Opinion
No. 107619 No. 107620
05-02-2019
In Re: T.C. A Minor Child
Appearances: Timothy Young, State Public Defender, and Timothy Hackett, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant. Michael C. O'Malley, Prosecuting Attorney, and Joanna N. Lopez and Nora Caitlin Bryan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division
Case Nos. DL 16101180 and DL 17104150 Appearances: Timothy Young, State Public Defender, and Timothy Hackett, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant. Michael C. O'Malley, Prosecuting Attorney, and Joanna N. Lopez and Nora Caitlin Bryan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Appellant, T.C., appeals from a juvenile court judgment recommitting him to the custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services ("ODYS") following a parole violation. He claims the following two errors:
1. The Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court acted without statutory authority and erred as a matter of law when it recommitted T.C. to
ODYS for a parole violation for a minimum period of one year, in violation of R.C. 5139.52(F).
2. The Juvenile Court erred as a matter of law and violated T.C.'s right to due process because it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its own valid final judgment.
{¶ 2} We find merit to the appeal and reverse the trial court's judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 3} In Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. DL-15-115008 and DL-15-102106, the juvenile court adjudicated T.C. delinquent for committing several acts that would be felonies if committed by an adult and committed T.C. to the custody of ODYS. Following 16 months of incarceration, T.C. was released from ODYS and placed on parole supervision. Three months later, T.C.'s parole officer filed a complaint alleging a parole violation. T.C. admitted at a parole violation hearing that he violated the terms of his supervised release. The juvenile court found T.C. in violation of his parole, revoked his supervised release, and recommitted him to the legal custody of ODYS for "a period of not less than one year."
{¶ 4} T.C. filed a postconviction motion asking the court to vacate the minimum one-year commitment, arguing the one-year commitment was not authorized by R.C. 5139.52(F), which governs the length of recommitment following parole violations. T.C. argued that under R.C. 5139.52(F), as amended by 2014 Am.Sub. H.B. No. 143 (effective September 19, 2014), the juvenile court could only return a child to the custody of ODYS for "a minimum period of ninety days," and that the court was not authorized to recommit him for a minimum period of one year. T.C. further asserted that only ODYS had discretion under R.C. 5139.52(F) to extend his period of commitment beyond the minimum 90-day period.
{¶ 5} The state did not respond to T.C.'s postconviction motion to modify the disposition. In a judgment entry dated July 5, 2018, the juvenile court granted T.C.'s motion and ordered that he be returned to the custody of ODYS for a period of 90 days. The state did not appeal from this judgment. Instead, the state filed a "Motion to Deny the Youth's Request to Vacate." On reconsideration, the court "granted" the state's request, reversed its earlier decision granting T.C.'s postconviction motion to vacate, and reinstated its original judgment committing T.C. to ODYS for a minimum of one year.
{¶ 6} In its journal entry, the court observed that although 2014 Am.Sub. H.B. No. 143 amended R.C. 5139.52 to impose a minimum 90-day period of recommitment for parole violations, the legislature failed to specify "whether or not the release authority [ODYS] ha[s] the exclusive authority to increase the minimum period of confinement." Therefore, the juvenile court followed the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in In Re H.V., 138 Ohio St.3d 408, 2014-Ohio-812, 7 N.E.3d 1173, that interpreted the prior version of R.C. 5139.52 and gave the juvenile court authority to impose more than the statutorily prescribed minimum period of incarceration. Following the reasoning articulated in In Re H.V., the juvenile court concluded it had authority to commit children "beyond the minimum 90-day period" and ordered its original decision be "reinstated in full force and effect." This timely appeal followed.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 7} We find the second assignment of error dispositive. In this assigned error, T.C. argues the trial court erred and violated his constitutional right to due process of law when it reconsidered its own final judgment, vacated the order granting his motion for postconviction relief, and reinstated the original sentence. We agree.
{¶ 8} A trial court has no authority to reconsider its own final judgments. State v. Carlisle, 131 Ohio St.3d 127, 2011-Ohio-6553, 961 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 1. The state concedes the trial court lacked authority to reconsider its judgment granting T.C.'s motion for postconviction relief. (Appellee brief at p. 4.) Therefore, the trial court's judgment granting the state's motion for reconsideration is a nullity, and we are left with the court's judgment granting T.C.'s postconviction motion.
{¶ 9} An order granting or denying a petition for postconviction relief is a final, appealable order. State v. Carter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106690, 2018-Ohio-4115, ¶ 14, citing R.C. 2953.23(B). Yet, the state did not appeal the court's order granting T.C.'s postconviction motion. Moreover, res judicata bars a postconviction claim that could have been raised in a direct appeal. State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 114, 443 N.E.2d 169 (1982). Therefore, the trial court's judgment granting T.C.'s postconviction motion is not subject to review, even if it is erroneous.
{¶ 10} The second assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 11} The trial court's judgment granting the state's motion for reconsideration is vacated, and the order granting T.C.'s motion for postconviction relief is reinstated.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. /s/_________
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE MARY J. BOYLE, J., and
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR