(Ibid.) In that event, a party seeking to challenge any order made during the hearing may not appeal but must instead petition the reviewing court for an extraordinary writ. (§ 366.26, subd. (l); In re Tabitha W. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 811, 816-817 (Tabitha W.) [a party seeking to challenge orders made contemporaneously with the setting of a section 366.26 hearing must comply with subdivision (l) of that section, which requires review by extraordinary writ].) Here, the denial of the section 388 petition did not occur at the same time as the setting of the section 366.26 hearing.
applies to "all orders issued at a hearing at which a setting order is entered," "regardless of [their] nature." (In re Anthony B. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1023, 1024; accord, In re Tabitha W. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 811, 817 ["All orders issued at a hearing in which a section 366.26 hearing is ordered are subject to section 366.26, subdivision (l) and must be reviewed by extraordinary writ"]; In re Merrick V., at p. 247 [same].)
The desired expedition and finality obviously would be most threatened when the permanent plan was adoption and termination of parental rights, the preferred plan which must be ordered if the child is found adoptable and the juvenile court cannot make any of the findings set out in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) through (D)."'" (In re Tabitha W. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 811, 816; see In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 247 ["All court orders, regardless of their nature, made at a hearing in which a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing is set must be challenged by a petition for extraordinary writ."].) This "rule is the only way to ensure that all outstanding issues will have been reviewed by the Court of Appeal prior to the section 366.26 hearing and that it is both conducive to judicial economy and sensitive to the increasing emphasis on the importance of expeditiously achieving finality in dependency matters in the best interests of the children affected by the process."
Although the order terminating visitation was not an order "that a hearing pursuant to this section be held" (§ 366.26, subd. (l)), it is subject to writ review under section 366.26, subdivision (l), and California Rules of Court, rule 8.452. (See In re Tabitha W. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 811, 816-817; In re Anthony B. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1022-1024.) FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Here, the dispositional order bypassing mother for reunification services was part of an order setting a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26. Since “[a]ll orders issued at a hearing in which a section 366.26 hearing is ordered are subject to section 366.26, subdivision (1) and must be reviewed by extraordinary writ” (In re Tabitha W. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 811, 817, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 565 (Tabitha W.)), mother was required to seek writ review of the juvenile court's bypass decision in order to preserve her right to appellate review. (See § 366.26, subd. (1)(2) [failure to file a petition for extraordinary writ review within the period specified by rule “shall preclude subsequent review by appeal” of a setting order (italics added) ]; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450(e)(4)(A) [when a party is present at the setting hearing, notice of intent to file writ petition must be filed within seven days from the date of the setting order].)
(Jessica T., supra, A143444.) Since "[a]ll orders issued at a hearing in which a section 366.26 hearing is ordered are subject to section 366.26, subdivision (l) and must be reviewed by extraordinary writ" (In re Tabitha W. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 811, 817 (Tabitha W.), mother is also foreclosed from arguing that separate counsel should have been appointed at the October 2014 setting hearing. Under such circumstances, we limit our review solely to the question of whether the juvenile court erred in failing to appoint separate counsel for the minors at the February 2015 permanency planning hearing.
(§ 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452; In re Ricky H. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 552, 561, 563 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two]; In re Tabitha W. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 811, 816 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)
The agency has moved to dismiss appeal A133629 on the ground that Mother was required to seek writ review of the denial of her section 388 petition because granting the petition “would require vacation or reversal of the.26 setting order itself.” It is settled that orders entered contemporaneously with an order setting a.26 hearing are not appealable, and must be reviewed via a writ petition under California Rules of Court, rule 8.452. (§.26, subd. (l)(1); In re Tabitha W. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 811, 815–817; In re Anthony B. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1022–1024.) But the agency cites no case holding that an order made after the setting of a.26 hearing, such as the order denying the section 388 petition in this case, is likewise reviewable only by writ. If that were true, then orders made after a.26 hearing has been set and the deadline for the petition has passed would escape review.
The agency has moved to dismiss appeal A133629 on the ground that Mother was required to seek writ review of the denial of her section 388 petition because granting the petition "would require vacation or reversal of the .26 setting order itself." It is settled that orders entered contemporaneously with an order setting a .26 hearing are not appealable, and must be reviewed via a writ petition under California Rules of Court, rule 8.452. (§ .26, subd. (l)(1); In re Tabitha W. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 811, 815-817; In re Anthony B. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1022-1024.) But the agency cites no case holding that an order made after the setting of a .26 hearing, such as the order denying the section 388 petition in this case, is likewise reviewable only by writ. If that were true, then orders made after a .26 hearing has been set and the deadline for the petition has passed would escape review.
Following the disposition hearing, she failed to seek review in any manner, but rather waited until her rights were terminated to seek appellate review. The Court of Appeal in In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 696, recently reiterated: “ ‘All orders issued at a hearing in which a section 366.26 hearing is ordered are subject to section 366.26, subdivision (l) and must be reviewed by extraordinary writ. [Citation.]’ (In re Tabitha W. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 811, 817.)” (Italics added; accord, In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 248; In re Anthony B. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1023; Eisenberg et al., Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2009) ¶¶ 2:164.10e -2:164.10h, pp. 2-85 – 2-87; Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts (2010) § 2.190[10], p. 2-492.