Marriage of Thatcher, 864 N.W.2d 533, 539-40 (Iowa 2015) (providing that Rule 1.914 authorizes trying a case in segments “while entering a final judgment only at the end”).
"It is fundamental to our system of government that the authority for courts to act is conferred by the constitution or by statute." In re Marriage of Thatcher, 864 N.W.2d 533, 546-47 (Iowa 2015) (Zager, J., concurring)
); see also id. § 4.1(30)(a ) ("The word ‘shall’ imposes a duty."); In re Marriage of Thatcher , 864 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Iowa 2015) ("In a statute, the word ‘shall’ generally connotes a mandatory duty." (quoting In re Det. of Fowler , 784 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 2010) ) ).
If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision."); see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.101 ("The rules in this chapter shall govern the practice and procedure in all courts of the state, except where ... statutes not affected hereby provide different procedure in particular courts or cases."); In re Marriage of Thatcher , 864 N.W.2d 533, 540 (Iowa 2015) (applying rule 1.101 to give effect to a more specific statute); Wade Farms, Inc. v. City of Weldon , 419 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Iowa 1988) ("[T]he rules of civil procedure do not apply in those cases in which statutes provide a different procedure."). Chrischilles , in our view, does not countermand the clear text of Iowa Code section 414.15.
See Iowa Code § 809A.13(4) ("The answer . . . shall also set forth all of the following . . . . (Emphasis added.)); see also id. § 4.1(30)(a) ("The word 'shall' imposes a duty."); In re Marriage of Thatcher, 864 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Iowa 2015) ("In a statute, the word 'shall' generally connotes a mandatory duty." (quoting In re Det. of Fowler, 784 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 2010))).
We presume the Iowa legislature was aware of, but declined to follow, the [Uniform Probate Code]'s dower provision because it chose to shield the dower interest in all real estate from the estate's creditors.In re Marriage of Thatcher , 864 N.W.2d 533, 541 (Iowa 2015) (quoting Freedom Fin. Bank , 805 N.W.2d at 814 (citations omitted)). We similarly conclude that the Iowa Legislature was aware of the UPC provision regarding ademption but decided not to adopt it as part of the Iowa Probate Code.
In interpreting section 631.1, we begin with the statutory language. See In re Marriage of Thatcher, 864 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Iowa 2015). “Words or phrases that are undefined in the statute or for which there is no established legal meaning are given their common, ordinary meaning in the context within which they are used.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Schulte, 843 N.W.2d 876, 880 (Iowa 2014). If the statute is unambiguous, we will look no further than the language chosen by the legislature.
When the term “shall” appears in a statute, it generally connotes the imposition of a mandatory duty. In re Marriage of Thatcher, 864 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Iowa 2015); In re Det. of Fowler, 784 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 2010). Moreover, rules of statutory construction set forth in the Iowa Code specify that in statutes enacted after July 1, 1971, the word “shall” imposes a duty unless otherwise specified by the legislature.