Opinion
04-22-00165-CV
06-15-2022
IN RE THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES
This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2020-PA-00945, styled In the Interest of K.S.R.C., a Child, pending in the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Mary Lou Alvarez presiding.
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PATRICIA O. ALVAREZ, JUSTICE
The child at the center of this case is K.S.R.C., a seventeen-year-old child in the permanent managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services. In its March 17, 2022 order titled "Benchmark Hearing After Final Order, " the trial court ordered the Department to "find and negotiate a child[-]specific contract for placement of this child on or before Monday, March 21, 2022, with a daily rate up to $800.00."
The benchmark hearing was held on March 15, 2022; the trial court signed the order on March 17, 2022. We refer to the challenged order as the March 17, 2022 order.
The Department filed a motion to stay the order, which we granted, and a petition for writ of mandamus complaining of the order. The trial court filed a response, and the Department filed a reply to the response.
Having considered the petition, the record, the response, and the reply, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.
MANDAMUS STANDARD OF REVIEW
Generally, to obtain mandamus relief, a petitioner "must show that the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion and that [the petitioner] has no adequate remedy by appeal." In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). "A trial court abuses its discretion if 'it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law' or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law." Id. (quoting Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839, 840 (Tex. 1992)).
However, the petitioner does not have to show a lack of an adequate appellate remedy for mandamus relief to be appropriate if the complained-of order is void. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). "[A] judgment [is] void when 'the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act.'" PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. 2010)).
Background
In May 2020, the Department filed its original petition for protection of K.S.R.C., for conservatorship of K.S.R.C., and for termination of K.S.R.C.'s parents' rights. In June 2021, the trial court found that appointing a parent or both parents as managing conservators would not be in K.S.R.C.'s best interest. Instead, it appointed mother and father as possessory conservators and appointed the Department as K.S.R.C.'s permanent managing conservator.
At a benchmark hearing on March 15, 2022, the trial court reviewed and assessed the Department's care for K.S.R.C. In its March 17, 2022 order, the trial court included the following:
2.1. The Department is to find and negotiate a child[-]specific contract for placement of this child on or before Monday, March 21, 2022, with a daily rate up to $800.00.
On March 21, 2022, the Department filed a petition for writ of mandamus and a motion for emergency relief to stay the trial court's order. The next day, this court granted the stay and requested responses. The trial court filed a response, and the Department filed a reply.
Discussion
In its petition, the Department argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the Department to pay a specified amount for K.S.R.C.'s foster care because, inter alia, the trial court violated the Separation of Powers Clause of the Texas Constitution. We agree.
In In re The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, No. 04-22-00040-CV, 2022 WL 1751677 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jun. 1, 2022, orig. proceeding), we considered whether the trial court could order the Department to enter a child-specific contract for foster care at a specific daily rate. Id. at *7-8. In that case, we held that the trial court's order violated the Separation of Powers Clause of the Texas Constitution, id. at *8, which was a clear failure to correctly analyze or apply the law, and which constituted an abuse of discretion, see In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d at 317.
The same principle applies here: Paragraph 2.1 of the trial court's order, which requires the Department to enter a child-specific contract for K.S.R.C.'s care up to a specific rate, violates the Separation of Powers Clause, incorrectly analyzes or misapplies the law, and is void. See PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 272; In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d at 317.
Conclusion
The trial court lacked the authority-constitutional, statutory, inherent, or otherwise-to require the Department to "to find and negotiate a child[-]specific contract for placement of [K.S.R.C.] on or before Monday, March 21, 2022, with a daily rate up to $800.00." Thus, the trial court's inclusion of paragraph 2.1 in its March 17, 2022 order was an abuse of discretion, that paragraph is void, and the Department is entitled to relief.
We conditionally grant the Department's petition for writ of mandamus. We direct the trial court to, no later than fifteen days from the date of this opinion, vacate paragraph 2.1 of its March 17, 2022 "Benchmark Hearing After Final Order." We are confident the trial court will promptly comply; our writ will issue only if it does not.