Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. SJ08010000-01
RIVERA, J.
T.H. appeals from orders sustaining a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and declaring him a ward of the court. His counsel has filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) T.H. has been apprised of his right to file a supplemental brief, but he has not done so.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The Alameda County District Attorney filed a petition pursuant to section 602, alleging that T.H. had committed misdemeanor vandalism, causing injury of $400 or more. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1).)
A contested jurisdictional hearing took place. Jazmin Rangel testified that she and her family were neighbors of T.H. on March 10, 2008. She believed he had recently moved to the neighborhood. Since that time, she had seen groups of young people playing music and drinking outside his apartment.
On the evening of March 10, Rangel’s father’s truck was parked outside her house, separated from the house by a gate. Rangel heard screaming outside the house. Her father asked her to call the police because people were trying to get inside the house. Rangel went outside and saw 10 or 15 people trying to open the gate. She locked the gate and went back to call the police. As she called the police, she saw the youths jumping on the bed of the truck, screaming, and running across the street. Some of the youths dispersed. Before the police arrived, Rangel saw T.H. and two other people kicking and jumping on her father’s truck, then kicking the truck’s window. They broke the window and dented the hood. Rangel was about 30 feet from the group, and the lighting was good. She saw part of T.H.’s face. T.H. went into an apartment next door. Shortly afterward, Rangel identified T.H. in a line-up. She identified him with certainty at the hearing.
T.H. was not part of this group.
T.H.’s sister testified that T.H. and his family had lived in their apartment for about four years. She saw the incident, and testified that T.H. was not part of the group involved in the disruption and vandalism, that he was not outside at the time, and that when she returned to the apartment about a minute after she saw two people kicking the truck’s window, T.H. was inside. T.H. testified that he was inside his apartment during the entire incident. He stayed inside because his mother had told him to wash the dishes.
The juvenile court found beyond a reasonable doubt that T.H. had violated Penal Code section 594, subdivision (b)(1). It declared him a ward of the court, placed him on probation, ordered him to live in his mother’s home, and set the maximum term of confinement at one year.
Section 726, subdivision (c) provides in pertinent part: “If the minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” Here, T.H. was not removed from his mother’s physical custody. In such a case, the court held in In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 573-574 and footnote 2, the juvenile court is not required by section 726, subdivision (c) to fix a maximum term of confinement, and any such provision has no legal effect. The court in Ali A. went on to conclude that although a maximum term of confinement had been erroneously included in the dispositional order where the minor was not removed from his parents’ physical custody, there was no need to reverse or remand because the juvenile court would have to comply with section 726, subdivision (c) at a later date if the minor violated the terms of his probation, and the minor therefore suffered no prejudice. (Ali A., at pp. 573-574 & fn. 2.) We likewise see no prejudice here and no need for remand.
T.H. was represented by counsel. The evidence supports the juvenile court’s orders. There are no meritorious issues to be argued.
DISPOSITION
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
We concur: RUVOLO, P.J., REARDON, J.