Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. YJ32097, Irma J. Brown, Judge.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MANELLA, J.
T.H. appeals from an order of wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) following a finding that she committed grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)), second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and battery (Pen. Code, § 242). She was ordered suitably placed in an open facility and contends the record does not support the juvenile court’s finding that she committed a robbery. For reasons stated in the opinion, we conclude the finding she committed a second degree robbery is supported by substantial evidence and affirm the order of wardship.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 18, 2008, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Nayely Lopez was walking with her friend Nathalie Garcia near the intersection of Gardena Boulevard and Berendo Avenue in the County of Los Angeles. Appellant and a male friend were walking behind them. Appellant walked faster, passing Lopez and Garcia, and then stopped and asked them for the time. As Lopez told appellant the time, appellant snatched Lopez’s cell phone from Lopez’s hand and ran. Lopez, who was three months pregnant, could not run after appellant but she and Garcia followed appellant, walking fast. Lopez encountered two friends, Leslie Durantes and Melissa Cerna, who followed appellant into an alley and saw her enter a market. From the time that appellant took the phone until she was seen in the market, approximately two minutes passed. When appellant left the market, approximately a minute later, she pushed Lopez and Durantes out of the way. Lopez told appellant, “I won’t call the police. Just give me my phone back. That’s all I want.” Appellant responded that she did not have the phone. Lopez told appellant, “You do have it. You have it in your purse.” Durantes intervened, warning Lopez to move away from appellant because it would be dangerous if appellant hit Lopez. Durantes told appellant to give back Lopez’s phone then grabbed appellant’s handbag, which ripped. Appellant then took the handbag away from Durantes. Appellant shoved Durantes and tried to leave. Appellant claimed she did not have the phone, that she never took it, and also that she had flushed it down the toilet. Durantes opined appellant could have “put it in the toilet... ’cause [they] did take a while to find her.” Durantes and appellant shoved each other, grabbed each other’s hair, and appellant bit Durantes in the arm. When the manager of the market told the women they had to leave, appellant ran away. Approximately 30 minutes later, Lopez saw appellant again and called the police.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the record does not support the finding she committed a robbery against Durantes because appellant abandoned the property before using force or fear. We disagree.
Count 1, the robbery of Lopez, was dismissed.
“‘The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding, the appellate court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence–such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence [citation] and we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089.) “This standard applies to cases based on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830.)
“‘Although it is the duty of the [trier of fact] to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the [trier of fact], not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’” [Citations.] “Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Figueroa (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1584, 1587.)
To prove a robbery, the prosecution must establish the defendant took property from the victim “by means of force or fear with the specific intent to permanently deprive him of that property.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1176-1177; People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1058; Pen. Code, § 211.) “[T]he intent required for robbery... is seldom established with direct evidence but instead is usually inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 643.) “[A]n intent to permanently deprive someone of his or her property may be inferred when one unlawfully takes the property of another.” (People v. Morales (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1391.)
“Circumstances otherwise constituting a mere theft will establish a robbery where the perpetrator peacefully acquires the victim’s property, but then uses force to retain or escape with it.” (Miller v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 216, 222.) ‘“[A] robbery is not completed at the moment the robber obtains possession of the stolen property and... the crime of robbery includes the element of asportation, the robber’s escape with the loot being considered as important in the commission of the crime as gaining possession of the property.’” (Ibid.) ‘“[A] robbery occurs when defendant uses force or fear in resisting attempts to regain the property or in attempting to remove the property from the owner’s immediate presence regardless of the means by which defendant originally acquired the property.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pham (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 61, 66.) Further, the victim of the robbery need not be the owner of the goods stolen. (People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 26-28.)
Apart from whether appellant used force or fear when she initially snatched the cell phone from Lopez (see People v. Burns (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1257-1259), appellant thereafter used force against Durantes to prevent her from regaining the property. While appellant argues she abandoned the cell phone before using force against Durantes, the juvenile court stated it disbelieved appellant’s claim that she had thrown the phone in a toilet, finding the statement was a “self-serving statement by the minor” with little supporting evidence in that witnesses had only lost sight of appellant “for a very brief period of time” and that “no one ever looked inside of the [appellant’s] bag... which in fact was the subject of the tug-of-war that led to the force and violence that was used.” The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment supports the finding of the juvenile court that appellant committed the subject robbery.
DISPOSITION
The order of wardship is affirmed.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P.J., SUZUKAWA, J.