Opinion
No. 345440
04-18-2019
In re A. TAYLOR, Minor.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Kent Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 17-051133-NA Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and SHAPIRO and RIORDAN, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (failure or inability to rectify conditions of adjudication) and (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody). We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from the child's exposure to an incident of physical assault and domestic violence that occurred on April 27, 2017, while the child was in respondent's care. On May 4, 2017, petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), submitted a petition to the trial court to terminate respondent's parental rights, alleging that the child was in a situation of threatened harm and that respondent improperly supervised the child. Additionally, petitioner alleged that respondent admitted that she consumed alcohol and used marijuana on the day of the assault and domestic violence incident. On June 13, 2017, respondent pleaded to the petition, and the trial court accepted respondent's plea.
Petitioner provided respondent with multiple services, including random drug screens; a substance abuse assessment; a healthy relationships class at the YWCA; and counseling sessions at the YWCA related to domestic violence and behavioral therapy. Respondent participated in supervised visits and interacted with the child appropriately. Although the trial court found that respondent demonstrated some initial benefit from the services and made some progress toward alleviating the conditions that led to the child's removal, the trial court found that respondent ceased making progress in February of 2018 and that respondent did not sufficiently address the barriers to reunification with the minor child. Ultimately, the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights to the minor child. This appeal followed.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
Respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence to support the statutory grounds for termination. We disagree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND GENERAL LAW
"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met." In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). " 'If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made.' " Id., quoting MCL 712A.19b(5). This Court reviews the trial court's findings and factual determinations for clear error. MCR 3.977(K); see also In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542-543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). "A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). "Appellate courts are obliged to defer to a trial court's factual findings at termination proceedings if those findings do not constitute clear error." In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90; 763 NW2d 587 (2009).
Termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) is proper when "the conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age." Additionally, termination is proper when the totality of the evidence supports the conclusion that the respondent-parent did not accomplish "any meaningful change in the conditions" that led to the adjudication. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009).
B. APPLICABLE LAW & ANALYSIS
The trial court did not err in finding that there is clear and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The trial court entered the initial disposition order on June 13, 2017. The trial court terminated respondent's parental rights on August 23, 2018. Therefore, "182 or more days" had "elapsed since the issuance of an initial disposition order." See MCL 712A.19b(3)(c).
The primary conditions that led to the adjudication were respondent's substance abuse, domestic relations, and emotional stability issues. First, respondent tested positive for marijuana on multiple occasions during the termination proceedings, including several failures to attend the drug screens. Respondent also tested positive for cocaine after she received substance abuse services, demonstrating that she did not maintain long-term benefit from the services.
She also failed to rectify her domestic relations and emotional stability issues. On May 27, 2017, less than one month after petitioner submitted the termination petition, respondent met with the man who assaulted her in April 2017 in disregard of the trial court's no-contact order. Later, respondent sought to reside with a man who had a history of domestic violence issues. There also were allegations of domestic disputes and violence between respondent and the minor child's maternal grandmother. During these proceedings, respondent demonstrated anger, projected blame to others, and was unable to show a long-term commitment to modifying her behavior.
Further, respondent did not rectify her parenting, housing, and resource availability. Although respondent's interactions with the minor child were appropriate during parenting-time visitations, respondent's decisions to seek drugs and to continue behaviors that led to domestic relations issues, arguments, and suicidal intentions demonstrated that she did not make long-term progress regarding her decision-making skills. Respondent also had failed to secure stable housing for her and the minor child at the time of the termination hearings.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that respondent failed to accomplish "any meaningful change" with respect to the conditions that led to adjudication. See In re Williams, 286 Mich App at 272-273.
Additionally, the record supported the trial court's finding that there was no reasonable expectation that respondent was able to rectify the conditions that led to adjudication within a reasonable time. The trial court presided over this matter for approximately 15 months during which time respondent showed minimal improvement. Beginning in February 2018, respondent's progress ceased. Respondent continued to test positive for illegal substances and failed to attend counseling services at the YWCA. Respondent also demonstrated aggression, dishonesty, a lack of proactive communication with petitioner, and had ongoing domestic relations issues. As respondent failed to demonstrate that she was able to consistently address and manage the conditions that led to the adjudication on a long-term basis, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). See In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 359-360.
Because the trial court did not clearly err by determining that one statutory ground for termination existed, we need not consider whether the other ground cited by the trial court also supported termination of respondent's parental rights. In re Foster, 285 Mich App 630, 633; 776 NW2d 415 (2009).
III. REUNIFICATION SERVICES
Respondent next argues that petitioner did not provide respondent with appropriate and timely reunification services and, therefore, that the trial court erred in finding a statutory basis to terminate her parental rights. We disagree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW
This Court also reviews for clear error a trial court's decision regarding reasonable efforts. In re Fried, 266 Mich App at 542-543. "A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re HRC, 286 Mich App at 459.
Generally, "the [DHHS] has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights." In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) and (c); MCL 712A.19a(2). The DHHS must create a case service plan outlining the steps that it and the parent will take to rectify the conditions that led to intervention and achieve reunification. Id. at 85-86. The case service plan must include, in relevant part, a schedule of services "to be provided to the parent, child, and if the child is to be placed in foster care, the foster parent, to facilitate the child's return to his or her home or to facilitate the child's permanent placement." MCL 712A.18f(3)(d); see also In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 156; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). The parent should be given a reasonable time to make changes and benefit from services before termination of parental rights. See In re Mason, 486 Mich at 159. The trial court should regularly update the plan to account for the parent's progress and developing needs. Id. at 156.
B. ANALYSIS
In this case, the record shows that petitioner provided services to respondent in an effort to reunify her with the minor child. Petitioner offered respondent various services, including random drug screens; a substance abuse assessment; a healthy relationships class at the YWCA; and counseling sessions at the YWCA related to domestic violence and behavioral therapy. The trial court found that respondent made progress for some periods throughout the proceedings but ultimately did not benefit from the services. The record shows respondent began participating in services in May 2017 and ceased making progress in February 2018. Thus, respondent had a reasonable amount of time to participate in and benefit from the services but failed to do so. See In re Dahms, 187 Mich App 664, 647; 468 NW2d 315 (1991) ("[T]he Legislature did not intend that children be left indefinitely in foster care, but rather that parental rights be terminated if the conditions leading to the proceedings could not be rectified within a reasonable time.").
Based on the record, respondent did not demonstrate that petitioner failed to offer reasonable and timely services. The trial court did not clearly err by determining that petitioner made reasonable efforts to reunify the family and that respondent failed to demonstrate benefit from these efforts and services. See In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 90.
IV. BEST INTERESTS
Finally, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by determining that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the minor child's best interests. We disagree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW
"Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012); see also MCL 712A.19b(5); MCR 3.977(E)(4). "[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews the trial court's findings and factual determinations for clear error. MCR 3.977(K); In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 356.
"[A] trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children's best interests." In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. The focus of the best-interest analysis is on the child's interests, rather than the parent's best interests. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 88. The trial court determines each child's best interests individually and, in doing so, "may consider the child's bond to the parent; the parent's parenting ability; the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality; and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). "The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White, 303 Mich App at 713.
B. ANALYSIS
The evidence and testimony presented below supports the trial court's conclusion that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the minor child's best interests. While the child and respondent had a bond and respondent acted appropriately and was prepared during parenting-time visitations, her behavior and decision-making demonstrated that she lacked appropriate parenting skills. She chose to continue using marijuana and failed to sufficiently address her domestic relations issues, even though she knew these issues were barriers to reunification. See, e.g., In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 129-130; 777 NW2d 728 (2009). Respondent also failed to comply with her parent-agency treatment plan regarding her commitment to sobriety and her participation in, and ability to benefit from, the provided services. Additionally, testimony showed that the minor child was "very adoptable" and that adoption would provide permanency for the child. See In re White, 303 Mich App at 714.
We conclude that the trial court appropriately considered the minor child's best interests and it did not clearly err by determining that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interests. See In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42.
V. CONCLUSION
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Michael J. Riordan