Opinion
October 22, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I. INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of a petition filed with the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at New Haven on September 3, 2002, by the department of children and families (hereinafter referred to as the "petitioner" or the "department"), whereby the department seeks the termination of the parental rights of Karen M. and William H. to their minor child, Tage M., who was born on September 13, 2001, and who is currently three years of age. The parents will be referred to herein as mother or father and collectively as the "respondents."
II. HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
At the commencement of trial, the petitioner filed a Request For Judicial Notice dated July 6, 2004, that asked the court to take judicial notice of the history of the court proceedings. No party objected, thus the court granted the motion. The court will, therefore, cite herein only the major judicial events that preceded the trial:
September 28, 2001: The order of temporary custody was granted by the court.
January 7, 2002: Mother was found by the court to be not competent. Petitioner's Exhibit #5.
March 11, 2002: Mother was found by the court to be competent.
May 2, 2002: The child was adjudicated as uncared for with special needs and was committed by the court to the care and custody of the department.
September 3, 2002: The termination petition was filed by the department.
September 16, 2002: The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that continued efforts to reunify Tage with his mother and/or father were no longer appropriate and that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify said child with his parents.
February 11, 2003: The court accepted mother's consent to the termination of her parental rights, found that said consent was knowingly and voluntarily given with the effective assistance of competent counsel and found that termination of mother's parental rights was in Tage's best interest. The court, however, ordered that disposition be stayed pending the conclusion of father's trial.
May 5, 2003: The court commenced the trial of the termination petition relative to father.
June 26, 2003: The court declared a mistrial due to the fact that, during the pendency of the trial father's court-appointed attorney accepted employment by the attorney general, who represented the petitioner.
April 29, 2004: The court ordered that the child's commitment be maintained until further order. The commitment remains in full force and effect.
Father remains vehemently opposed to the termination of his parental rights. The trial was held over a three-day period, July 6th, 7th and 8th, 2004. The court finds that mother and father had appeared and that each parent and the child were represented by court-appointed counsel. The child also benefitted from the services of a guardian-ad-litem. The court has jurisdiction. There is no proceeding pending elsewhere affecting the custody of this child.
As to father, the petitioner alleges, as a statutory ground for the termination of his parental rights, that Tage has been found in a prior proceeding to have been uncared for and that father has failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation, as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering said child's age and needs, father could assume a responsible position in Tage's life. The petitioner also alleges that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship as the same is statutorily defined. See General Statutes Sec. 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) and (D), respectively.
During the trial, the court heard from ten witnesses, including father. Father also called a parent educator and an Advanced Practice Registered Nurse (APRN). Among the seven witnesses called by the petitioner were a visitation supervisor, an evaluating clinical psychologist, a birth-to-three therapist, a parent education project coordinator, the current foster mother, the department's current caseworker and the child's guardian-ad-litem. Twenty-seven exhibits were received in evidence by the court — twenty-one offered by the petitioner and six offered by father. As noted, the court took judicial notice of the history of previous court proceedings.
The court has also taken judicial notice of the three sworn affidavits that resulted in the issuance of the order of temporary custody on September 28, 2001:
(1) Social Worker (Auger) Affidavit dated September 27, 2001.
(2) Social Worker Affidavit (Marotta) dated September 27, 2001.
(3) Affidavit by a primary care registered nurse employed by the Visiting Nurse Association (VNA).
The court, after reading the termination petition and the summary of adjudicatory facts filed therewith, reviewing each of the exhibits, considering the testimony of each of the witnesses, assessing the credibility of all witnesses and considering the arguments of counsel, hereby finds the following.
III. FACTS A. Events That Resulted in the Order of Temporary Custody
Tage was born on September 13, 2001. The department received a referral from the hospital social worker, as the child was considered at high risk due to the mental health issues that affected both his parents. Mother had sought no prenatal care. It was reported that mother was unable to feed or to change the baby, despite repeated instruction and demonstrations by hospital staff. Mother intended, upon discharge, to bring the child to father's residence, however, father was not agreeable as the couple, having been married and divorced after one year, fought often. Both father and mother had a history of psychiatric hospitalizations. Father also had a history of alcohol abuse.
Despite concerns, on September 19, 2001, the child was discharged to mother's care. Mother was provided with a visiting nurse twice daily, and an intensive family preservation worker. During a home visit on September 21st, the department's caseworker (Auger) reported mother's statement that she had not slept since bringing the child home, as she was consuming large amounts of coffee in order to stay awake. Mother was very reluctant to allow the service providers into her apartment; in fact, on September 25, 2001, she ordered the VNA home health aide to leave. Two days thereafter, a VNA nurse made an emergency referral to the department. Mother (when found naked during a visit), told the nurse that she feeds the baby while they are both naked in order to avoid the baby spitting-up on her and the child's clothes. Mother was crying inconsolably and was smoking in front of the baby. Mother told the nurse on September 27th, that she had not slept for three days as the baby was constantly crying. Mother refused to allow anyone to observe her when she fed the child. Mother informed the nurse that she poked holes in the nipple on the baby's bottle in order to make the milk flow faster, as she felt that the feeding was taking too long. Mother reported many arguments with father and complained to the nurse that he was "not supporting the baby." During the visit the nurse took the child's temperature as he felt cold; the child's temperature was 96.7. The nurse expressed grave concerns as to mother's mental status and for the safety of the child; the nurse strongly recommended that the department intervene. A ninety-six hour hold was invoked shortly thereafter. As noted, the court issued the order of temporary custody one day later. The child has been in foster care ever since.
B. As To Mother
Within one month of Tage's removal from her care, mother underwent a competency evaluation that was performed by David Krulee, M.D., a psychiatrist who was appointed by the court to evaluate both parents. The report of mother's evaluation is dated November 10, 2001, and is Petitioner's Exhibit #5.
At the time of the evaluation mother was forty-two years old. She reported that she had five psychiatric hospitalizations since she was seventeen, most of which were followed by no aftercare. She reported that she has been on many different medications through the years. During the interview with Dr. Krulee, mother became increasingly agitated at the evaluator's questions and was "swearing, ranting and raving" over the actions of the department. The doctor reported that mother "giggled hysterically." Mother stated that she objected to the parent aides coming into her home and admitted her threats to "throw them out." Mother made persecutory references to the department, the court, and the FBI. Krulee reported that mother's speech was pressured, that her mood was labile and she became easily agitated. Mother reported that she was not sleeping and that she was awake all night.
Krulee diagnosed mother as suffering from Bipolar Disorder with Psychotic Features, with a Rule-Out diagnosis of Schizophrenia. The evaluator also reported that mother's actions, statements and demeanor during his evaluation were indicative of "residual effects of an acute manic episode." Krulee concluded that mother could not assist her attorney in her own defense and that she was, therefore, not competent. The psychiatrist recommended that mother engage immediately in therapy and that she resume taking her psychotropic medications.
As noted, on January 7, 2002, the court, Jones, J., found that mother was not competent, however that court found that she was competent two months later.
It is noteworthy that mother disclosed to Krulee that father "pushed me, shoved me, and banged my head into the wall." She told the evaluator that she and father resided together as man and wife for seven months only and that they were divorced on October 11, 2000. Mother also indicated that father resided a mere fifty yards from mother's apartment which was located in the same residential complex. Department records indicate that the parties were divorced as a result of the recommendation of their therapists.
Mother has a ninth grade education, has never worked as an adult and is a recipient of social security disability benefits. As noted, mother has a lengthy history of psychiatric hospitalizations. She not only presents with mental health issues but has abused alcohol. Subsequent to the removal of Tage from mother's care, the department reported that mother's compliance with the therapeutic and medical management programs to which she was referred by the department was minimal. In fact, mother ceased attending court proceedings within a month of the child's removal. Mother did not attend conferences held by the department.
Mother's visitation with her new-born son was sporadic. She stopped visiting the child in November 2001, but resumed the visits in April 2002, only to cease visiting him on September 6, 2002. The department reported that during the visits mother was unable to calm the child and rarely held Tage. The department reported that mother was simply unable to discharge parental duties. See Petitioner's Exhibit #5. Among the symptoms that have been reported indicative of her mental health disorders have been persecutorial and delusional thoughts. Among the persons concerned as to mother's failure to engage in ongoing psychotherapy and her cessation of medications is father who, despite his concerns, has continued throughout the pendency of these proceedings to pursue and maintain a close and sexually intimate relationship with her.
Mother has not seen her son since September 6, 2002; as noted, on February 11, 2003, the court accepted mother's consent to the termination of her parental rights.
C. As To Father CT Page 15205
Karen Pelletier was the department's caseworker from September 2001 to June 2002, one month after the child's commitment to the department. At the first termination trial that was held before Judge Turner on May 5, 2003 (Father's Exhibit A), she testified that father first offered himself as a custodial resource for Tage on November 5, 2001. Individual paternal visits were to begin shortly thereafter, however, due to the child's heart disability and resultant surgery, all of which will be hereinafter described, visitation did not commence until January 8, 2002. In addition to visiting with his son, father attended parenting classes and cooperated with the medical management of his mental illness. According to Pelletier, father complied with the specific steps that were issued by the court at the time of the child's commitment. Petitioners's Exhibit #11. Father kept the department informed as to his whereabouts, underwent a substance abuse evaluation, participated in several parent education programs, cooperated with court-ordered evaluations, maintained adequate housing and income and, during the pendency of this case, had no further involvement with the criminal justice system. Pelletier testified that despite father's compliance with the specific steps, the department had significant concerns as to the father's ability to function as a parent and to discharge childcare duties, in light of his significant mental-health history and the symptoms of his mental illness.
1. Father's Psychiatric History
Petitioner's Exhibit #2 is a discharge summary of father's confinement to Connecticut Valley Hospital from May 22 to July 11, 1986. The history contained therein indicates that this was father's fifth psychiatric hospitalization in the past ten years. Father was then twenty-six years of age. Father had been a patient at said hospital in 1985 for seven months. His current admission was as a result of a burglary allegedly committed at a doctor's office, for which father served a period of six months. He was admitted on a fifteen-day Physician's Emergency Certificate from Griffin Hospital. Father refused to take all prescribed medications. A diagnosis was made that he was suffering from an acute exacerbation of Chronic Paranoid Schizophrenia. His speech and his thought were incoherent; he exhibited delusions of grandeur and a marked looseness of associations. Father was discharged after a two-month stay as a result of an order from the probate court after a hearing. The senior psychiatrist reported that father's prognosis was poor, considering a lengthy psychiatric history, a history of drug and alcohol abuse, his noncompliance with medications, and the nature of his schizophrenia.
Petitioner's Exhibit #3 is a report from a psychiatrist at Yale, dated January 14, 1997. Father, apparently, had been referred by Griffin Hospital for a psychological evaluation at the Child Study Center. At the time, father was participating in a five-day therapeutic program. It was reported that he was heavily medicated, his speech was slower and his affect was flat. Father was reluctant to disclose personal information. Father told the evaluator that he felt that the medications were controlling his psychotic symptoms. Father was noted to be "extremely concrete" in his responses and in his communication. Father disclosed to the evaluator that he had experienced auditory hallucinations and serious paranoia from age thirteen to the time of the evaluation, a period of twenty-three years. Father also disclosed a criminal history, including violent behavior, while under the influence of alcohol. Father asserted, however, that he had not had a drink in four months. The evaluator confirmed the diagnosis of a Schizophrenic Disorder and recommended, following discharge from the five-day program, participation in a two-day program to include individual psychotherapy.
Petitioner's Exhibit #4 is a report of a Project Safe substance abuse evaluation in which father participated in December 2001. Father was referred by the department. He disclosed a twenty-year history of alcohol abuse and a ten-year history of drug abuse, including cocaine and marijuana. He claimed that he had not used alcohol in four years and had not used any illegal drugs in eight years. Tests for substances were negative. Father disclosed that he had been in a partial hospitalization program at the Cochrane Clinic at Griffin Hospital for the past two and one-half years and that he was taking Thorazine and Cogentin as the medications that had been prescribed to deal with his schizophrenic symptoms. Father reported that he had completed an inpatient alcohol treatment program at the McCall Foundation, in which he was a resident for thirty days. His discharge was followed by his participation in an outpatient program for two months. At the time of this evaluation, father claimed that he was attending regular AA meetings. No substance abuse treatment was recommended, nor did the evaluator observe any signs of an "acutely active psychotic process."
2. Rehabilitative Services
Since 1999, father participated in the Cochrane Clinic's medical management program that included a minimal therapeutic component. N.W., an Advanced Practice Registered Nurse (A.P.R.N.), who was called by father, testified as to said program. She confirmed the diagnosis of Chronic Paranoid Schizophrenia. She testified that father's mental disorder has been characterized by recurrent exacerbations and remissions. Father, at the time of the trial, had undergone some individual therapy with said nurse for about a year. She testified, however, that she was "not sure" as to why the individual therapy started, however, she later recalled that it may have been suggested by the department. A portion of the department's narrative, offered by the father as his Exhibit D, provides some insight. During a telephone conversation with Pelletier on January 22, 2002, N.W. confirmed that father, at the department's suggestion, requested an increase in the frequency of individual sessions, however, father did not keep the initial appointment, nor did he reschedule. Thus, the increased individual sessions did not commence until nearly a year and a half later. During that telephone conversation, N.W. informed the caseworker that "father suffers from a severe and chronic mental illness" and that the medications had not effectively controlled his symptoms. The purpose of the therapy, according to the witness, was supportive and involved listening to father about his concerns as to Tage's custody and the pending child protection case. Shortly before the individual sessions were increased, N.W. stated to Natalia Rodriguez, the department's current caseworker, that she saw little reason to increase the sessions, as she could not foresee what they would do for father. See Father's Exhibit E. When asked by Judge Turner at the first termination trial to give the reasons for the department's recommendation of individual therapy, Pelletier responded that it was necessary, not only to assess father's parenting ability, but to determine his functioning, in light of his mental illness, so as to identify supportive services.
The individual therapeutic sessions lasted for fifty minutes, "more or less," and were held every two to four weeks. N.W. testified that father continues to take his anti-psychotic medications; the Cogentin had been stopped a year ago, due to side effects that were not described by the witness. Prior to the initiation of the individual therapy, the nurse saw father every two to three months in order to monitor symptoms and to assess the side effects of the medications. These group meetings were followed by a fifteen minute individual session. The witness testified that father kept his appointments and took his prescribed medications. She stated that, although father no longer hears voices, his "loose, tangential and concrete speech has prevailed throughout the time that she saw [father]." Father had left the program several weeks prior to the commencement of the trial as the clinic was about to close.
Petitioner's Exhibit number 16, was offered by both parties. It is a letter from the nurse to the department caseworker dated March 28, 2002. N.W. indicated therein that the purpose of father's visits to her clinical sessions was the management of his psychiatric medications and that the therapeutic component was "fairly brief." Petitioner's Exhibit #17 is a letter from N.W. to father's initial attorney dated December 31, 2002. The nurse indicated that she had been seeing father in individual therapeutic sessions since April 19, 2002, and that father continued to experience difficulty in expressing his thoughts, especially under stress. His speech, according to N.W., becomes "concrete, digressive, even tangential and disorganized." The letter concluded with a reservation — "we do not evaluate our patient's ability to parent," a reservation that was also expressed by this witness at the trial.
Father attended a parenting program at Boys Village, known as "Common Sense" for a period of six weeks in January and February 2004. Petitioner's Exhibit #13. Father attended four out of six of the three-hour classes. As a result of the two classes that he missed, father was not awarded a program certificate until, at a later date, he completed the program.
R.D. testified as the project coordinator of a parenting program, known as "R Kids." Petitioner's Exhibit #14. The participants are non-custodial fathers who attend twelve sessions over a three-month period at ten hours a month; each class is two and one-half hours in length. Most of the participants, including father, are referred by the department. The program instructs fathers on issues such as responsibility, communication with the custodial parent, motivation to stay employed, and instruction as to how to spend quality time with, and show affection to, a child. Father has taken four courses over the past year and one-half. That was "unusual" according to the witness. Father was referred each time by the department. Father had perfect attendance, was always on time and was sincere and active in class. In a letter dated April 30, 2003 ( Father's Exhibit C), the witness stated that father had the "potential to become a good father" and that father "deserves an opportunity to be involved in the life of his son." R.D. testified, however, that he was "not sure" whether father learned what was presented in the classes, as "father tended to see things in black-and-white, as far as parenting was concerned." Father took an "all or nothing" approach as to the raising of a child, as father felt that he should have "full custody or none at all." The classes included parental role-playing. The witness testified that, although he believed that father loves his son, he had concerns as to the father's ability to care for a child on a daily basis. The witness stated that those concerns are the same now as they were a year ago. He added that "father's sincerity was no problem, but how is the concern."
D.K. is a parent educator who coordinates a program known as the 4 C's which is a parent support group consisting of eight sessions of one and one-half hour classes. Father completed this program in December 2003. The witness stated that father followed the rules, was always on time and exhibited a positive attitude. The witness, however, could not say whether father possessed the ability to parent a child.
3. Father's Visits With Tage
As noted, visits between Tage and his father (unaccompanied, by mother) did not commence until two months after father informed the department that he desired custody of the child: The delay was pursuant to medical advice that the department received from the child's treating physicians, due to the child's heart condition that necessitated surgical intervention. Weekly one-hour visits, supervised by the department, did commence in January 2002. At some point they were reduced to one hour every two weeks, presumably after the department formulated the permanency plan. The visits continued until the commencement of trial. This court ordered their continuation, pending the decision on the termination petition.
The department narratives ( Father's Exhibit D) contain certain entries as to the visitation sessions. On February 26, 2002, it was observed that father repeatedly looked at Tage and uttered, "there he is, look at the baby." On April 8, 2002, father reportedly was observed to " constantly kiss and hug" the child. Emphasis added.
As of September 2002, father had attended twenty-one visits. Case worker Rodriguez reported that the child cried most of the time and that father attempted in many different ways to soothe the child. Father would show the child toys, sing songs and feed and change the child, however, according to Rodriguez, nothing worked. Petitioner's Exhibit #18, Page 13. In her testimony before Judge Turner on May 5, 2003, Pelletier stated that, during the visits, father often repeated the same phrase to the child " over and over" and, at times, father was "a little smothering," which caused the department some concern. Overall, however, the child seemed to enjoy father's visits. Fathers Exhibit A, page 21. According to Pelletier, when the department determined the permanency plan of terminating parental rights and adoption, among the factors that influenced the decision were not only father's mental illness and the child's need for permanency, but the observed interactions between Tage and his father. Id., page 22. The caseworker added that the department, in light of the child's heart symptoms, considers him to be a "medically complex child." Id., page 34. Again, the department narratives offer further insight. Father's Exhibit D. On November 17, 2003, it was reported that Tage focused on eating the bananas and the cookies provided by father at the visit. On January 20, 2004, father had presented Tage with a brand-new tricycle. The child enjoyed playing with his new toy and the child, again, enjoyed the banana that father had given him, however, it was observed and reported that whatever the child did in his interactions with father, the child always made sure that his foster mother was close by.
On June 28, 2004, Rodriguez reported that although father interacts appropriately with Tage, father needs guidance on such things as what to feed the child. For example, father gave the child, at various times, shrimp, chocolate, and peanuts, without checking with anyone as to whether the child was capable of digesting said food items or, in the past, had suffered an allergic reaction to any of the items. It was also reported that father was constantly feeding his son. Rodriguez also reported that, due to the constant crying exhibited by the child during father's visits, particularly when the foster mother was not in the room, the department, with father's agreement, commencing in September 2002, allowed the foster mother to remain during the entire visit. As a result, the child, thereafter, was more comfortable with father during the visits and the crying has, since that time, ceased. Petitioner's Exhibit #19.
Lakesha Smith is a case aide for the department. She testified that she supervised most of father's visits with Tage from July 2002 until the trial. She stated that Rodriguez and the child's foster mother arrange the visits, as foster mother brings the child to the visits every two weeks. The situs of the visits is, usually, McDonald's or the department's offices. As noted, since September 2002, the foster mother remains during the entire visit as, according to this witness as well, the child would cry unless the foster mother was present. Smith testified that father has not missed a visit, stays the entire time and is always appropriate with the child. She stated, however, that "the child calls father, nothing" and does not run to father when he becomes aware of his presence. She added that the child calls the foster mother and foster father "mommy and daddy." Although the child shows affection to his father, affection is always initiated by father, not Tage, and, although the child appears to be happy in father's presence, "there are hugs, but no kisses." Again, the child's mood changes drastically to uncontrollable crying, whenever the foster mother leaves the room.
D. As To The Child
Tage was born on September 13, 2001. He was placed in foster care within two weeks of his birth. Shortly thereafter, he was diagnosed with "pulmonary valve stenosis," which is a form of congenital heart disease. In early November 2001, doctors attempted to repair the defective heart valve through a minimally invasive procedure, however, they were not successful. The child underwent open heart surgery on November 15, 2001. That surgery was a success. Tage, due to the mental health disorders that are applicable to both of his parents, is at high risk for schizophrenia. Due to the mental health risks and his heart impairment, the department stresses the child's need for a stable, secure familial environment. Petitioner's Exhibit #18.
As of September 2002, parental visits with Tage took place every other week, under the department's supervision. Rodriguez reported that the child often was "fussy, cries and screams," and that neither father nor mother, who was visiting the child with father, were able to comfort their son.
Upon the child's removal from parental care, Tage was placed in a licensed foster home, where he remained for in excess of eight months. On June 7, 2002, he was placed in his current foster home. As of September 2002, Rodriguez reported that the child was thriving in his pre-adoptive home and was "receiving affection, guidance and encouragement" from his caretakers. Id.
Tage has received birth-to-three services since August 2002. H.P., his therapist, testified as to the child's need for the services offered by this program. In addition to the child's heart condition, Tage has been diagnosed as having Noonan's Syndrome, a genetic disorder that affects height, facial features and may account for Tage's impaired heart. The disorder may precipitate developmental issues. Among the services that the child has received from this program were physical and speech therapy. H.P. testified that Tage has made "tremendous progress"; the physical therapy was terminated and is no longer needed; the child's social skills have improved; and the improvement in his speech is "phenomenal," as the child was able, at the time of trial, to compose three to four word sentences.
The birth-to-three program was established within the department of mental retardation to assist children who may be developmentally delayed and to assist their caretakers. See General Statutes Sec. 17a-248 et seq.
Tage's current foster mother testified as to the child's progress. She stated that when Tage was first placed with her and her husband, he was not sitting up, was not active and did not speak. She attested to the child's "steady improvement," including the development of speech and of memory. Upon the cessation of the birth-to-three services, the foster mother plans to have the child tested by local school personnel. She will follow through with any and all recommended programs or therapies.
As to Tage's health, the foster mother, who is a surgical registered nurse, stated that the child has a heart murmur and that his heart is larger than what is deemed normal for his age. The child may require further surgical intervention during his teenage years. He now sees the cardiologist every two years. The Noonan's Syndrome is viewed by his geneticist as a mild case, however, it has affected his eyes (they are far apart), his ears (they are lower) as well as the size of his heart. Tage is below the height and weight norms for a child his age. The genetic disorder can cause mild retardation and learning disabilities. According to his foster mother, however, Tage is "on target" for his age.
E. Dr. Krulee's Competency Evaluation
In November 2001, father participated in a court-ordered competency evaluation that was conducted by Dr. Krulee. The report of that evaluation is Petitioner's Exhibit #5. The evaluation was prompted by father's mental health history and reported symptoms of his schizophrenia. Although Krulee found that father was competent, his report of the interview with father and his findings are certainly worthy of mention. Father told Krulee that he wanted to take care of Tage "with all my heart," but only in the event that mother could not care for the child. Father disclosed his history of psychiatric hospitalizations to the evaluator that included seven or eight such confinements in addition to the inpatient substance abuse program at McCall. Father indicated that he was in an outpatient program at Griffin Hospital and was part of a medical group that met once every three months. Father told Krulee that he was taking Thorazine and Cogentin to control his symptoms. Father admitted to past symptoms of derailed thoughts and audio hallucinations. Father also admitted to past abuse of alcohol, marijuana and quaaludes He disclosed that he had been incarcerated on two occasions as a result of criminal convictions for assault, burglary and larceny and that he had been convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Father indicated that he had purchased a bassinet and clothing for the child and that he intended to take parenting classes and seek the assistance of the VNA in raising the child. Father admitted to an ongoing intimate relationship with mother. Krulee concluded that father suffered from a Schizophrenic Disorder, Paranoid Type and also suspected an Antisocial Personality Disorder. The evaluator observed that father appeared to be stable with his medication.
F. Dr. Haymes Psychological Evaluations and Testimony
Dr. Michael Haymes is a clinical psychologist who performed the first of three court-ordered psychological evaluations of father on March 12, 2002. Petitioner's Exhibit #7. Each included observation of the interaction between father and Tage. Haymes also testified at the first termination trial and at the trial before this court. At the time of the initial evaluation, Tage was six months old and father was forty-one. Personality testing performed by Haymes, in particular questions relative to child-rearing situations, revealed that father was extremely naive, was not resourceful, and lacked flexibility. Projective drawings revealed, according to the evaluator, a lack of stability and symptoms of paranoia. In his discussion of the circumstances that resulted in the child's removal, father disclosed that mother was awake for twenty-four hours. He explained that the parents had agreed on a childcare routine. Father would come home from work, go to mother's apartment, cook supper and change and feed the infant. Mother was supposed to sleep until 1:00 A.M. at which time father was to return to his apartment. Father complained that mother did not keep the parties' agreement. Father admitted to ongoing sexual relations with mother. Father disclosed that he resided in a one-bedroom apartment and did not have a telephone. He told the evaluator that he moved many times in the last few years. He disclosed that he was employed twenty-five to twenty-eight hours a week; his job was moving carriages at a grocery store. Father also admitted that he was receiving social security disability payments. Father had not driven an automobile in fourteen years. Father disclosed that he was not engaged in any community activities and that he attended church only once. Father disclosed his many psychiatric hospitalizations and the inpatient alcohol program. He admitted that he currently was not attending any substance abuse program and that he had no sponsor. Father told the evaluator that his plan was to co-parent Tage with mother, so long as mother took her medication. A diagnosis was made by Haymes of Schizophrenia, Paranoid type, with current mild to moderate symptoms. The evaluator concluded that father's emotional deficits would impair his ability to discharge childcare responsibilities. The evaluator opined that the child, given his parents' mental illnesses, had a fifty percent probability of having a schizophrenic disorder. Haymes concluded that it was "unlikely that father would rehabilitate beyond his current level of functioning" and reported that "the best thing for the child" was adoption at the earliest possible time. Haymes concluded his initial assessment with the following comments:
[Father] has a serious chronic mental disorder. This structure of his personality and character development is faulty. Despite a very pleasant first impression, and an apparently mild demeanor, he is lacking in basic trust, expects to be exploited, wants sympathy for his feelings and is simultaneously likely to be judgmental about the shortcomings of others. He has significant [anti?] social patterns, even while he is allegedly sober. Overall, he is not stable and will need an unusual amount of structure in his life to maintain semi-normal functioning.
During the interactional session, Haymes observed that father was very nurturing and carried the child in a secure fashion, however, he stroked and kissed the child " more or less nonstop" and appeared surprised when the child spit up after taking his bottle. Father changed the child's diaper, however he put it on incorrectly. Haymes reported that father felt attached to the child and was gentle and affectionate with him. Father appeared, in the opinion of the evaluator, capable of learning basic infant care skills.
Haymes conducted his second evaluation on November 5, 2002, eight months after his first meeting with father. The child was fourteen months of age. Haymes reported that father had been compliant with the court-ordered specific steps, had kept the same job and the same apartment, had installed a telephone, and had obtained his driver's license and purchased a car. He was visiting Tage regularly and was taking his medications. He had joined a church group. Father, however, continued to have unprotected sexual relations with mother. Haymes confirmed his initial diagnosis and reported that father's schizophrenia was "episodic with continued residual symptoms," despite his medications. Haymes reported that father had difficulty holding a normal conversation and was overly abstract, concrete and tangential. At times, father had difficulty thinking clearly and logically. Haymes concluded that, by himself, father lacked the psychological strengths to parent a child, in particular, a special needs child such as Tage. During the interactional session father was relaxed, comfortable and behaved appropriately with his son. Father was sensitive to Tage's signals and showed warmth and intimacy. Father was very accepting of the child, however, according to the evaluator, "the child was only slightly accepting of father"; Tage never smiled and resisted eye contact. Haymes concluded that although father improved in his style and content in relating to his son, the psychologist saw no evidence that the child was attached or connected to father. Haymes reported that father was likable, residentially and vocationally stable and made progress in complying with the court-ordered steps. Father was apparently maintaining his sobriety, however, according to the evaluator, father continued to exhibit schizophrenic symptoms, was socially isolated and was not maintaining an appropriate distance from mother.
On May 13, 2003, during the first termination trial held before Judge Turner, that ultimately ended in a mistrial, Haymes testified that his second evaluation confirmed the findings reported in his first evaluation and "added weight to it." Father's Exhibit B. He testified that father's residual symptoms of schizophrenia were just as clear. He stated that father would hold almost a normal conversation that would "almost always" lead to tangents and irrelevant details with loose associations. He added that such could be confusing and frightening to a young child. He acknowledged that, given father's disabilities, he was "doing really well" and that he was maintaining himself in the community, but opined that " this was as good as it gets, and it's not good enough for parenting." Id., page 14-15. Emphasis added. Despite having been provided with specific knowledge of father's cooperation with the department, completion of parenting courses, his attendance at parent support groups, and his compliance with medications, Haymes testified that his conclusions would remain unchanged. The evaluator stated that, given Tage's special medical condition, a higher level of "parenting awareness skills" would be required to provide appropriate childcare to Tage. Father's testing demonstrated that he was incapable of responding appropriately in "regular parent-child situations"; father would have great difficulty with more complex scenarios.
Haymes' third evaluation took place on February 3, 2004, and consisted of an updated psychological evaluation of father with another parent-child interactional, as well as an interview with the current foster parents and an observation of their interaction with Tage. Petitioner's Exhibit #9. Further personality testing indicated that father was in denial as to having even the most common human failings. Father had a tendency to have concrete and stereotyped ideas about childhood, which, according to Haymes, can have a negative impact on a parent-child relationship and a child's development. Father continued to have an intimate relationship with mother, whom he referred to as "his closest friend"; father had no other friends. Father disclosed his intention to "leave town" after Tage was placed in his care, causing Haymes to be concerned that father, while asserting that he would keep the present structures in his life, nevertheless planned to move from the area. As to father's interaction with Tage, Haymes reported that when the child entered the room, he cried and reached out to his foster mother. Tage would not separate from her. Haymes observed that the child "did not seem attuned to father at all." Father was warm, affectionate, sensitive, and appeared relaxed and comfortable with his son, however, Tage did not return the affection. The child separated from father, without difficulty at the end of the session; he did not look back upon leaving. Haymes observed that "[Tage] related to father as a child his age would relate to a visit with a distant relative, with his parents in his sight." Haymes concluded that father continued to manifest a serious psychological disorder, evidenced by "extremely abnormal" modes of thinking and communication that would be "disturbing and destructive" to Tage. Father remained socially isolated and did not see the need for any additional supportive services. Haymes concluded that father's emotional characteristics "preclude his being able to discharge childcare responsibilities."
During his testimony at the termination trial before this court, Haymes restated the conclusions that he had reached during his three psychological evaluations. He stated that father's diagnosis of schizophrenia is supported by historical background, by testing, and by his personal interview with, and professional evaluations of, father. He stated that father's personality structure is disordered, as he has difficulty in accomplishing goals easily accomplished by most people in society; father makes decisions based on what he wants rather than what is right. His thought disorder is ever present. His characteristic communication would be confusing to any child. Father is unable to understand Tage's needs, other than protection and "mechanical care," such as holding, feeding and changing the child. Haymes saw "no evidence" that father is capable of administering "psychological care." He is unable to empathize with his son, a trait that is absolutely necessary for the child's emotional well-being and essential to a child's learning from a parent. The possession of this trait by a caregiver would be particularly necessary for a child having Tage's facial characteristics and special medical needs who will require a great deal of emotional care and parental empathy. Haymes testified that father has no insight into his own diagnosis, therefore, does not understand that "his thinking and his judgment are off." Although the medications can eliminate the hallucinations experienced by father, they do negate the classic symptoms of father's schizophrenia that are concerning to the evaluator. Services provided by the department and its service providers, including parenting services and instruction, would not alleviate father's parenting deficits; in terms of becoming a competent parent, "father will not benefit from any services." Emphasis added. Father's appointments with N.W. were not orientated toward change or improvement but were purposed to maintain and support father's present psychological status. Father remained socially isolated and had no friend other than mother. Father continued to connect with mother and continued to have an unprotected sexual relationship with her. Haymes testified that he saw "no mutual attachment" between Tage and his father, as the child became quite distressed as soon as the foster mother left the room. Haymes concluded by stating that; " parenting is not doable for father." Emphasis added. His opinion was based on a reasonable degree of psychological certainty.
IV. ADJUDICATION
For the purposes of adjudication, the court is limited to consideration of those events which preceded the filing of the termination petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a particular ground that might be alleged for termination of a parent's parental rights. Practice Book § 35a-7. The commentary to that section allows the court to consider post-adjudicatory evidence in adjudicating the statutory grounds of failure to rehabilitate and no-ongoing parent-child relationship. The adjudication date is, therefore, September 3, 2002. The disposition date is the date that the trial concluded and the decision was reserved, i.e., July 8, 2004.
Since the termination of parental rights results in a complete severance of the legal relationship between a child and his or her parent, terminating one's parental rights has been referred to as "a most serious and sensitive judicial action." In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44 (1990). Since termination involves the ultimate interference of the state in the familial unit and results in a final severance of the legal relationship between child and parent, courts must require strict adherence to statutory standards. See In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 203 cert. denied, 199 Conn. 809 (1986).
A. Reasonable Efforts
Prior to the court's consideration of the statutory grounds alleged by the petitioner to provide the basis for the termination of the respondents' parental rights and prior to consideration as to whether such termination is in Tage's best interests, this court must consider the "reasonable efforts" findings required by General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1). That section provides that in order for the court to grant the termination petition, it must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the department has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the child with the parents. In lieu of that finding, the court may find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
The cited section also states "provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to subsection (b) of § 17a-110 . . . that such efforts are not appropriate." The cited subsection refers to a determination by a court as to the appropriateness of continuing efforts "[a]t a hearing held in accordance with subsection (k) of § 46b-129."
As noted earlier herein, on September 16, 2002, Judge Turner found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify Tage with his father and that continued efforts by the department were no longer appropriate. This finding was made based upon the statutorily-mandated clear and convincing evidence standard, therefore, this court is not required to make this finding a second time. In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. 286, 291 (2001).
Be that as it may, the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates the significant and multiple efforts made by the department to implement reunification services. As earlier described in detail those efforts consisted, inter alia, of referrals to the Cochrane Clinic for individual therapy, numerous parenting education classes, a parenting support group and a substance abuse evaluation. Father has been visiting Tage on a regular basis since the child's recovery from heart surgery. The department has furnished transportation to get father to the visits. He has participated in three clinical evaluations. When further reconnected with his religion and told the department of his desire to have his son baptized, the department enlisted the full cooperation of the child's foster parents. Father attended and celebrated Tage's baptism. The department also cooperated with father by acceeding to this request that the child's last name be changed to reflect that of both his parents. This court concurs with the previous finding that the department exerted reasonable efforts purposed to reunify Tage with his father. The evidence clearly and convincingly reflects those efforts.
B. The Statutory Grounds 1. Failure To Rehabilitate
The petitioner alleges, as one of the statutory grounds to support the termination of his parental rights, that father has failed to achieve that level of rehabilitation necessary to be a responsible parent to Tage. Section 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). Before this court reaches the issue of whether termination of father's parental rights is in Tage's best interests, the petitioner must prove one of the two statutory grounds alleged by clear and convincing evidence. In contrast to custody proceedings, in which the best interests of the child are always the paramount consideration and, in fact, usually dictate the outcome, in termination proceedings statutory criteria must be met before termination can be accomplished and adoption proceedings begun. In re Eden F., 250 Conn., 674, 689 (1999).
General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) allows for the involuntary termination of parental rights when "the parent of a child who has been found by the Superior Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . ." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 229 (2000).
To terminate parental rights for failure to achieve rehabilitation, both prongs of the test incorporated in § 17a-112(j) must be met: one, that the parent has failed to achieve rehabilitation, and two, that there is no reason to believe that the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child. (Emphasis in original.) In re Danuael D., 51 Conn.App. 829, 843 (1999).
Our Supreme Court has defined "rehabilitative" as follows:
"Personal rehabilitation" as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [§ 17a-112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. "Rehabilitate" means to restore [a handicapped or delinquent person] to a useful and constructive place in society through social rehabilitation . . . The statute does not require [a parent] to prove precisely when she will be able to assume a responsible position in her child's life. Nor does it require her to prove that she will be able to assume full responsibility for her child unaided by available support systems. It requires the court to find by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child's life.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 706.
The statute mandates that the court consider "some future date," insofar as parental rehabilitation is concerned, as reasonably achievable, given the age and the particular needs of the children.
In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 179 (1999).
What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis. CT Page 15220
In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 231 (2000).
Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than in any rehabilitation . . . [In] assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.
(Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 254-55 (2003).
Because the parent-child relationship is at issue, all relevant facts and family history should be considered by the trial court when deciding whether to terminate [father's] parental rights.
In re Brianna F., 50 Conn.App. 805, 814 (1998).
At the outset, it should be acknowledged that this case is not about a parent who has refused or has failed to follow the path to rehabilitation as set forth in the court-ordered steps. Nor is this case about a parent who has not cooperated with the department or who has evidenced minimal concern for his child's well-being. In short, this case is not about father's failure to rehabilitate; the case is about father's ability or capacity to rehabilitate. The crucial question is whether father is capable of providing appropriate, safe and nurturing care to Tage, given his chronic mental illness. In reaching the sad conclusion that father lacks the requisite capacity to render the care that Tage requires, this court has considered, not only the ongoing symptoms of father's schizophrenia, but the special needs of the child in light of his heart and genetic disorders. This court has also considered the psychological reports of Dr. Haymes, based upon the multiple evaluations of father that he performed, in addition to Haymes' previous testimony and the testimony given at the trial before this court.
This court has also reviewed the documents and has considered father's testimony as to his improvement in his over-all functioning. According to N.W., father kept all of his appointments, took all of his prescribed medications and, over a time, improved his over-all functioning. When asked to recite specifics, N.W. replied that father had not been "acutely ill" for two years; he had not been hospitalized; he had not been arrested for three years; he has kept the same apartment and a steady job and he completed parenting courses and was attending church. N.W. also pointed out that he cooked his own turkey. Father no longer hears voices, however, N.W. confirmed that his loose, tangential and concrete speech continued throughout her contact with him. Despite the positive progress in his functioning, N.W. could not offer an opinion as to his ability to parent a child.
This court is aware of father's substantial compliance with the court-ordered steps, and his admirable efforts to improve his knowledge and social functioning in the hope of having Tage live with him. Father's Exhibit C contains certificates of completion from Griffin Hospital's partial hospitalization and chemical dependency programs, the McCalls' residential substance abuse program and five different parenting education programs. The court has also noted the favorable letters from father's employer and his landlord. Father has been accepted as a matriculated student into a general studies program at a community college where, according to father, he intends to study child development. He has identified a daycare program for Tage and has pre-qualified to purchase a house with a C.H.F.A./F.H.A. mortgage. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that during the pendency of this case, father obtained his driver's license and purchased a used cab, only to shortly thereafter return the vehicle at a loss, as he did not anticipate the cost of insurance, which he could not afford. Father continued to make payments on a loan relative to that purchase, even though he no longer owned the vehicle. Also, father applied for additional Social Security payments to which, as a recipient of disability payments, he would be entitled if Tage was placed in his custody. The application was denied, as it was premature; the child was not living with father. Father, nevertheless, appealed the decision. The outcome of that appeal is obvious. See Father's Exhibit C.
There is no dispute that father has complied with the court-ordered steps, however, the successful completion of the specific steps does not necessarily negate the petitioner's claim. In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 500 (2003).
When informed of many of father's accomplishments, in particular, his completion of numerous parenting classes, his participation in a parenting group, his ability to maintain steady employment and appropriate housing and his compliance with his medical regimen, Haymes' findings and opinions as to father's ability to provide childcare were not altered. In March 2002, Haymes concluded that father lacked the ability to care for Tage and that it was unlikely that he could ever gain such ability. Eight months later, Haymes concluded that father lacked the psychological strengths to parent his son, especially given Tage's special needs. Ten months later, Haymes testified that father's loose and tangential speech would frighten a young child and that father would not be able to appropriately handle the special circumstances presented by his son's genetic and heart diseases. Ten months after that testimony, Haymes performed his final evaluation of father and opined that father's abnormal thoughts and language would be destructive to Tage. Finally, seven months thereafter, Haymes testified before this court and reconfirmed the psychological findings that he made nearly two and a half years earlier and that he has consistently held throughout his sessions with father. Haymes stated that father was unable to deal with any of the child's needs, beyond his basic needs for safety and food. Haymes added that no services would be successful in alleviating father's parental deficiencies, as they are a direct consequence of his chronic mental illness that, sadly, cannot be altered or improved upon. "The psychological testimony of professionals is rightly accorded great weight" in termination cases. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 707 (1999). It is quite appropriate for this court to consider Haymes' reports and testimony in assessing whether father's mental deficiencies preclude his ability to render appropriate childcare. In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. 598, 605 (1987).
This court has read the letter from Dr. Sreenivasan, a psychiatrist who interviewed father shortly before the commencement of trial and was not called to testify. Father's Exhibit F. Sreenivasan did not observe an "overt thought disorder or delusional thinking," although he reported that father had "minimal insight." The psychiatrist confirmed the long-standing diagnosis of chronic paranoid schizophrenia. He reported that father was "stable." That report, however, was based on one interview with father for the purpose of admitting him into a medical management program similar to that at Griffin Hospital. That report does not, in this court's view, negate the observations reported and opinions offered by Haymes, based on three extensive professional evaluations that were conducted over a period of two and one-half years, observations and opinions that were testified to at the trial and were, therefore, subject to cross examination and this court's scrutiny.
As previously discussed herein, N.W., who was called by father and who maintained a clinical relationship with him for five years, could not and would not offer any opinion as to the father's ability to parent a child. She had stated to the department's caseworker that an increase in the frequency of individual counseling would not alter the symptoms of father's "severe and chronic" mental illness, symptoms that she confirmed prevailed throughout her clinical contact with father. As also previously noted, the R-Kids coordinator expressed concerns as to the father's ability to render appropriate childcare, given his concrete approach relative to such issues, as evidenced by role-playing scenarios.
Given father's extensive mental health history, the continuation of significant symptoms of the schizophrenia, and his ongoing relationship with mother, a court would be justified in finding that father would be unable to render appropriate childcare to a child of normal physical and mental health. This court, however, must consider the special health-related circumstances of Tage — a child with a genetic disorder that is evidenced by abnormal physical traits and a child who, because of his parents' mental illnesses, has a fifty percent risk to develop schizophrenic features.
This court must also consider, in dealing with the second prong of the rehabilitation test, the fact that Tage has been in foster care since he was two weeks old, he is now three years of age and is happy, content and thriving in his pre-adoptive foster home. He refers to his foster parents as his "mommy" and "daddy" and calls them by those names. The foster parents are the ones to whom the child turns for nurturing, protection and comfort, as testified to by Rodriguez and confirmed by Dr. Haymes' interview with the foster parents and his observation of Tage's interaction with them. Petitioner's Exhibit # 9. Haymes testified that the foster parents are "the most significant persons" in the child's life and that "they are the basis of his emerging identity." Haymes stated that Tage's removal from their care, would be "destructive" to the child.
This court has absolutely no doubt that father loves his son and has no doubt that he would protect him and be devoted to him. Father is highly motivated to have Tage live with him, however, the petitioner has clearly and convincingly proven that father lacks the ability, given Tage's special needs, to discharge childcare responsibilities. Due to his chronic mental illness and to the resultant symptoms that father continues to exhibit, he did not possess the capacity to parent his son at the time that the termination petition was filed in September 2002, and, due to his mental illness, will not develop that capacity in the foreseeable future, if ever. Given father's mental disorder and Tage's special needs, father is not capable of achieving a level of rehabilitation that would be necessary to assure the child's proper parental care and guidance and his psychologically healthy development.
This court is painfully aware how difficult it will be for father to accept the court's findings in this regard. There is no question that despite many psychiatric hospitalizations, father has made significant progress in controlling the most disabling symptoms of his schizophrenia and in overcoming his alcohol addiction. He has achieved a level of stability that is admirable, given his chronic illness and psychiatric history. There is no doubt that he loves Tage dearly. Sadly, however, despite that love and despite father's progress in the maintenance of his own life, he is not capable of administering the level of parental care and guidance that Tage requires. In re Eden F., supra. 707.
This court, therefore, finds by clear and convincing evidence, that father has failed to rehabilitate and that, considering Tage's age and special needs, there is no reason to believe that father possess the ability or capacity to do so in the foreseeable future. The petitioner has satisfied both prongs of the rehabilitation test.
2. Ongoing Parent-Child Relationship
As an alternative statutory ground, the petitioner alleges that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between Tage and his father. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) provides that the court may grant a petition to terminate parent rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that "there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child . . .
"This part of the statute requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent . . . Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).
However, in cases such as this, that involve the development of a parent-child relationship between a parent and child who has been removed from parental care within two weeks of his birth, this court must consider the positive feelings of father toward Tage. This court must also consider the quality of the observed visits between Tage and his father, in light of father's limited access to his son, while he has been in foster care. In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 425 (2001). Unlike the father in that case, the separation of Tage from his father was not caused by his criminal conduct, resulting in his incarceration; the department was compelled to intervene in this case as a consequence of mother's bizarre conduct. Father has, from the day he decided to pursue the custody of his son, until the commencement of the trial before this court, exhibited nothing but positive parental feelings. He has visited Tage whenever the department permitted, at first, with mother one time per week, then, after the termination petition was filed, once every two weeks. He has consistently provided food, clothing and gifts to the child. He has, as described herein in detail, taken numerous parenting courses in the hope of learning and being able to apply proper parenting techniques. He has significantly improved his own functioning. Father has clearly demonstrated concern for Tage's well-being. He clearly loves his son and demonstrates his love and affection when he is with the child.
This court has seen no evidence that father attempted to increase the frequency of his visits, either by requesting an administrative hearing or by filing an appropriate motion with the local Juvenile Court.
Father has not demonstrated the lack of contact, lack of care, and lack of effort that has been consistently judicially held to establish this statutory ground. On the contrary, everything that father has done during the pendency of this case has been motivated by one single goal, i.e., his reunification with his son.
The petitioner, as evidence of the non-existence of an ongoing parent-child relationship, argues that father's relationship with Tage is more akin to that of a family friend who visits, rather than a parent. The evidence clearly demonstrates that Tage is comfortable with father, so long as the foster mother is within the child's view. The evidence clearly shows that father nearly smothers the child with affection and constantly repeats himself in the child's presence. The evidence clearly shows that father is unable to stop the child's cries, unless the foster mother is near. Although the evidence establishes that father is relaxed and comfortable with Tage and behaves appropriately, the child, according to Haymes, is only "slightly accepting" of his father. A narrative entry on April 30, 2003, relates father's unsuccessful attempt to have the child call him "dada." The child remained quiet. Father's Exhibit D.
Father told Haymes in February 2004 that he thought that the child saw father as a "new playful friend for him." Petitioner's Exhibit #9. Father testified that Tage eats the food that father brings to the visits, and enjoys the playing and that the child kisses him "once in a while." The foster mother has recently informed Tage, who is beginning to question the visits, that father is a "very special person who wants to see him." Since then, Tage is more accepting of the visits and now refers to father as "Billy." The foster mother stated that the child enjoys the food and the play. She did not object to the continuation of the parental visits, pending this court's decision. She testified that, in recognition of father's love for Tage, she has attempted to create a bridge between her and father, with a view toward continued contact in the event that the court terminates the parental rights of the respondents.
Although Tage does not know his father as his father, father certainly knows Tage as his son. The ordinary usage of the term "parent" means "one that begets or brings forth offspring." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 515 (1992). Father, as a parent, has demonstrated consistently positive and caring feelings for his son. His behavior during the pendency of this case is reflective of his parental love and his concern for Tage's well-being. Given the child's removal at infancy, father had no opportunity to form a bond or connection to Tage in the manner that a child would form a bond with his or her psychological parent. The loss of that opportunity, however, was not caused by father. Given that fact and the positive feelings demonstrated by father toward his son, this court cannot find, by clear and convincing evidence, the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship, especially, in light of the principles set forth by Justice Borden in Valerie D. and reconfirmed by Judge Dranginis in Alexander C.
As to the second prong, under this statutory ground, unless the petitioner has satisfied the first prong, i.e., that no parent-child relationship exists, the court cannot consider whether it would be contrary to Tage's best interest to allow more time to establish a parent-child relationship. However, had this court considered the second prong, the court would be permitted, not only the consideration of the child's best interest, but would be obligated to consider four specific factors: (1) the length of stay with the child's foster parents, (2) the nature of the child's relationship with his foster parents, (3) the degree of contact maintained with father, and (4) the nature of the child's relationship with father. In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 22 (1993). Emphasis added. As discussed in detail in the following portion of this memorandum, had the court been permitted to consider Tage's best interest and had the court been allowed to make findings relative to the above four factors, those findings would weigh heavily in favor of the petitioner.
V. DISPOSITION A. The Child's Best Interest
Now that the court has found in the adjudication stage that the petitioner has proven one of the statutory grounds alleged by clear and convincing evidence, this court must consider whether termination of the parental rights of the respondents is in the best interest of the child. The burden remains with the petitioner who must convince the court that termination is, in fact, in Tage's best interest. In making its determination as to best interest, the trial court may take into account not only events preceding the filing of the present petition, but may consider all events up to the conclusion of the trial. Practice Book § 35a-9. Each case must be decided on its particular facts and circumstances as it has been held that the determination of whether to terminate parental rights is a highly fact-specific process. See In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 244, 254 (2000).
The desire and right of a parent to maintain a familial relationship with a child cannot be separated from the desire and best interest of a child either to maintain or to abandon that relationship, or the interest of the state in safeguarding the welfare of children. These legitimate interests of parent, child and state require a balancing of the factors involved in those interests.
In re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn.App. 592, 598-99 (2001).
In every case involving parental rights, a struggle exists between parents and the state to determine what is in the child's best interest, the child being the focus of the struggle.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Dorrell R., 64 Conn.App. 455, 467.
The trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining what is in the child's best interests.
Schult v. Schult, 241 Conn. 767, 777-78 (1997).
The ultimate standard underlying the whole statutory scheme regulating child welfare is the best interest of the child.
In re Tyqwane V., et al. (AC 24026), released October 12, 2004.
Conducting a best interest analysis is not a narrow concept restricted to a compelling reason [keeping a parent in a child's life] or to fully reuniting the parent with the child. Rather, it is purposely broad to enable the trial court to exercise its discretion based upon a host of considerations.
In re Allissa N., 56 Conn.App. 203, 208 (1999) cert. denied, 252 Conn. 932 (2000).
The parent has only one interest, that of family integrity; the state has only one compelling interest, that of protecting minor children. The child, however, has two distinct and often contradictory interests. The first is a basic interest in safety; the second is the important interest, discussed above, in having a stable family environment.
(Citations omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal, (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 286 (1983). Emphasis added.
In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 261 (2003).
"The primary concern all of [the department] is the safety of [the child] . . . Where appropriate the agency can and must take unilateral action, either to reunite families or to terminate parental rights as expeditiously as possible to free neglected children for placement and adoption in stable family settings." . . . It is indisputable that protecting the physical and psychological well-being of children is a compelling, as well as legitimate, state interest." In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 258 and 260 (2000).
General Statutes § 45a-727a delineates the state policy concerning the best interest of the child.
(1) The best interests of a child are promoted by having persons in the child's life who manifest a deep concern for the child's growth and development; (2) the best interests of a child are promoted when a child has as many persons loving and caring for the child as possible; (3) the best interests of a child are promoted when the child is part of a loving, supportive, and stable family whether that family is a nuclear, extended, split, blended, single parent, adoptive or foster family . . .
In the case of In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167 (2000). The court states: "the best interests of the child includes the child's interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of its environment." (Emphasis added.)
Once the petitioner has proven a statutory ground by clear and convincing evidence, it is proper for the court, in assessing the child's best interest, to consider the circumstances of the proposed adoptive parents and the suitability of the permanent placement of the child with them. In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 666 (2001).
B. As To Mother
As noted, on February 11, 2003, the court (Turner, J.), accepted mother's consent to the termination of her parental rights. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that it was in Tage's best interest to terminate his mother's parental rights. This court finds that the evidence clearly and convincingly justifies that previous finding.
There is no question that the action of the department in removing Tage, at two weeks of age, from his mother's care was justified and was mandated by mother's bizarre conduct and reluctance to cooperate with various supportive agencies that were involved in an attempt to keep the child with mother. As also noted, mother's visits with the child were intermittent and sporadic. She has not seen her son in over two years, yet she, nevertheless, continues the relationship with the child's father. Father has expressed concern to the department caseworker and to Haymes about mother's behaviors when she is not taking her medications. This court, given mother's mental illness, her extensive psychiatric history and her failure to comply with medical and therapeutic recommendations, would have great concern as to the child's safety and well-being, in the event that mother would reinsert herself into Tage's life, a frightening prospect that, most probably, would be realized if the child were placed with father. The petitioner has clearly and convincingly proven that the termination of mother's parental rights case is in Tage's best interest.
C. As To Father
The sole basis upon which the department seeks to terminate father's parental rights is his mental illness and the resultant impact of his paranoid schizophrenia on his child-rearing capacity and abilities. Despite father's many achievements in complying with the court-ordered steps and in improving his social functioning, all of which have been acknowledged and discussed herein, concerning symptoms of his mental illness continue. Although his hallucinations and acute psychiatric episodes, which have precipitated many psychiatric hospitalizations, are satisfactorily controlled by his anti-psychotic medications, pills do not and cannot eliminate or alter his thought and communication disorders that would profoundly and adversely impede Tage's orderly development. As Haymes stated, father's concrete and tangential speech, a product of his thoughts, would be frightening and confusing to a child. Although father has demonstrated an ability to satisfy the child's basic needs by administering "mechanical care," he is unable, due to his mental disease, to deliver the "psychological care" essential to the healthy development of any child, but, most importantly, critical to that of a child with special needs.
Our courts have consistently held that termination of the parental rights of a parent whose mental deficiencies preclude the discharge of appropriate childcare responsibilities, is in a child's best interest. In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 473 (1999). Father has done whatever he could to improve his own functioning. During his testimony, he listed his accomplishments, recognized and described earlier herein. He stressed his financial ability to raise the child, his many parenting classes, his acceptance into college, and his continuing relationship with Tage, that is maintained by him with the aid of the food, toys and clothing that he brings to the visits. As stated by Haymes, what father has accomplished, may have stabilized his own life, but it is " as good as it gets," as father is not capable of rendering more than mechanical care to a child who is in need of much more. As so aptly stated by Judge Brenneman in In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477 (1997):
Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; It is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying [him] a safe permanent home with proven competent caretakers because [his] biological [father] has tried hard, but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for [him].
According to Haymes, who, as noted, has spent a significant amount of time over the years in assessing father's overall functioning and parenting capacity, father cannot improve upon what he has accomplished to a level at which he would be able to render to his son the parental care of the kind that would be essential to the child's healthy psychological development. His serious and chronic mental health disorder precludes his ability to do so. In re Eden F., supra, 706. Father's achievement of some stability in his own life cannot and does not in this court's view, portend his ability to provide Tage with a stable familial environment. Moreover, father's continuing intimate connection with mother poses a significant risk, not only to Tage's healthy development, but to the child's safety and well-being should father be granted custody of his son.
As stated earlier herein, this court has no doubt that father loves his son and feels a bond with him. Our courts, however, have held that a finding of a bond or connection between parent and a child is not sufficient reason to find that termination of that parent's rights is not in the child's best interest. In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 106 (2000); also see In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 667 (2001); cert. den'd 295 Conn. 950 (2001). Courts have applied this principle to a two-way parent-child bond. In this case, the observed interactions between Tage and his father, both during professional evaluations and during visits, clearly demonstrate that the bond that exists between this child and his father is one-way only. Father initiates hugs and kisses and speaks affectionate words; the child rarely reciprocates to his special friend, "Billy." This court is compelled to agree with Haymes' testimony during the first termination trial that, as to father, "the best thing for him might be to have the child, but it wouldn't be the best thing for the child." Father's Exhibit B., page 18.
D. As To The Child
Tage has recently reached age three. Except for two weeks immediately after his birth, he has been in foster care for his entire young life. He has resided in his current pre-adoptive foster home since June 2002, a period of two years and four months. He is a medically fragile child due to his heart and genetic disorders. He is at significant risk of developing a mental disorder due to his parentage. His genetic disorder could precipitate learning disabilities and developmental delays. Haymes reported that the foster mother, who is a registered nurse and who has apparently studied the subject, told the evaluator that Noonan's Syndrome can lead to hearing difficulties and kidney disfunction. He has qualified for and has received birth-to-three services and will, most likely, require special education services. His heart disorder, despite surgical intervention as an infant, may necessitate heart surgery when he reaches his teens. Currently, Tage experiences intermittent episodes of regurgitation of oxygenated blood due to his heart stenosis. The child continues to suffer painful bowel movements for which he is on a special diet. Petitioner's Exhibit #9.
Tage is clearly a child who has a special need for a loving, nurturing, stable, familial environment and a specific need for caretakers who have the understanding of all of the child's needs, and the capacity to react promptly and efficiently in response to whatever childcare difficulties they may encounter. The testimonial and documentary evidence has shown that father does not have the capacity to respond to Tage's needs, while the child's current caretakers have demonstrated that they possess the necessary parenting skills to deal effectively with whatever the circumstances may present. The foster parents have professed their love for Tage and have demonstrated a total and permanent commitment to his growth and well-being. They wish to adopt Tage as their only child.
The foster mother is a surgical nurse who works only one day per week, and is, therefore, available to the child for most of the time. She stated that the child runs to greet his foster father when he arrives home from work. She explained that the child requires a lot of attention and cries often. She added that he is "very adventurous" and that she and her husband must "watch him like a hawk." She testified that she and her husband are well aware of the substantial risk that the child will present with mental health issues, in addition to his physical impairments. She stated that risk made no difference, as she and her husband are permanently committed to Tage. Long before a subsidized adoption was approved (on the eve of trial), due to the medical fragility of the child, the foster mother told Haymes that the prospect of governmental assistance had no impact on their resolve to raise Tage. The birth-to-three therapist testified that the child calls foster mother and foster father, "mommy" and "daddy"; they are "very affectionate" with Tage. She stated that based upon her contact with the family, Tage is "safe, secure and comfortable" with his pre-adoptive foster parents.
During his evaluation in February 2004, Petitioner's Exhibit # 9, Haymes interviewed the foster parents and reported his observations of the child's interaction with them. Haymes reported that the child was "comfortable, relaxed and accepting" of both foster parents. He noted that there was a good deal of touching and mutual affection between them and the child. Both were working hard to understand and improve upon the child's speech difficulties. Tage and his foster parents exhibited "mutual pleasure, enjoyment and happy moods." Haymes reported that the power and control that the foster parents asserted was done in a calm, confident and appropriate manner. He observed that Tage became distraught on any attempt to separate him from his foster mother. Haymes concluded that the child should be adopted by his foster parents and should not be placed with father. Moreover, the evaluator opined that in the event that the child's current placement were lost, which would be "tragic and destructive" to Tage, the child would be "psychologically safer" with another foster family, rather than residing with his father.
Attorney Thomas Mitola, who was appointed guardian-ad-litem only thirty days prior to the commencement of trial, has practiced juvenile law for fourteen years. He testified that in preparation for the trial, he reviewed all of the court documents, met with the foster parents, met with the child and his father and observed an interaction between Tage and his father for over an hour. He testified after reviewing all the exhibits introduced into evidence, and after hearing the testimony of all the witnesses. The observed visit between Tage and his father took place at a local McDonald's. At one point during the visit, the foster mother went to her car. When the child noticed that she was no longer in his vicinity, Tage cried out for his "mommy" and ran from father to find her. Once father pointed to the foster mother, whom the child then saw through the window, the child calmed down. Atty. Mitola testified that the relationship between Tage and his father appeared to him to be that of a distant relative. The child was mostly interested in eating french fries; too many at one time were allowed by father. The child played with the football that father had brought him. At another point during the visit, the child became frightened by a mop and, again, immediately ran from father to look for the foster mother. The guardian-ad-litem testified that he saw no reciprocal affection by Tage to father and that the child showed no reluctance to leave when the visit was over. Atty. Mitola testified to his belief that it was in Tage's best interest that he be adopted by the foster parents.
E. The Child's Need For Permanency
As recently as July 27, 2004, our Supreme Court in the case of In re Jeisean (SC 17012), again, stressed the importance of permanency in a child's life. "Virtually all experts, from many different professional disciplines, agree that children need and benefit from continuous, stable home environments." The court stated that the delay in placing a child in a permanent home is inconsistent with the child's best interest, citing In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 646 (1980). Protracted foster care, and the uncertainty that permeates a child's life as a result thereof, has long been recognized by our courts as something to be avoided. In re Samantha B., supra, 479; In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 19 (1999). "The state's primary interest in terminating parental rights is to free the child for adoption or to free the child of uncertainty. In re Jeisean, supra, Part II B.
Father asks this court to deny the petitioner's request to terminate his parental rights and to allow the child to remain in foster care, so that father can improve upon his relationship with the child and be given an opportunity to form a parental bond, apparently, via increased contact with the child and supportive services. This court agrees with Haymes' observation that such might be best for father, however, it is not what is in Tage's best interest. In this court's view, long-term stability, a goal whose achievement is critical to Tage's healthy development, cannot be achieved with father. In re Eden F., supra, 709. Adoption of this child by the foster parents, who, unlike father, understand and have the ability to deal appropriately with his special needs presents the best alternative for the attainment of that goal. In re Dorrell R., 64 Conn.App. 455, 467 (2001).
Implementing a permanency plan of long-term foster care, by not terminating father's parental rights, given the characteristic uncertainty of that plan will seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the close, loving and nurturing relationship that Tage has forged with his foster parents. In this court's view, the loss of this current placement would spell disaster for this special needs child. Unfortunately, father's symptomatic concrete, one-track thinking will not permit him to accept the close parental bond that exists between Tage and his foster parents. Father told Haymes, after the evaluator described that bond, that any love demonstrated by the foster parents was "artificial." Father rejected any thought of an open adoption and saw no reason for any contact between Tage and his foster parents in the event that the child was placed with father. What may prove to be fortunate for father is the fact that foster mother looks at relationships from a healthier and broader perspective. She continued, to the time of trial, to make the forty-five minute trip to bring the child to the visitation situs; when asked by the court whether she supported continued visits, pending the court's decision, she answered in the affirmative. As noted, she attempted to form a relationship with father that would allow post-termination contact, however, father, apparently due to his dislike of the department, according to the foster mother, vowed "to fight to the end" to gain full custody of his son. The foster parents understand and appreciate father's love for Tage; father is critical of and fails to comprehend the love that the foster parents have for Tage and, most importantly, the love that Tage reciprocates to them.
Based upon the totality of the circumstances and relationships, as described in detail herein, this court, therefore, finds that the petitioner has proven, by clear and by convincing evidence, that the termination of the parental rights of both father and mother and the subsequent adoption of Tage by his foster parents is in this child's best interest. Hopefully, the appreciation that foster parents have for father's love for his son will propel them to permit post-termination contact. This court, however, has no legal authority to order such contact. That decision will be left entirely up to his caretakers and, until the adoption is accomplished, the department.
VI. THE STATUTORY FACTORS
In a non-consensual termination, the court, in deciding whether termination of a parent's parental rights is in a child's best interest, is mandated to consider those factors provided in General Statutes Sec. 17a-112(k). Proof of each factor by clear and convincing evidence is not required. In re Quanitra M., supra, 104. This court, therefore, in deciding to terminate the parental rights of father, has considered the following:
1. The timeliness, nature and extent of the services offered.
The services offered to father by the department were timely and were appropriate. Their purpose was the unification of Tage with his father. Included among those services were a substance abuse evaluation, individual counseling, parenting classes, parenting group programs, transportation to the supervised visits with Tage, case management services and professional evaluations. The department has maintained the child's physical health and has provided the child with birth-to-three services and appropriate foster care. Notably, the department continued to refer father to mental health service providers and to parenting programs long after the court found (on September 16, 2002) that continued efforts at reunification by the department were no longer appropriate.
2. Reasonable efforts to reunite.
This court has earlier addressed, in detail, the efforts by the department to deliver the services purposed to reunify Tage with his father. This court has also described in detail the reasons that such efforts proved unsuccessful in that father's mental health impairment precludes any ability to deliver the childcare that would be appropriate to Tage's special needs.
3. Fulfillment of court-ordered obligations.
As previously described herein, father complied with the court-ordered specific steps. Father took his medications, attended the medical management conferences, took numerous parenting classes and joined parenting support groups, as well as a church group. Father visited Tage whenever the department would allow and was appropriate with the child during the visits. He maintained stable housing and was able to keep steady employment. Father has had no further involvement with the criminal justice system. Father has improved his social functioning and has achieved an admirable level of stability in his own life, however, as also discussed herein, the symptoms of his paranoid schizophrenia continue to present themselves. Sadly, his concrete and tangential thinking and communication will not allow him to deliver more than mechanical care to Tage, a child who requires much more. As noted, according to Haymes, father's abnormal thoughts and speech would be damaging to this child, if he were placed with his father.
4. The feelings and the emotional ties between the child and his father and between the child and his foster parents.
As stated by several witnesses, Tage enjoys the visits with father, so long as the foster mother is near. When the child is startled by any occurrence, he immediately looks for his foster mother, and upon seeing her, leaves father and runs to her. Tage enjoys the food and the toys that father gives him, however, the child rarely returns the affection that father constantly offers. Witnesses have described the parent-child visitation interaction as more akin to a visiting relative.
On the other hand, Tage considers the foster parents as his mother and as his father. According to Haymes, they are the most important persons in the child's life and are the basis of his emerging identify. They have provided safe and nurturing care to this child and have met his every need. Tage has thrived while in their care. The foster parents, who are committed to adopt the child as their own, have professed their love and are very affectionate with him; Tage returns that love and affection. This court agrees with Haymes' cautionary statement that the removal of Tage from his current familial environment would be "destructive" to this child.
5. The age of the child.
Tage is currently three years of age and has been in foster care, but for two weeks subsequent to his birth, for his entire life. He has resided with his pre-adoptive foster family since June 2002 and he has bonded with his foster mother and father. To Tage, they are his parents and their home is his home. Permanency for this child is long overdue and is critical to his psychological well-being and healthy growth and development. Adoption by his foster parents is clearly in this child's best interest.
6. Father's effort to adjust his circumstances, conduct and conditions.
As acknowledged and described herein, father has made substantial efforts to stabilize his life and to acquire the parenting skills necessary to serve as an appropriate custodial resource for his son. However admirable those efforts have been, father, due to his mental impairment, is lacking in the capacity and the ability to discharge childcare responsibilities to Tage, who is a child with special needs, due to his heart ailment and his multi-faceted genetic disorder.
7. The extent to which father has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with his child by the unreasonable act or conduct of mother or by the unreasonable act of any other person or by his economic circumstances.
Neither the unreasonable act or conduct of mother, nor the unreasonable act of any other person, nor economic circumstances, have prevented father from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Tage. As noted, father has continued to regularly visit with his son up to the date of this memorandum. It is this court's hope and request that Tage's pre-adoptive foster parents will offer father some form of post-termination contact with Tage and will keep father informed as to the child's growth and progress. Should that offer be extended, this court urges father to accept with the realization that the best place for Tage to be is where he presently is.
VII. ORDERS
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED, that the parental rights of Karen M., by reason of her consent and that the parental rights of William H., because of his failure to rehabilitate within the meaning of Sec. 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) of the Connecticut General Statutes, be and are hereby terminated with respect to their minor child, Tage M.
ORDERED, that the permanency plan recommended by the department of children and families, i.e., termination and adoption, is hereby approved as to said child.
ORDERED, that the commissioner of the department of children and families is hereby appointed statutory parent for said child, who shall submit to the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at New Haven, within thirty days, a case plan, and, thereafter, such further reports as may be required by law until the permanency plan is finalized, with first consideration to the adoption of Tage by his current caretakers.