Opinion
1:24-CV-4012 (LTS)
08-02-2024
IN RE ERIC TAYLOR
ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Eric Taylor, who is currently held in the Otis Bantum Correctional Center on Rikers Island, brings this action pro se. Because he has not paid the fees to bring this action, the Court understands that Taylor is requesting to proceed with this action without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”).The court has previously recognized Taylor as barred, however, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (“PLRA”) “three-strikes” provision, 28 U.S.C. §1915(g), from filing any new federal civil action IFP while he is a prisoner. See Taylor v. NYPD Bureau, ECF 1:18-CV-0289, 8 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2018); see also Taylor v. NYPD Auth., ECF 1:24-CV-4138, 4 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2024) (noting that one of the strikes listed in Taylor, ECF 1:18-CV-0289, 8, was not actually a strike, but holding that Taylor is still barred under Section 1915(g) by virtue of his appeal dismissed as frivolous in Taylor v. New York City, No. 18-2192 (2d Cir. Apr. 11, 2019)). The PLRA's three-strikes provision provides that:
Taylor's “pleading” commencing this action consists of a personal injury claim form issued by the New York City Comptroller's Office, literature from what appears to be the American Civil Liberties Union, an affidavit of service form, Taylor's own writings, and what appears to be an except from an annotated edition of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action . . . [IFP] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Although the Court understands that Taylor has filed this new federal civil action seeking IFP status, his pleading does not show that he was under imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time that he filed it.Taylor alleges, among other things, the following:
For the purposes of the exception to the Section 1915(g) filing bar, a danger “that has dissipated by the time a complaint is filed,” Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2009), is not an imminent one; rather, the danger must be one “existing at the time the complaint is filed,” Malik v. McGinnis, 293 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2002).
I Eric Taylor feel I'm being made (ward of the State). The State won[']t stop rendering me voiceless I[']m at Rikers Island and they refuse me protective custody taking me out of it. Corrections on Rikers [Island] is mob[b]ed up. No one has perfect rights until after a problem of fights or unclean diseases or sick from food or water poisoning. The[re] are lack luster delay[s]. You[r] every move slow to get you to court (Ponzi). [sic](ECF 1, at 9.) None of the allegations in his pleading indicate, however, that he was under imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of filing. Taylor is therefore barred, under Section 1915(g), from filing this federal civil action IFP. The Court therefore denies Taylor IFP status and dismisses this action without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
The Court denies Taylor IFP status, and dismisses this action without prejudice, under the PLRA's three-strikes provision. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Taylor remains barred from filing any future federal civil action IFP while he is a prisoner, unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of filing. Id.
Taylor is not barred from filing a new federal civil action by prepaying the relevant fees to bring such an action. If Taylor does so, his complaint will be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to dismiss any civil rights complaint from a prisoner if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The court may bar any vexatious litigant (including a nonprisoner) from filing future civil actions in this court (even if the relevant fees are paid) without first obtaining leave from the court. See In re Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 227-30 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing sanctions courts may impose on vexatious litigants, including a “leave of court” requirement).
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter a judgment dismissing this action without prejudice for the reason set forth in this order.
SO ORDERED.