Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J0801743
Lambden, J.
On October 28, 2008, a juvenile wardship petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 was filed and, subsequently, defendant admitted that she had unlawfully driven or taken a vehicle without the consent of the owner (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). The victim’s vehicle was damaged and not repairable. The parties agreed that defendant would pay victim restitution of $1,875, which represented the difference between the amount of insurance money received by the victim and the value of the car. The victim mentioned additional costs and the court stated that he could claim and prove additional restitution at a contested hearing. The lower court declared defendant a ward of the court, placed her on probation, and ordered victim restitution of $1,875, subject to further restitution as claimed and proved.
All further unspecified code sections refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Following a contested hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to pay an additional $1,419.38 in victim restitution for car rental costs during a period that the court deemed was reasonable for the victim to be looking for a replacement car. On appeal, defendant contends that the lower court abused its discretion in ordering this additional restitution because the victim admitted that he never actually intended to buy a car with the insurance money. We conclude that the lower court did not abuse its discretion and that the restitution order complied with the deterrent and rehabilitative effect of the restitution statutes (see In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1387). We therefore affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
On February 20, 2008, Allan Anthony Silva’s 1990 Toyota Camry was stolen. Two days later, defendant and another person were seen abandoning Silva’s vehicle. Defendant admitted to police that she had driven the vehicle and knew it was stolen.
On October 28, 2008, a juvenile wardship petition pursuant to section 602 was filed, alleging that defendant had unlawfully driven or taken a vehicle without the consent of the owner (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and had received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)). At the hearing on March 19, 2009, defendant admitted the allegation that she had unlawfully driven an automobile and the other charge was dismissed.
Silva testified that his car had been completely “ransacked.” The insurance company estimated the value of the car at $1,500 and determined that it would cost $2,100 to repair the car. The insurance company gave Silva $2,300, but he asserted this amount was less than the full value of the car. The parties agreed that the difference between the amount Silva received from the insurance company and the value of his car was $1,875.
Silva also reported that he had costs associated with renting a car. He claimed that he needed to use a rental car because he had a storage unit in Los Angeles. The court responded that the parties were agreeing to the $1,875 in restitution related “to the damage” to Silva’s car, but were not stipulating to any car rental costs. Any additional costs, according to the court, could be claimed and proved at another contested hearing.
At the end of the hearing on March 19, 2009, the lower court declared defendant a ward of the court. It placed her on probation with agreed victim restitution of $1,875, subject to further restitution as claimed and proved.
The court held a contested restitution hearing on June 8, 2009. Silva testified that the car stolen was a 1990 Toyota Camry, which his father had bought for him in July 2007 for about $3,600. He declared that the car had been in mint condition and gone about 65,000 or 70,000 miles prior to being stolen. He reiterated that the insurance company gave him $2,300 for his car after it was stolen and that he received this sum in early March 2008.
Silva presented evidence of rental car expenses for four periods of time: $1,419.38 paid on May 27, 2008; $967.89 paid n July 14, 2008; $1,705.09 paid on October 24, 2008; and $890.90 paid on December 1, 2008. The total rental car amount claimed by Silva was $4,983.26. Silva maintained that his first car rental bill was for the time that he drove to his storage unit in Los Angeles in April and the bill was for the rental of a car from April to May 2008. He testified that he was in Los Angeles five to six weeks and that he obtained the cheapest rental deal that he could find. The second rental car bill was for a trip to Oregon to visit a sick relative, which began at the beginning of July 2008; the trip lasted about two weeks. The third rental car agreement reflected another trip to Los Angeles, and this trip began around September 22, 2008. The final rental car agreement was for a trip to Arizona that began around November 19, 2008.
When asked whether he had purchased a new car with the money he received from the insurance company, Silva replied that he had not because the amount he received from the insurance company was too little to buy another car. He clarified that he never actually went to look for a car because he did not have a vehicle to drive to used car dealerships and because the insurance money was less than the price of the used cars for sale.
At the end of the hearing, the court explained that it believed that Silva was entitled to rental car costs for “a reasonable period of time” after receiving the insurance money to find a replacement car. It found that a reasonable period of time to find a car was two to three months. Since the first car rental bill was for a period beginning around April 9 or 10, 2008, which was within two or three months of Silva’s receipt of the insurance money in March 2008, the court ruled that Silva was entitled to the $1,419.38 for that car rental bill. The court determined that the other bills were for time periods where Silva should have already been able to find another vehicle and therefore he was not entitled to the amounts for those bills. Thus, the court ordered an additional $1,419.38 in victim restitution.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant does not challenge the original restitution order but objects to the supplemental order of $1,419.38 restitution for the car rental costs. Defendant maintains that Silva was not entitled to that money because the record demonstrates that he never intended to buy a car. Defendant concedes that the court’s order would have been “eminently fair” if Silva had been looking for a car but, since Silva never looked for a car, defendant maintains the court’s determination that he was entitled to rental car costs for the two or three months after he received the insurance money in order to find a replacement car was irrational.
“In 1982, by initiative, the voters of California added a provision to the state Constitution establishing a new constitutional right: the right of every crime victim to obtain restitution from the perpetrator of the crime for losses suffered.” (People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952, 956.) This constitutional provision directed the Legislature to enact implementing legislation. (Ibid.) Section 730.6 is one of the implementing statutes. (In re Tommy A. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1587.) Section 730.6 “governs restitution in cases where a minor is adjudicated a ward of the court pursuant to section 602.” (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1131.)
Subdivision (a)(2) of section 730.6 provides, in relevant part, that the court, upon finding a minor to be a person described in section 602, “shall order the minor to pay, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the law,... the following: [¶]... [¶] (B) Restitution to the victim or victims, if any, in accordance with subdivision (h).” Subdivision (h) of section 730.6 reads in relevant part: “The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record.... A restitution order pursuant to [subdivision (a)(2)(B) of section 730.6]... shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor’s conduct for which the minor was found to be a person described in Section 602, including... the following: [¶] (1) Full or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.”
We review a juvenile court’s restitution order for an abuse of discretion. (In re Johnny M., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132.) The purpose of an order for victim restitution is to rehabilitate the defendant, deter future delinquent behavior, and make the victim whole by compensating for the victim’s economic losses. (In re Brittany L., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387.) The court may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution, as long as it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole and provided it is consistent with the purpose of rehabilitation. (Id. at pp. 1391-1392.)
Here, the trial court’s rationale for ordering restitution was that a victim needing to purchase a new car as a result of the minor’s criminal conduct is entitled to car rental costs for the period it could be reasonably expected the victim would need to find a replacement car. Defendant does not challenge the court’s assessment that a reasonable period of time to find a replacement car after receiving the insurance money is two or three months. Rather, she complains that “[t]he court’s opinion that two to three months would be a reasonable time period to replace a car is irrational, given that Silva had clearly decided not to replace his car.”
Defendant, however, ignores the various purposes for the law on restitution. “[A]side from making the victim whole, restitution serves valid punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative objectives by... helping [the minor] appreciate the harm done to the victim.” (People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1097.) Thus, appellate courts have consistently held that even when an insurance company has paid the costs to repair the damage to a home or vehicle caused by the minor, the trial court should order the minor to pay restitution. (See, e.g., In re Brittany L., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387; People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 246.) “ ‘Requiring the [minor] to make complete reparation to her victims for the harm done to them is more likely to make an impression on the [minor] than simply imposing a statutory fine.’ ” (In re Brittany L, supra, at p. 1387.) Our Supreme Court in People v. Birkett made it clear that trial courts are not to consider whether the victim has been, or will be, reimbursed from third parties in ordering victim restitution. (Birkett, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 246.)
The policy reasons for ordering restitution when a third party pays for the damages resulting from the defendant’s criminal conduct apply with equal force to the present case. Absolving a minor from the responsibility of paying the rental car costs for the reasonable period of time it would take a victim to find a replacement vehicle when the minor’s actions caused the victim to need a new car––simply because the victim chose not to purchase a replacement car––would frustrate the deterrent and rehabilitative effect of the restitution statutes. Silva was entitled to a restitution order that “fully” reimbursed him for reasonable damages resulting from defendant’s criminal conduct and it was immaterial that he did not actually try to buy another car.
We are not aware of any published case involving victim restitution under section 730.6 that addresses the exact fact pattern present in this case.
Here, the trial court did not allow any reimbursement for rental car costs incurred beyond the reasonable period of time it would take a person to find a replacement vehicle and therefore the restitution order was rational and did not provide Silva with a windfall. Accordingly, we conclude that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution of $1,419.38 for the car rental expenses.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Kline, P.J., Richman, J.