Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. SWJ005328. Kenneth Fernandez, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Carole A. Nunes Fong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jacquelyn E. Gentry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors.
OPINION
RICHLI, J.
Justin F. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his reunification services. For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 22, 2005, Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) detained father’s two children, ages six and 11 months, due to allegations that the children had been exposed to ongoing acts of domestic violence involving father and the children’s mother.
On December 27, 2005, DPSS filed a juvenile dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The next day, the juvenile court removed the children from the parents’ custody.
On January 17, 2006, DPSS filed a jurisdiction report; it recommended that the juvenile court sustain the petition, declare the children as dependents, and offer reunification services to both parents. DPSS designed a reunification plan that required father to participate in anger management and domestic violence programs, receive general counseling, and complete a parenting education class. DPSS reported that father had monitored visitation with the children on a weekly basis.
At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing held on February 21, 2006, father entered a wavier of rights and submitted on the petition. The juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petition and ordered father to participate in reunification services. Father informed the court that he had not yet received any services from DPSS. The court ordered DPSS to provide service referrals to both parents no later than February 27, 2006.
In the August 21, 2006, six-month status review report, DPSS recommended that both mother and father receive an additional six months of reunification services. DPSS noted that father was participating in individual counseling. Father continued to have weekly monitored visits with the children. At the six-month review hearing, the court ordered, despite father’s unsatisfactory progress, an additional six months of services for both parents. The court also ordered DPSS to refer father to parenting classes and have father undergo a psychological evaluation.
On January 25, 2007, DPSS prepared a 12-month status review report; it recommended that the juvenile court terminate father’s reunification services because he “cannot reunify with his children due to his incarceration and his statutory time line has lapsed.” At the 12-month review hearing held on March 21, 2007, the court determined that DPSS had provided father with reasonable reunification services. The court then terminated father’s services. The court did not set a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.
Father appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his reunification services. Both DPSS and the children request that we affirm the order.
II
DPSS PROVIDED FATHER WITH REASONABLE SERVICES
Father contends that the court’s order terminating his reunification services must be reversed because DPSS failed to provide him with reasonable reunification services. DPSS argues that (1) father has forfeited his right to raise the issue on appeal and (2) “[a]ny challenge to the court’s reasonable services finding is untimely for the period covered by orders made at the six-month review hearing.” We need not address DPSS’s waiver arguments because father’s contention fails on the merits.
The standard of review, when a parent challenges the reasonableness of the reunification services provided or offered, is whether substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s conclusion that such services were reasonable. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75.) “All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and the reviewing court must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court.” (In re Albert B. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 361, 375.)
The juvenile court’s determination that DPSS had provided reasonable services is supported by substantial evidence.
At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing held on February 21, 2006, father informed the court that he “just got the referral last week from the social worker.” However, the referral was still being processed and “father is still not able to get enrolled in services.” The court commented that because the children were detained in December, they were “almost two months into this,” and yet, father still did not have any referrals. The court then went on to state, “That’s just unacceptable.” Therefore, the court ordered that both parents have referrals by February 27, 2006. On the same day, DPSS recognized the need to provide services to the parents on an emergency basis. On February 24, 2006, DPSS sent via facsimile the service referrals to the parents. Father was to attend parenting classes through ADV (Alternative to Domestic Violence) and therapy with Southwest Family Counseling.
According to the August 21, 2006, status review report, although counseling for father was approved, he failed to attend any sessions until April 17, 2006. In fact, when a social worker called Southwest Family Counseling, she was informed that “they had attempted to contact [father] at home and left messages but there were no return phone calls.” Moreover, although father attended his first counseling session on April 17, 2006, his quarterly progress report indicates that he had attended only three sessions. It was also noted that father had been “incarcerated for 17 days, missed a lot of appts, didn’t call.”
That same report indicates that father was provided with referrals for parenting classes on February 24, May 8, and May 16, 2006. However, father failed to enroll in any parenting class. Father reported that he had a difficult time attending parenting classes. Father stated the difficulties resulted from some classes not starting “for another few months” and another one of the classes conflicted with his domestic violence class. In addition, his incarcerations interfered with a possible parenting class schedule. However, father failed to timely notify the social worker of his difficulties.
As for domestic violence programs, according to the August 21, 2006, status review report, father reported that he was currently attending a domestic violence program as a condition of probation. On July 22, 2006, father advised the social worker that he had completed 12 classes. He also reported that he missed three classes due to work and one class because he was incarcerated. The social worker was unable to verify father’s participation or progress in father’s court-ordered 52-week anger management class because father failed to provide DPSS with the necessary information.
At the time the 12-month permanency status review report was filed on January 25, 2007, the social worker was advised that father had been discharged from the Southwest Family Counseling and that his last session was August 30, 2006. Father was discharged because he was resistant, not benefiting from therapy, and abusive to the staff. Father’s therapist stated that father should complete psychological testing before being referred to another counselor. Father was referred for a psychological evaluation on September 6, 2006. Father was unable to be evaluated because he was arrested on September 25, 2006.
On September 25, 2006, a referral letter for a parenting class through the Murrieta Valley United School District was sent to father. Father was unable to attend because he was arrested that same day.
Thus, the record reflects that father was provided reasonable reunification services. Unfortunately, he chose not to participate in the referred counseling services or parenting classes. Or, if he did participate, he did so only on a limited basis.
Father also complains that DPSS failed to provide reasonable services to him while he was incarcerated. Father was initially housed at the Southwest Detention Center. In December 2006, father was moved to North Kern State Prison. Before he was moved to the prison, the children visited with father at the Southwest facility on a weekly basis. The visits ended after father was moved to prison, which was five hours away. Father concedes that this was reasonable because visitation “had become impracticable.”
After father’s move to prison, pursuant to the social worker’s inquiry into services at the prison, the prison’s counselor stated that father was not in a “main line” prison and no services were offered there. It appears that in February 2007, father was incarcerated at the Desert View Modified Community Correctional Facility (Desert View) in Adelanto, California. Father informed DPSS that he had completed anger management and parenting classes at Desert View. Father complains that visitation with his children should have resumed after his transfer to Desert View.
We find that any lack of services available to father while incarcerated was not a reflection of the services provided by DPSS. Additionally, we recognize that it was father’s choice of a criminal lifestyle that landed him in prison and, thereby, limited his access to services or visits with his children. Furthermore, we note that although father complains that DPSS failed to provide him with services while he was at Desert View, such error was harmless because father accessed the services notwithstanding any alleged failure by DPSS.
We note that “[i]n almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.) Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to DPSS, as we must, we hold that father was provided with reasonable reunification services.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: HOLLENHORST, Acting P. J., MILLER, J.