See, e.g., id.; In re Young, 392 B.R. 6, 22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (explaining that it was "loathe to characterize [] § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) as clear or unambiguous in light of the vast amount of conflicting authority"); In re Mati, 390 B.R. 11, 21 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (noting that courts are about evenly split as to whether a vehicle ownership deduction is permissible where the debtor has no car payment); In re Swan, 368 B.R. 12, 17 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that the issue has been thoroughly discussed but no discernable majority view has emerged). For an excellent exposition of the line of reasoning adopted by many of the courts that haveconcluded a debtor may not claim the vehicle ownership deduction where there is no loan or leasepayment on the vehicle, see In re Ransom, 380 B.R. at 805-808.
For cases subscribing to the temporal view see, for example, In re Fridley, 380 B.R. 538, 544 (9th Cir. BAP 2007); In re Wiegand, 386 B.R. 238, 241 (9th Cir. BAP 2008); In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290 (Bankr.D.Nev. 2007); In re Nance, 371 B.R. 358 (Bankr.S.D.Ill. 2007); In re Alexander, 344 B.R. 742 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); In re Beckerle, 367 B.R. 718 (Bankr.D.Kan. 2007); and In re Davis, 348 B.R. 449 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 2006). For cases adopting the monetary view see, for example, In re McGillis, 370 B.R. 720 (Bankr. W.D.Mich. 2007); In re Swan, 368 B.R. 12 (Bankr.N.D.Cal. 2007); In re Brady, 361 B.R. 765 (Bankr.D.N.J. 2007); and In re Fuger, 347 B.R. 94 (Bankr.D.Utah 2006). In considering the overall Chapter 13 statutory scheme, it bears noting that ACP only exists in relationship to PDI. If Congress intended ACP to set the minimum term of a plan, the Court would have expected it to have appeared in a statute that is applicable to all Chapter 13 cases.
See In re Fuger, 347 B.R. 94, 95 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) ("The Court determines that the term `applicable commitment period' requires the Debtors only to commit to a specific return to unsecured creditors, not to a specific period of time."); In re Swan, 368 B.R. 12 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007); see also Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, § 500.1 (3d ed. 2006). In support of this statutory interpretation, reference is sometimes made to BAPCPA's 2005 amendments to the confirmation requirements for chapter 11 reorganization plans proposed by individual debtors.
2007); In re Mathis, 367 B.R. 629, 632-36 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 2007); In re Swan, 368 B.R. 12, 24-27 (Bankr.N.D.Cal. 2007); In re Brady, 361 B.R. 765, 776-77 (Bankr.D.N.J. 2007); In re Fuger, 347 B.R. 94, 97-101 (Bankr. D.Utah 2006).
In analyzing § 707(b) several courts have found that the term "applicable monthly expenses" cannot be interpreted to mean the same as "actual monthly expenses." In re Demonica, 345 B.R. 895 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); See also In re Swan, 368 B.R. 12 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007); and In re Chamberlin, 369 B.R. 519 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007). Courts then turn to the statute to determine how and if to use the IRS's financial analysis.
See, e.g., In re Swan, 368 B.R. 12, 26 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2007) (“ ‘[W]here the debtor's projected disposable income is consistent with the calculations on Form B22C, it makes little sense to hold the debtor hostage for 60 months where the debtor can satisfy the requirements of § 1325(b)(1)(B) in a shorter period.’ ” (quoting In re Fuger, 347 B.R. 94, 101 (Bankr.D.Utah 2006))).
2007); In re Mathis, 367 B.R. 629, 632–36 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2007); In re Swan, 368 B.R. 12, 24–27 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2007); In re Brady, 361 B.R. 765, 776–77 (Bankr.D.N.J.2007); In re Fuger, 347 B.R. 94, 97–101 (Bankr.D.Utah 2006).
, In re McGillis, 370 B.R. 720, 732 (Bankr.W.D.Mich. 2007); In re Swan, 368 B.R. 12, 26-27 (Bankr. N.D.Cal. 2007); In re Mathis, 367 B.R. 629 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 2007); In re Brady, 361 B.R. 765 (Bankr.D.N.J. 2007); In re Lawson, 361 B.R. 215 (Bankr.D.Utah 2007); In re Fuger, 347 B.R. 94, 96 (Bankr.D.Utah 2006). See also 6 Keith M. Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 3d ed. §§ 500.1 at 500-2 (2000 Supp. 2006) ("The applicable commitment period . . . is the multiplier in a formula that determines the amount of disposable income that must be paid to unsecured creditors.").
2007); In re Briscoe, 374 B.R. 1 (Bankr.D.D.C.2007); In re Swan, 368 B.R. 12 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2007); In re Naslund, 359 B.R. 781 (Bankr.D.Mont.2006); In re Farrar-Johnson, 353 B.R. 224 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 2006).
E.D.Wis.2007), rev'd Grossman v. Sawdy, 384 B.R. 199 (E.D.Wis.2008), the bankruptcy judge reviewed the decisions on both sides of the issue and summarized the major rationales from them, finding six: (1) the "Plain Meaning" Rationale; (2) the Unfair Results Rationale; (3) the "Ownership/Liability" Distinction Rationale; (4) the Policy Rationale; (5) the Applicable v. Actual Rationale; and (6) the Reliance on IRS Materials Rationale. 362 B.R. at 903-911. See also In re Swan, 368 B.R. 12, 17 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2007). Many courts focus on the "applicable" versus "actual" dichotomy.