Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD224854
RAYE , J.R. P. (appellant), the maternal grandmother of minor T. G., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) She contends she received ineffective assistance of counsel during the early stages of the proceedings below. We conclude appellant lacks standing to raise the challenge and shall dismiss the appeal.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
In September 2006 the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the minor. The petition alleged that appellant, the minor’s temporary legal guardian and maternal grandmother, had a history of substance abuse from which she had failed to rehabilitate and which impaired her ability to provide adequate care for the minor.
A section 300 petition was also filed on behalf of the minor’s half sibling, who had also been living with appellant. This appeal does not concern the proceedings involving the minor’s half sibling.
The juvenile court appointed counsel for appellant at the initial detention hearing and continued the matter. At the continued detention hearing, the court ordered the minor detained out of appellant’s home.
In addition to information regarding drugs recently found in appellant’s home and appellant’s history of drug use, the social worker’s report, prepared for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, explained that appellant had previously filed for guardianship of the minor. Appellant and the minor’s mother had a strained relationship. The minor’s mother has a history of substance abuse. The minor’s father was then incarcerated for driving under the influence and causing great bodily injury, assault with a deadly weapon, and hit and run.
Appellant requested a contested hearing. Her counsel submitted a pretrial statement that included evidence of appellant’s participation in services. On February 8, 2007, the juvenile court determined that probate guardianship was not needed and relieved appellant as temporary guardian of the minor. The juvenile court then also relieved appellant’s appointed counsel.
Thereafter, the juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition and ordered reunification services for the minor’s mother. The minor’s mother, however, failed to reunify and her services were terminated. Reunification services were then ordered for the minor’s father. The minor’s father also failed to reunify, his services were terminated, and a section 366.26 hearing was set.
At the time of the February 4, 2009, section 366.26 hearing, the minor was doing well in her foster-adoptive home. Appellant attended the hearing and requested placement and adoption of the minor. The juvenile court terminated parental rights and freed the minor for adoption. The court also found that placement of the minor in appellant’s home was not in the best interest of the minor.
DISCUSSION
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on February 4, 2009, from the juvenile court’s orders entered at the section 366.26 hearing. She claims she did not receive effective assistance of counsel in the early stages of the proceedings. Specifically, appellant contends that counsel did not effectively notify the court that she had completed therapy, nor did counsel explain to the court why appellant tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. She also contends that, as a result, she was wrongfully relieved as temporary guardian. Her contentions of error are not properly before this court.
Appellant does not have standing to appeal from the juvenile court’s orders entered at the section 366.26 hearing, as she was not an aggrieved party. In juvenile dependency proceedings, only a party aggrieved by the judgment has standing to appeal. (In re Lauren P. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 763, 768.) “‘Whether one has standing in a particular case generally revolves around the question whether that person has rights that may suffer some injury, actual or threatened.’ [Citation.]” (Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1034.) As a grandparent, appellant had only limited rights once the minor was declared a dependent child of the court. (Cf. In re Albert B. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d361, 381.) A termination of parental rights proceeding does not result in an injury to appellant in the legal sense, and therefore she lacks standing to challenge the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. (Cf. Clifford S. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 747, 751.)
In light of appellant’s claim on appeal (that she was wrongfully relieved as temporary guardian), she was aggrieved, if at all, by the juvenile court’s February 8, 2007, order relieving her as guardian. The statutory period within which to appeal from such an order had long since passed by the time appellant filed her notice of appeal in February 2009. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.400(d) [must file written notice of appeal within 60 days of order].) Thus, any appeal in that respect is untimely.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur SIMS , Acting P. J. CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.