Opinion
WR-95,689-01
07-31-2024
IN RE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Relator
Do Not Publish
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN CAUSE NO. 69441 IN THE 34TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT EL PASO COUNTY
ORDER
PER CURIAM
Before us are (1) the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's (TDCJ's) Motion for Leave to File a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and (2) the accompanying Petition. Because this case involves a death sentence, it was proper for TDCJ to file the motion and petition in this Court. Cf. Padilla v. McDaniel, 122 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Real Party in Interest Tony Egbuna Ford was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in July 1993. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Ford's conviction and sentence. Ford v. State, 919 S.W.2d 107, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Mandate issued April 19, 1996.
Ford has since pursued several postconviction remedies. In February 1998, Ford filed in the convicting court his initial state habeas application under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.071. This Court ultimately denied relief. Ex parte Ford, No. WR-49,011-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2001) (not designated for publication). Ford filed a second 11.071 application in this Court in November 2005, but when the convicting court granted DNA testing under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 64, we dismissed the application without prejudice. Ex parte Ford, No. WR-49,011-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2005) (not designated for publication). Years later, in September 2018, Ford filed a third 11.071 application. We dismissed that application as an abuse of the writ under Article 11.071, Section 5. Ex parte Ford, No. WR-49,011-03 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2019) (not designated for publication). As of the date of this order, Ford has no pending 11.071 applications or Chapter 64 motions.
On March 27, 2024, Ford filed in the convicting court a "Defense Motion for Funding for Genetic Testing." Ford alleged that if he could obtain a specific kind of genetic testing, he could prove that he did not personally shoot the victim in the underlying capital murder case. Ford explained that he had already found a doctor and a lab willing to facilitate and conduct the testing, but that he needed funding from the convicting court to pay for the testing. In light of Ford's motion, Respondent, Judge William E. Moody of the 34th Judicial District Court of El Paso County, Texas, entered an order directing:
(1) "El Paso County [to] pay to [Ford's doctor] . . . the amount of $3600.00 for the collection and assessment of a blood sample from Mr. Ford for [genetic testing]"; and
(2) "[T]he warden of the Polunsky Unit-TDCJ [to] allow access to Mr. Ford . . . by personnel from [Ford's doctor's] office for the purpose of drawing the necessary blood sample for this testing."
For ease of use, we will refer to item (1) of Respondent's order as the "Funding Order" and item (2) of Respondent's order as the "Access Order."
TDCJ, Relator in this proceeding, has come to this Court seeking mandamus relief from the Funding and Access Orders. TDCJ argues that because the convicting court's plenary jurisdiction ended long ago, and because Ford does not currently have an active case or pleading under Article 11.071 or Chapter 64, the convicting court has no jurisdiction over Ford's case. Therefore, TDCJ concludes, the Funding and Access Orders were entered by a court lacking jurisdiction, making them subject to this Court's mandamus authority. See In re Medina, 475 S.W.3d 291, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) ("If a trial judge lacks authority or jurisdiction to take particular action, the judge has a ministerial duty to refrain from taking that action, to reject or overrule requests that he take such action, and to undo the action if he has already taken it.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
In response, Ford argues that the convicting court had jurisdiction to enter the Funding and Access Orders by dint of its statutory authorization to set Ford's execution date. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 43.141; but see also In re State of Texas ex rel. Bill D. Hicks, No. WR-95,092-01, slip op. at 7 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2023) (not designated for publication) ("Article 43.141 did not give the trial court general jurisdiction over matters pertaining to [the inmate's] pending execution.").
Before we rule on TDCJ's mandamus pleadings, we need clarification on two points. First, "[i]t is a fundamental rule of law that only the person whose primary legal right has been breached may seek redress for an injury." Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). In other words, "[o]ne who has not suffered an invasion of a legal right does not have standing to bring suit." Id. at 202. In the civil system, "the party who invokes the courts' jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing . . . standing; it is not the duty of the other side, or of the courts, to negate [it]." See Abbott v. Mexican Am. Leg. Caucus, Texas House of Representatives, 647 S.W.3d 681, 693 (Tex. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. also TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021) ("[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross; rather, plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that they seek[.]").
Under this rubric, it is reasonably clear that TDCJ has standing to challenge the Access Order. By comparison, however, it is less clear whether TDCJ has standing to challenge the Funding Order. Therefore, we order TDCJ and Ford to file responses on the issue of standing, specifically as it relates to the Funding Order. Responses from TDCJ and Ford are due in this Court within thirty days of the date of this order.
Second, Respondent has not yet had a chance to explain his actions. We therefore invite Respondent to put forward his rationale as to why, and by what jurisdiction and authority, he issued the Funding and Access Orders. Respondent may also discuss any other consideration he deems relevant to the appropriateness of mandamus relief in this case. If Respondent wishes to submit a response to this Court, he must do so within thirty days of the date of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED