Opinion
No. 6-046 / 05-1463
Filed March 15, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Gerald W. Magee, Associate Juvenile Judge.
This is an appeal from an order terminating a mother and father's parental rights to their child. AFFIRMED.
Kevin E. Schoeberl of Story Schoeberl, L.L.P., Cresco, for appellant-mother.
Normand Klemesrud, Charles City, for appellant-father.
Rodney Mulcahy of Eggert, Erb, Frye Mulcahy, P.L.C., Charles City, for appellant-intervenor.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Marilyn J. Dettmer, County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Cynthia Schuknecht of Noah, Smith Schuknecht, P.L.C., guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
This is an appeal by a mother and father from an order terminating their parental rights to their child, T.B. The maternal aunt, an intervenor, also appeals. We review terminations of parental rights de novo. In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002).
The child was born in August 1995 and was nine years old at the time of the termination of parental rights hearing. He had been in foster care since February 20, 2004. The mother's parental rights were terminated pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(f) and (l) (2005). The father's parental rights were terminated pursuant to sections 232.116(1)(e) and (f). We need only find termination proper under one ground to affirm. In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). Termination is appropriate under section 232.116(1)(f) where:
(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102.
The mother does not dispute the first three elements have been met, but contends the State has failed to prove the child cannot be returned to her care.
The father argues his rights should not be terminated due to abandonment because the mother kept him from the child. He makes no argument disputing termination was proper under section 232.116(1)(f) and has therefore waived this issue. In re W.C., 489 N.W.2d 40, 41 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992).
We conclude clear and convincing evidence shows the child cannot be returned to the mother's care. The mother has a lengthy criminal record and is again facing the possibility of serving a jail term. She has a long history of alcohol and drug abuse and is currently relapsed. Seven attempts at treatment have failed. The mother also has mental health issues, with a diagnosis of major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar I disorder, and borderline personality disorder, resulting in erratic behavior and a chaotic lifestyle. These problems have plagued the mother over the years and the evidence shows they will continue. A parent's past actions are evidence of the quality of a child's future care. In re K.F., 437 N.W.2d 559, 560 (Iowa 1989). The mother cannot effectively parent her child. Accordingly, termination was proper under section 232.116(1)(f) as to both the mother and father.
For the reasons stated above, we also reject the mother's argument that termination is not in the child's best interest. The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while the mother experiments with ways to face up to her own problems. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa 1997). The child simply cannot wait for responsible parenting. Id. Nor can parenting be turned off and on like a spigot. Id. It must be constant, responsible, and reliable. Id. This mother has shown she is unable to provide responsible parenting. The child needs permanency. Termination is in the child's best interest.
The child's maternal aunt intervened in this case seeking to have the child placed with her. On appeal she contends the court erred in admitting into evidence a handwritten letter from the child. The objection made at trial was that the letter, in which the child expressed his feelings regarding termination, was not relevant. The court admitted the letter for "whatever probative value" it might have. We conclude the letter was relevant and properly admitted.
The aunt also contends the court erred in relying on the testimony of a service provider because she was an unlicensed family therapist. Iowa Code section 154D.4(c) allows persons contracting with the Department of Human Services (DHS) to provide family therapy, even though unlicensed, so long as they do not represent themselves to be family therapists. The provider in question had the title "Family Therapist" printed on her business cards. Any violation of section 154D.4(c) does not invalidate the provider's observations regarding her observations of the mother and child. We find no error.
Finally, the aunt contends "the court erred in not placing [the child] in the legal guardianship of his maternal aunt and Intervenor, S.B." It is unclear if she is arguing the child should be placed in her care in lieu of termination or after termination. Long-term foster care is not preferred to termination of parental rights. In re R.L., 541 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). Termination was appropriate. The court ordered the child placed in the legal custody of the DHS for placement in foster family care, with an appropriate relative, or in a pre-adoptive home. The court did not preclude placement with a relative. We affirm.