Opinion
04-22-00096-CV
06-15-2022
IN RE THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES
This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2021-PA-01762, styled In the Interest of J.B.M. and L.R.M., Children, pending in the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Mary Lou Alvarez presiding.
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Beth Watkins, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Conditionally Granted
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BETH WATKINS, JUSTICE
In this original mandamus proceeding, relator the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services challenges an order directing it to transfer eight unidentified cases overseen by a specific Department caseworker to other caseworkers as well as a subsequent order renewing and extending that order. We conditionally grant the Department's petition for writ of mandamus.
Background
The underlying lawsuit is a suit affecting the parent-child relationship filed by the Department. On October 11, 2021, the trial court signed an order appointing the Department temporary managing conservators of J.B.M. and L.R.M., the children involved in this case. On October 21, 2021, the trial court signed an order that, inter alia, required the children's parents "to comply with each requirement set out in the Department's original, or any amended, service plan during the pendency of this suit." As of the filing of this mandamus proceeding, no final order had been entered in the underlying lawsuit.
To protect the privacy of the minor children, we use initials to refer to the children. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex.R.App.P. 9.8(b)(2).
On December 15, 2021, the trial court held a status hearing pursuant to Chapter 263, Subchapter C of the Texas Family Code. Allison Boroda, the caseworker the Department assigned to this matter, appeared on behalf of the Department. Following the hearing, the trial court signed a January 4, 2022 "Progress Report Order" providing, inter alia: "Caseworker Allison Boroda's caseload will have 8 cases transferred to another caseworker(s) until the next setting." On January 18, 2022, the trial court held another status hearing, also under Chapter 263, Subchapter C. Following that hearing, the court signed a January 21, 2022 "Progress Report Order" renewing and extending the previous order limiting Boroda's caseload.
On February 17, 2022, the Department filed this mandamus proceeding challenging the January 4 and January 21 orders along with a motion seeking an emergency stay of the provisions of those orders that limit Boroda's caseload. We granted the motion for emergency relief and invited a response from the respondent and the real parties in interest. The respondent filed a response, as did real party in interest C.R., the children's mother.
Analysis
Standard of Review
To be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must show the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion and the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). A trial court abuses its discretion if "'it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law'" or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (citation omitted). A "mandamus will not issue when the law provides another plain, adequate, and complete remedy." In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. 2006). However, if the complained-of order is void, the relator does not have to show a lack of an adequate appellate remedy for mandamus relief to be appropriate. See In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Mask, 198 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, orig. proceeding). "A judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering judgment 'had no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.'" Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1987) (citation omitted).
Applicable Law
The Department argues the challenged orders: (1) violate the Separation of Powers Clause of the Texas Constitution; (2) are barred by sovereign immunity; (3) are not in the best interest of the children whose cases Boroda would be removed from; and (4) disregard the Department's right to choose its own representative in this litigation. Because we conclude the Department's separation of powers argument is dispositive, we limit our analysis to that issue.
Separation of Powers
The Department argues the challenged orders violate the Separation of Powers Clause of the Texas Constitution because they "deprive an executive branch agency of its ability to administer work responsibilities to its own employees and to manage their assignments, an interference which prevents the Department from effectively exercising and performing its assigned functions." The Department contends that "the power to oversee its administration and organization is more properly attached to the Department itself and not individual courts."
The respondent counters that she had statutory authority to enter appropriate orders following her review of these parents' court-ordered service plans. The respondent cites no statutory or constitutional authority specifically permitting her to order the Department to transfer or re-assign caseworkers as part of her review of a service plan. Instead, she asserts this court should reject any argument that the legislature would require a trial court to conduct hearings to review the Department's care of the children entrusted to it while at the same time preventing the court from taking action it deems necessary following such review. She contends she has the inherent power to issue orders necessary to aid in the court's jurisdiction and the implied power to advance what she believes is in the children's best interest-here, by limiting the workload of the caseworker the Department assigned to this case.
The respondent directs this court to In the Interest of R.W.K. for the proposition that she had the requisite power to render the orders at issue here. In R.W.K., the trial court determined the Department established proper grounds to terminate appellant's parental rights but found termination would not be in the child's best interest. No. 10-16-00393-CV, 2017 WL 1957444, at *1 (Tex. App.-Waco May 10, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Following a final order wherein the Department was named managing conservator of the child, the trial court clarified its order to require the appellant to comply with the Department's service plan. Id. at *2. On appeal, the appellant argued the trial court lacked the authority to require her to comply with the requirements of the family service plan. Id. The R.W.K. court affirmed the trial court's order because, as appellant's parental rights were not terminated, the trial court had the authority to order services in the context of the child's best interest. Id. at *2-`3. The R.W.K. court focused on the actions, and inactions, of the appellant to comply with the Department's service plan. See id. The opinion did not address the issue before this court, which is whether the trial court had the authority to compel the Department to alter its employees' caseloads. Therefore, the R.W.K. opinion does not provide guidance for the issue faced by this court in this original proceeding.
A. The Law in General-Separation of Powers
"The separation of the powers of government into three distinct, rival branches- legislative, executive, and judicial-is 'the absolutely central guarantee of a just Government.'" Fin. Comm'n of Tex. v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. 2013) (citation omitted). The Texas Constitution mandates:
The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: those which are Legislative to one; those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.Tex. Const. art. II, § 1. "The separation of powers doctrine means that a 'public officer or body may not exercise or otherwise interfere with a power constitutionally assigned to another public officer or body, nor may either surrender its own constitutionally assigned power, referring in all cases to the 'mass' of its powers or any 'core' paramount power.'" Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio v. Mata & Bordini, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 312, 317 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (citations omitted).
"The Separation of Powers Clause is violated (1) when one branch of government assumes power more properly attached to another branch or (2) when one branch unduly interferes with another branch so that the other cannot effectively exercise its constitutionally assigned powers." In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, 635 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied). "The application of these two tests is not always straightforward, as there is an overlap in the functioning of the three different branches of government." Martinez v. State, 503 S.W.3d 728, 733-34 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2016, pet. ref'd). The determination of whether an action is permitted to be undertaken by the judicial or legislative branch is often difficult "under varying factual circumstances." Gov't Servs. Ins. Underwriters v. Jones, 368 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. 1963) (orig. proceeding). Any exceptions "to the constitutionally mandated separation of powers are never to be implied in the least; they must be 'expressly permitted' by the Constitution itself." Norwood, 418 S.W.3d at 570 (citation omitted).
Although the constitutional provision on separation of powers "appears on its face to be rigid and absolute . . . such a construction would be impossible to implement in all cases because not every governmental power fits logically and clearly into any particular 'department.'" Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality v. Abbott, 311 S.W.3d 663, 671 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, pet. denied) (citation omitted). Thus, Texas courts have never held that the three branches of government operate with absolute independence, and have instead "long held that some degree of interdependence and reciprocity is subsumed within the separation of powers principle." Id. at 672. Accordingly, the separation of powers doctrine "enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Id. (citation omitted).
Where one branch of government assumes power more properly attached to another branch or unduly interferes with the powers of another, any resulting order is void. State v. Ferguson, 125 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. 1939) (orig. proceeding) (noting availability of mandamus relief from a void order where one branch of government usurps the power of another); D.W., 249 S.W.3d at 635.
To determine whether the trial court violated the Separation of Powers Clause in this case, we next consider the powers delegated to the trial court and to the Department.
B. The Judicial Branch
The power of the judiciary is "divided among . . . various named courts by means of express grants of 'jurisdiction' contained in the constitution and statutes." Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979). "In addition to the express grants of judicial power to each court, there are other powers which courts may exercise though not expressly authorized or described by constitution or statute." Id.
Here, the trial court derives its constitutional power from Article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 ("District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.").
The trial court's statutory power in this case derives from the Texas Family Code. Specifically, the trial court's relevant authority revolves around its powers to review and implement the service plans the Department developed for J.B.M. and L.R.M.'s parents. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 263.106, 263.201-.202. A service plan is a document which, inter alia, outlines permanency goals for a child who is under the temporary managing conservatorship of the Department. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.102(a)(5). The service plan must "state steps that are necessary to: (A) return the child to the child's home if the placement is in foster care; (B) enable the child to remain in the child's home with the assistance of a service plan if the placement is in the home under the department's supervision; or (C) otherwise provide a permanent safe placement for the child[.]" Id. § 263.102(a)(6). The purpose of a service plan "is to help [parents] provide [their] child with a safe environment within the reasonable period specified in the plan." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.102(b).
When the trial court entered the orders appointing the Department as the temporary managing conservator of J.B.M. and L.R.M. and implementing the Department's service plans, the court retained the power to make future modifications to those orders. See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.106. The challenged orders were ostensibly issued under the authority of Family Code Chapter 263, Subchapter C, which provides, "Not later than the 60th day after the date the court renders a temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator of a child, the court shall hold a status hearing to review the child's status and the service plan developed for the child." Tex. Fam. Code § 263.201(a). Subchapter C further provides, inter alia, "Except as otherwise provided by this subchapter, a status hearing shall be limited to matters related to the contents and execution of the service plan filed with the court." Tex. Fam. Code § 263.202(b). "After reviewing the service plan and making any necessary modifications, the court shall incorporate the service plan into the orders of the court and may render additional appropriate orders to implement or require compliance with the plan." Id. § 263.202(b-1). Thus, the trial court here had the statutory duty and power to review the Department's service plans for these parents and to require the parents to comply with their service plans. See generally id. §§ 263.201-.202.
In her response to the Department's petition for writ of mandamus, the respondent cites sections 155.001-.003 of the Texas Family Code for the proposition that when a court appoints the Department as a child's managing conservator, that court "acquires continuing jurisdiction over the child and retains the power to make future modifications to its order." Section 155.001 provides that "a court acquires continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the matters provided for by this title in connection with a child on the rendition of a final order." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 155.001(a) (emphasis added). Sections 155.002 and 155.003 describe a court's proper retention and exercise of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 155.002-.003. As noted above, however, the record indicates that when this mandamus proceeding was filed, no final order had been entered in the underlying lawsuit. Accordingly, sections 155.001-.003 do not apply to these facts under their plain language. Id. §§ 155.001-.003.
As stated above, a court also may exercise powers "not expressly authorized or described by constitution or statute." Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398. "These powers are woven into the fabric of the constitution by virtue of their origin in the common law and the mandate of Tex. Const. Art. II, Sec. 1, of the separation of powers between three co-equal branches." Id.; see also Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 36 (Tex. 2017) ("Our precedent also recognizes the judicial branch's inherent or implied authority, authority derived not from statute but born of the constitutionally mandated separation of powers and 'woven into the fabric of the constitution by virtue of their origin in the common law.'") (quoting Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398). "They are categorized as 'implied' and 'inherent' powers, though some courts have also used the terms incidental, correlative and inferred." Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398. "The inherent judicial power of a court is not derived from legislative grant or specific constitutional provision, but from the very fact that the court has been created and charged by the constitution with certain duties and responsibilities." Id. "The inherent powers of a court are those which it may call upon to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, and in the preservation of its independence and integrity." Id. Inherent power "springs from the doctrine of separation of powers between the three governmental branches." Id. at 399. "This power exists to enable our courts to effectively perform their judicial functions and to protect their dignity, independence and integrity." Id. Trial courts have the inherent authority "to ensure the proper administration of justice." Henry, 520 S.W.3d at 36. "The implied powers of a court do not stand on such an independent basis as those described as inherent." Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 399. "Though not directly or expressly granted by constitutional or legislative enactment, implied powers are those which can and ought to be implied from an express grant of power." Id.
The overall scheme of the Family Code and overriding public policy dictates that the best interest of the child is always paramount. See, e.g., In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. 2012). Thus, we conclude that, in addition to its statutory powers, the trial court had the inherent power to act in the best interest of J.B.M. and L.R.M.
C. The Executive Branch-The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
The power to make the law of the people is vested in the legislative branch through Article III, section 1 of the Texas Constitution. Diaz v. State, 68 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, pet. denied); see also Tex. Const. art. III, § 1 ("The Legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, which together shall be styled 'The Legislature of the State of Texas.'"). "The power of the legislature includes the power to make, alter, and repeal laws, when such power is not expressly or impliedly forbidden by other provisions of the state Constitution." Diaz, 68 S.W.3d at 685.
The legislative branch is empowered to create agencies and "may delegate its powers to agencies established to carry out legislative purposes, as long as it establishes 'reasonable standards to guide the entity to which the powers are delegated.'" Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 467 (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted); FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. 2000) ("Defining what legislative power is or when it has been delegated is no easy task."). The legislature is not required "to include every detail and anticipate unforeseen circumstances [as such obligation] would . . . defeat the purpose of delegating legislative authority." Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 740 (Tex. 1995).
In this case, the Department is a state agency, administered by the Health and Human Services Commission, that is legislatively designated to, inter alia, provide support and services to children through state and federal funding. See Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 40.002; Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs. v. Parra, 503 S.W.3d 646, 651 n.5 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2016, pet. denied) ("The Health and Human Services Commission oversees the Texas Health and Human Services system, which is composed of five state agencies, including [the Department]."); Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm'n v. Wolfe, No. 03-08-00413-CV, 2010 WL 2789777, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin July 14, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ("The Texas legislature reorganized several state social services agencies in 2003 and 2004. It created an umbrella agency, the Health and Human Services Commission[, ] and divided it into four departments: the Department of Assistive and Rehabilitative Services[, ] the Department of State Health Services, the Department of Aging and Disability Services, and the Department of Family and Protective Services."). As a state agency, the Department's "powers are limited to (1) powers expressly conferred by the Legislature, and (2) implied powers that are reasonably necessary to carry out the express responsibilities given to [the Department] by the Legislature." Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 253 S.W.3d 184, 192-93 (Tex. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In delegating authority to the Department, the legislature specified that the Department:
shall develop and implement a caseload management system for child protective services caseworkers and managers that:
(1) ensures equity in the distribution of workload, based on the complexity of each case;
(2) calculates caseloads based on the number of individual caseworkers who are available to handle cases;
(3) includes geographic case assignment in areas with concentrated high risk populations, to ensure that an adequate number of caseworkers and managers with expertise and specialized training are available;
(4) includes a plan to deploy master investigators in anticipation of emergency shortages of personnel; and
(5) anticipates vacancies in caseworker positions in areas of the state with high caseworker turnover to ensure the timely hiring of new caseworkers in those areas.Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 40.0529(a); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.016(2) ("'Shall' imposes a duty."). The legislature also provided that in calculating each individual caseworker's caseload, the Department "shall consider" additional factors, including but not limited to "caseworkers who are on extended leave"; "caseworkers who worked hours beyond a normal work week"; and "caseworkers who are on a reduced workload." Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 40.0529(b). Thus, the legislature granted the Department the authority and responsibility to manage its caseworkers' caseloads, both as part of a Department-wide "caseload management system" and in determining how many and which cases to assign to individual caseworkers. See id. § 40.0529; Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d at 467 (legislative branch "may delegate its powers to agencies established to carry out legislative purposes, as long as it establishes 'reasonable standards to guide the entity to which the powers are delegated'") (citations omitted).
Application
Abuse of Discretion
Against this background, we must determine whether the trial court had the power to order the Department to: (1) remove caseworker Boroda from eight cases to which it had assigned her; and (2) transfer those cases to different caseworkers.
As explained above, Chapter 263 of the Family Code requires the trial court to "review the child's status and the service plan developed for the child" and "incorporate the service plan into the orders of the court." Tex. Fam. Code §§ 263.201(a), 262.202(b-1). The term "review" is not defined in Chapter 263. Therefore, we look to the ordinary and plain meaning of the term, with a preference to harmonize and find consistency with the statutory scheme as a whole. Greater Hous. P'ship v. Paxton, 468 S.W.3d 51, 58 (Tex. 2015). To "review" means to consider, inspect, or reexamine a subject or thing. Review, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The inclusion of "review" within the text of section 263.201 allows the court to inspect, consider, or reexamine the Department's service plans. However, absent from that section is an avenue broad enough to allow a court to impose specific staffing requirements on the Department following the court's review of the service plan. To the contrary, the Family Code specifically limits the trial court's review during a status hearing "to matters related to the contents and execution of the service plan filed with the court." Tex. Fam. Code § 263.202(b). As noted above, the primary purpose of a service plan "is to help [parents] provide [their] child with a safe environment within the reasonable period specified in the plan." Tex. Fam. Code § 263.102(b). Because the contents of a service plan primarily consist of goals and tasks to be completed by parents-not the Department-we do not believe the Department's internal staffing decisions fall under the umbrella of "the contents and execution of the service plan[.]" See id. § 263.202(b).
For similar reasons, we do not believe that section 263.202(b-1), which permits the trial court to "render additional appropriate orders to implement or require compliance with the [service] plan," supports the orders challenged here. Tex. Fam. Code § 263.202(b-1). The steps involved in creating, filing, approving, amending, and modifying a service plan are specified by statute. See generally Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 263.101-.105. We see nothing in that statutory scheme to indicate that the legislature intended to permit a trial court to modify the Department's staffing decisions as part of the court's duty "to implement or require compliance with the plan." Compare Tex. Fam. Code §§ 263.101-.105, and Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 40.0529, with Tex. Fam. Code § 263.202(b-1). Additionally, because "[e]xceptions to the constitutionally mandated separation of powers are never to be implied in the least," we do not believe modifying caseworker assignments is a proper exercise of a trial court's inherent or implied powers. See Norwood, 418 S.W.3d at 570; see also Henry, 520 S.W.3d at 37 (trial court "may not usurp legislative authority by substituting its policy judgment for that of the [Department] acting as a legislative body").
The judiciary's "role . . . is not to second-guess the policy choices that inform our statutes or to weigh the effectiveness of their results; rather, our task is to interpret those statutes in a manner that effectuates the Legislature's intent." McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 748 (Tex. 2003). Here, as we have recognized, the legislature statutorily delegated the power to "develop and implement a caseload management system" to the Department. Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 40.0529. We are not aware of any authority-constitutional, statutory, or inherent-that would permit a trial court to substitute its own judgment for the Department's in determining an individual caseworker's caseload. See McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 748; see also Edgewood, 917 S.W.2d at 726 (cautioning that courts' role is "not to judge the wisdom of the policy choices of the Legislature, or to impose a different policy of our own choosing").
For these reasons, we agree with the Department that the challenged orders exercised power that more properly belonged to another branch of government. See Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 40.0529. Because those orders therefore violate the Separation of Powers Clause of the Texas Constitution, they are void. See In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d at 635. Accordingly, the Department has met its burden to show the trial court abused its discretion. See, e.g., Walker, 827 S.W.3d at 840.
Adequate Remedy by Appeal
Ordinarily, a relator must show that it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal to be entitled to mandamus relief. See In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d at 613. However, "[w]hen the trial court's order is void, mandamus relief is available regardless of whether there is an adequate remedy by appeal." In re Mask, 198 S.W.3d at 233. Because we have concluded the challenged orders are void, we also conclude the Department has shown it is entitled to mandamus relief without the need to demonstrate that it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See id.
Conclusion
We conditionally grant the Department's petition for writ of mandamus.