Opinion
No. COA12–1368.
2013-06-4
In The Matter of T.A.D.
Dean W. Hollandsworth, Senior Staff Attorney, for petitioner-appellee, New Hanover County Department of Social Services. Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Joyce L. Terres, Assistant Appellate Defender, for respondent-appellant.
Appeal by respondent from order entered 24 August 2012 by Judge J .H. Corpening, II in New Hanover County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 May 2013. Dean W. Hollandsworth, Senior Staff Attorney, for petitioner-appellee, New Hanover County Department of Social Services. Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Joyce L. Terres, Assistant Appellate Defender, for respondent-appellant.
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Jami J. Farris, for guardian ad litem.
DAVIS, Judge.
Respondent-mother A.M.B. (“respondent”) appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, T.A.D. (“Teresa”). After careful review, we affirm.
The pseudonym “Teresa” is used throughout this opinion to protect the privacy of the minor child and for ease of reading. N.C . R.App. P. 3.1(b).
Factual Background
On 10 March 2011, the New Hanover Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed a juvenile petition alleging that Teresa was a neglected and dependent juvenile. The petition alleged that Teresa's parents had a history of domestic violence and that respondent had admitted to abusing substances, specifically crack cocaine.
Teresa's father's parental rights were also terminated in the trial court's 24 August 2012 order, but he did not contest the order and is not a party to this appeal.
DSS obtained nonsecure custody of Teresa on 11 March 2011 and placed her with her maternal grandparents. The trial court entered an order adjudicating Teresa neglected on 13 May 2011. The court ordered respondent to (1) obtain a psychological evaluation; (2) complete a substance abuse assessment; (3) enroll in and complete an empowerment class through a domestic violence program; (4) submit to random drug screens; (5) enroll in and complete parenting classes through an approved program; (6) cooperate with Child Support Enforcement; and (7) obtain and maintain stable housing and employment.
In April 2011, respondent left the Wilmington area and did not return until October 2011. During this period, respondent did not participate in any of the services required by the trial court. On 1 December 2011, the trial court conducted a permanency planning hearing. The trial court ceased reunification efforts and changed the permanent plan to adoption.
On 30 January 2012, DSS filed a petition to terminate respondent's parental rights on the basis of neglect. Following a hearing conducted over several days in May and June of 2012, the trial court entered an order on 24 August 2012 terminating respondent's parental rights. Respondent gave timely notice of appeal.
Analysis
A proceeding to terminate parental rights is a two-step process involving an adjudication phase and a disposition phase. In re Blackburn, 142 N.C.App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001). During the adjudication phase, the trial court must determine whether the petitioner has established—by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence—that at least one of the ten grounds for termination enumerated in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111 exists. Id. If the court determines that the existence of a statutory ground for termination was established, it then moves into the disposition phase, where it considers whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the juvenile. Id. On appeal, we review a trial court's order terminating parental rights to determine whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether those findings, in turn, support its conclusions of law. In re Shepard, 162 N.C.App. 215, 221, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6,disc. review denied,358 N.C. 543, 599 S.E.2d 42 (2004).
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111 lists neglect as one of the enumerated grounds for termination of parental rights and provides that a trial court may terminate a parent's rights if it determines that the juvenile is a neglected juvenile within the meaning of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–101. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1) (2011). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–101 defines a neglected juvenile as one who “does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline” from a parent or caretaker or “who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare[.]” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–101(15) (2011).
On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights based on the ground of neglect. She contends that the court failed to make “clear and specific” ultimate findings of fact. She further asserts that the findings of fact that were made by the trial court are insufficient to support its conclusion that Teresa is a neglected juvenile. We disagree.
“In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ... the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C.App. 94, 96, 564 S.E.2d 599, 601 (2002) (citing N.C. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1)). “[T]he trial court's factual findings must be more than a recitation of allegations. They must be the specific ultimate facts ... sufficient for the appellate court to determine that the judgment is adequately supported by competent evidence.” Id. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at 602 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Ultimate facts are the final resulting effect reached by processes of logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts.” Id.
In this case, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact:
3. The child was removed from the home of the respondent-parents in March of 2011 due to neglect of the parents allowing the child to live in an environment injurious to the Juvenile's welfare due to the substance abuse of the mother and concerns of domestic violence between the parents.
....
11. The Court finds as a fact that [respondent] removed herself from the Wilmington area prior to adjudication of this matter in April 2011 and failed to engage in any services ordered by the Court, including submitting to a substance abuse assessment; failed to enroll in the parenting program; failed to complete the empowerment classes until after the Termination of Parental Rights Petition was filed and failed to visit her child from April 8, 2011 to December 27, 2011. She tested positive for illegal substances on three out of six random screens during the course of this matter, including twice for cocaine and most recently on October 20, 2011, when a hair follicle test revealed positive readings for marijuana, cocaine and benzoylecgonine. [Respondent] attributes this positive screen to a party that she attended in close proximity to the test. [Respondent] had testified that her last incidence of cocaine use was April 21, 2011 and that she has never smoked marijuana. The Court finds this testimony on her substance use to not be credible. There is a clear attachment between the Mother and the Juvenile but the mother never progressed to unsupervised visitation, or trial home placement and never established a residence during the course of the case. [Respondent] has been unable to adequately address the causes of the neglect including her substance abuse, lack of stability and lack of parenting skills, and her failure to progress to unsupervised visitation or trial placement and her disregard for the Orders of the Court indicate the neglect of her child is ongoing and that there is a likelihood of repetition of neglect in the event the child was returned to her legal custody.
....
19. The Court finds that even if [respondent] is fully committed to reunification, according to Dr. [Len] Lecci, she will not be ready to parent until spring 2013. She lacks insight today into her problems. She articulates language learned in her parenting and empowerment classes but doesn't understand such language. The mother did not do well home schooling the Juvenile since she was at least two years behind on her academics. The child lived with the paternal grandparents more than half of her life and [respondent] cannot provide for her child. She lacks credibility in her testimony. [Respondent] claims to have a cleaning business with multiple houses to clean but no full names have been submitted and no verification of employment despite the Guardian ad Litem's request for the same and the Court finds she would have no means of support for her child. The Court does not know where the mother lives today since the mother states she is living with a friend. She is just in the beginning of her treatment and not the end. [Respondent's] delay on making any efforts towards reunification and the fact that she misrepresented her circumstances to [the substance abuse services provider] and Dr. Lecci shows the Court she has no insight into her problems.
Respondent contends that the above findings do not adequately support the trial court's conclusion of neglect because they do not demonstrate the likelihood of a repetition of neglect. We are not persuaded.
Generally, “[a] finding of neglect sufficient to terminate parental rights must be based on evidence showing neglect at the time of the termination proceeding.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 248, 485 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1997). However, where, as here, the child has not been in the parent's custody for a significant amount of time prior to the termination proceeding, “the trial court must employ a different kind of analysis to determine whether the evidence supports a finding of neglect.” In re Shermer, 156 N.C.App. 281, 286, 576 S.E.2d 403, 407 (2003). In such situations, a prior adjudication of neglect “may be admitted and considered ... to support a termination of parental rights .... [but] the trial court must also consider evidence of changed conditions in light of the history of neglect by the parent and the probability of a repetition of neglect.” Id. A showing of a history of neglect and the likelihood for a repetition of neglect is sufficient to support a determination that this ground for termination exists. In re L.O.K., J.K.W., T.L.W. & T.L.W, 174 N.C.App. 426, 435, 621 S.E.2d 236, 242 (2005).
Here, the evidence tended to show that respondent left the Wilmington area after Teresa was adjudicated neglected. Respondent was gone for approximately six months and did not engage in any of the court-ordered services during that time. Respondent did eventually enroll in parenting classes, empowerment classes, and a substance abuse program as required. The trial noted, however, that completion of “most, if not all” of the programs occurred after it ceased reunification efforts and the termination of parental rights petition was filed.
Furthermore, despite respondent's completion of the programs, the evidence—and the trial court's findings based on that evidence—tended to show respondent lacked insight into her problems. During her substance abuse assessment, respondent denied using any illegal drugs or controlled substances. Dr. Len Lecci, the psychologist who performed a psychological evaluation of respondent, testified that respondent (1) was defensive during testing; (2) reported that she had not used any substances in almost a year when other evidence contradicted her assertion; (3) suggested that she did not have any substance abuse triggers; (4) minimized the issue of domestic violence with Teresa's father; (5) significantly minimized the difficulties she has experienced; and (6) lacked an appreciation of the extensiveness of the problems in her life. The trial court took note of and discussed Dr. Lecci's observations in its findings of fact.
Respondent also claimed that she had been effective in homeschooling Teresa and that Teresa had never been behind academically—despite evidence indicating that Teresa was, in actuality, at least two years behind in school. Moreover, respondent's living situation has been unstable throughout the case. Indeed, at the termination hearing, she still did not provide the court with a home address.
In this case, findings of fact 11 and 19 are clearly specific ultimate facts based upon the evidence before the trial court. These findings, along with finding of fact 3, demonstrate a history of neglect and the likelihood of a repetition of neglect, and, therefore, support the trial court's conclusion that sufficient grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's order terminating respondent's parental rights.
AFFIRMED. Judges ELMORE and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).