Opinion
04-27-2016
In the Matter of TASHEEMA B. (Anonymous), appellant.
Geanine Towers & Associates, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Deborah A. Brenner and Diana Lawless of counsel), for respondent.
Geanine Towers & Associates, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Deborah A. Brenner and Diana Lawless of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Jacqueline D. Williams, J.), dated July 20, 2015. The order adjudicated Tasheema B. a juvenile delinquent and directed her placement in a nonsecure detention facility with the Administration for Children's Services for a period of 12 months. The appeal brings up for review so much of a fact-finding order of that court dated May 12, 2015, as, after a hearing, found that Tasheema B. had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted gang assault in the first degree and attempted assault in the second degree.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The appellant contends that the Family Court's finding that she intended to cause serious physical injury (see Penal Law § 10.00[10] ) was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. Serious physical injury is an element of attempted gang assault in the first degree and attempted assault in the second degree. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to support a finding that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted gang assault in the first degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.07 ) and attempted assault in the second degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.05 [1] ). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Tiyana D.R., 130 A.D.3d 833, 13 N.Y.S.3d 528 ; cf. CPL 470.15[5] ), we nevertheless accord deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Darnell C., 66 A.D.3d 771, 887 N.Y.S.2d 211 ; cf. People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the court's determination with respect to those charges was not against the weight of the evidence (see Family Ct. Act § 342.2[2] ; cf. People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 644–645, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ). The proof adduced supported the court's finding (see People v. Armstrong, 125 A.D.3d 1493, 3 N.Y.S.3d 861 ; People v. Brown, 122 A.D.3d 461, 997 N.Y.S.2d 136 ; People v. Mazariego, 117 A.D.3d 1082, 1083, 986 N.Y.S.2d 235 ).
The appellant was not entitled to a missing witness charge (see Matter of Raymond G., 283 A.D.2d 576, 725 N.Y.S.2d 222 ; Matter of Paul N., 244 A.D.2d 488, 665 N.Y.S.2d 912 ).
DILLON, J.P., AUSTIN, MILLER and LaSALLE, JJ., concur.