Opinion
NO. 2012 CA 0822
12-21-2012
SUCCESSION OF LEON LAWRENCE VULLO
Craig J. Robichaux Angelique P. Walgamotte Mandeville, Louisiana Attorneys for the Appellant, Victor Tantillo Andre G. Coudrain Brooke E. Dufour Hammond, Louisiana Attorneys for the Appellee, Terri Demarco Chaucer, Independent Executor of the Estate of Leon Lawrence Vullo
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the
21st Judicial District Court,
In and for the Parish of Tangipahoa,
State of Louisiana
District Court No. 2011-0030327, Division "F"
The Honorable Elizabeth P. Wolfe, Judge Presiding
Craig J. Robichaux
Angelique P. Walgamotte
Mandeville, Louisiana
Attorneys for the Appellant,
Victor Tantillo
Andre G. Coudrain
Brooke E. Dufour
Hammond, Louisiana
Attorneys for the Appellee,
Terri Demarco Chaucer,
Independent Executor of the Estate of
Leon Lawrence Vullo
BEFORE: CARTER, C.J., GUIDRY AND GAIDRY, JJ. CARTER , C.J.
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Twenty-First Judicial District Court regarding the interpretation of the Last Will and Testament of Lawrence Leon Vullo ("Mr. Vullo") and the distribution of certain cash assets of Mr. Vullo's estate. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This appeal follows the probate of the notarial testament of the decedent. Mr. Vullo's testament, dated March 2, 2005, was probated on November 28, 2011.
Appellee Terri Demarco Chaucer ("Ms. Chaucer") filed a Petition for Appointment of Independent Executor on October 12, 2011. The Twenty-First Judicial District Court ordered the appointment of Ms. Chaucer as Independent Executor of the Estate of the decedent on October 17, 2011. On November 18, 2011, Ms. Chaucer filed a Petition for Order of Distribution of Certain Assets of Estate. On December 8, 2011, Appellant Victor Tantillo, a legatee of the decedent, filed a Motion to Intervene in the Petition for Order of Distribution of Certain Assets of Estate. The district court granted Mr. Tantillo leave to intervene on December 12, 2011.
Following a hearing on January 17, 2012, the district court ruled that the decedent's testament was "unambiguous as to the dispositions contained therein," finding that the decedent bequeathed any cash assets owned by him at his death to his residual legatees as set forth in his testament. Mr. Tantillo appealed the February 13, 2012 final judgment of the district court. On March 12, 2012, the district court granted Mr. Tantillo a devolutive appeal.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Mr. Tantillo avers the district court erred in its interpretation of the decedent's testament and erred in distributing assets without a lawful, dispositive provision. Mr. Tantillo further argues that the district court erred in interpreting paragraph 4 of the testament's dispositive provisions as applying to a situation where the spouse does not predecease the decedent and/or interpreting the same provision as applying by its terms to cash assets. Finally, Mr. Tantillo asserts that the district court erred in finding that certain cash assets of Mr. Vullo's estate were distributed to a class of residual legatees without a specific dispositive provision directing these assets to them and without defining said class to exist in the case the spouse does not predecease the decedent; or, in the alternative, the district court erred in finding that that Mr. Vullo's testament was unambiguous, and therefore erred in limiting parol evidence on his intent.
FACTS
Mr. Vullo died on November 5, 2006. Mr. Vullo was married but once, and then to Santa Tantillo Vullo ("Mrs. Vullo"). There were no children born of this marriage. Mr. Vullo was predeceased by his own father and mother. All of the assets possessed by Mr. Vullo at the time of his death consisted of community property owned with his spouse. Mr. Vullo's Last Will and Testament was probated on November 28, 2011.
We note that Mrs. Vullo subsequently died on April 12, 2011. As such, any property flowing to her is disbursed in accordance with her will and through her estate. Philipine Tantillo Fazzino was appointed the Independent Administrator of the Estate of Santa Tantillo Vullo in Proceeding No. 2011-0030164 in the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Tangipahoa Parish, Louisiana.
Mr. Vullo's Last Will and Testament is a valid notarial testament executed in accordance with the formalities of Louisiana Civil Code Annotated articles 1577 through 1580.1.
Mr. Vullo's testament makes a number of particular bequests, which are in proper form. The portions of Mr. Vullo's testament at issue are the last of the testament's four dispositive provisions, located before the creation of the trust.
Mr. Vullo bequeathed to his wife his undivided one-half interest in the fine jewelry, the home located at 1110 Rue De La Paix in Hammond, and any vehicle owned by the couple at the time of his death. Mr. Vullo also bequeathed a gold and diamond ring to Kenneth Giardino, a Rolex watch to Angelo T. Giardino, and a gold chain and metal medallion to Gerald Giardino.
We note that the particular legacy whereby Mr. Vullo gives "all of my interest in her [Mrs. Vullo's] fine jewelry" to his wife is peculiar. Read literally, "her fine jewelry" would appear to indicate that said jewelry is the separate property of Mrs. Vullo, such that Mr. Vullo had no interest in the property to give. However, the classification of the fine jewelry as separate or community property is of no consequence here, as the end result dictates that in either instance, the fine jewelry belongs to Mrs. Vullo. See La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 889 and 1587.
The first provision at issue in this appeal, paragraph 3 of the testament's dispositive provisions, sets forth a scenario for the disposition of Mr. Vullo's property should his spouse predecease him.
I give and bequeath to my wife, Santa Tantillo Vullo, all of my interest in my home located at 1110 Rue De La Paix in Hammond and my interest in any vehicle owned at the time of my death. Should my wife predecease me or if we die in a common accident, I direct that my Executor liquidate this property and divide the assets on an equal basis to my residual legatees, Angelo T. Giardino, Jr., Kenneth Giardino, Gerald Giardino, Joseph Anthony Piediscalzo, Carol P. Pivach, Joyce P. Boyd, Peggy F. Brown, Gayle F. Gendron, Terri D. Chaucer and Victor Anthony Mele, with the remaining one-eleventh (1/11th) interest to be divided equally between Diane T. Hoose, Victor Tantillo, Becky Tantillo and Sheila Matera. The portion to Victor A. Mele shall be subject to the Victor A. Mele Trust established hereinbelow. In the event any of the residual heirs predecease me then that deceased heir's share is bequeathed to the natural children of the deceased heir or, if such deceased heir has no children, to the remaining heirs stated above in the same proportions set forth above.
The above provision is clear and unambiguous. As noted previously, the scenario whereby Mr. Vullo's spouse predeceases him did not occur.
The second provision at issue in this appeal is paragraph 4 of the dispositive provisions of the testament, which provides:
Any residual household furnishings, movables and other assets or other furniture and non attached fixtures shall be offered for purchase at their fair market value to my residual legatees with the
sale proceeds to be placed in my residual estate. The process for the sale of this property shall be determined by my Executor in a fair and equitable fashion.
Independent Executor, Ms. Chaucer, filed a petition asking the court to direct her in the distribution of certain community property "cash assets" of Mr. Vullo's estate, which include bank accounts, certificates of deposits, and other cash assets. Ms. Chaucer noted that the cash assets, classified as "movables and other assets" pursuant to paragraph 4 of the testament, could be distributed to the residual legatees identified in paragraph 3. In the alternative, Ms. Chaucer noted that the cash assets could devolve by intestacy to Mrs. Vullo since the decedent left no descendants and the entirety of his estate consists of community property.
Victor Tantillo, a legatee of the decedent, intervened in the suit to challenge the distribution of the cash assets to the residual legatees. Mr. Tantillo argued that only in the event that Mr. Vullo's spouse predeceased him did paragraph 4 of the testament support the distribution of Decedent's residual estate to the group of residual legatees identified in paragraph 3. Since Mrs. Vullo outlived her husband by approximately five years, Mr. Tantillo argued there is no valid disposition of Mr. Vullo's residual estate by his testament; therefore, the undisposed property devolves by the laws of intestacy, with the community property at issue passing to Mr. Vullo's surviving spouse in accordance with Louisiana Civil Code Annotated articles 880 and 889.
Following a hearing on January 17, 2012, the district court ruled that Decedent's testament was "unambiguous as to the dispositions contained therein and that no parol evidence is necessary or required to ascertain the intentions of the Decendent." The district court further ruled that the decedent bequeathed any cash assets owned by him at his death to his residual legatees as set forth in dispositive paragraph 4 of the statutory testament.
Mr. Tantillo now appeals.
DISCUSSION
Before us is the validity of the purported disposition of Mr. Vullo's residual estate through the testamentary legacy found in dispositive paragraph 4 of the decedent's Last Will and Testament. We disagree with the district court's ruling that the legacy is unambiguous.
A donation mortis causa is an act to take effect at the death of the donor by which he disposes of the whole or part of his property. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1469. A donation mortis causa is only valid when made in the form of a testament authorized by law. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1570. Louisiana recognizes two forms of testaments: olographic and notarial. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1574. Mr. Vullo's Last Will and Testament is a valid notarial testament executed in accordance with the formalities of Louisiana Civil Code Annotated articles 1577 through 1580.1.
A 'legacy,' otherwise known as a testamentary disposition, refers to a donation mortis causa, which is nothing more than a gratuitous bequest made in a testament. Testamentary dispositions are particular, general, or universal. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1584. The legacy in question must bear the interpretation that was the intention of the testator.
At issue in this appeal is the validity of certain particular and universal legacies contained in Mr. Vullo's testament. A particular legacy is a legacy that is neither general nor universal. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1587. Ownership of property that is the subject of a particular legacy vests in the legatee upon the decedent's death. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 935. Particular legacies must be discharged before all others. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1600. A universal legacy is a disposition of all of the estate, or the balance of the estate that remains after particular legacies. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1585. All residuary legacies are universal, but not all universal legacies are residual.
If the meaning of a legacy is clear, the text of the legacy should be given effect. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1611. If the legacy is ambiguous, the intent of the testator should be used. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1611. The intent of the testator is the paramount consideration in interpreting the provisions of a will. Pittman v. Magic City Memorial Co., Inc., 07-1567, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/26/08), 985 So. 2d 156, 159.
In determining a testator's intent, the whole of the will must be considered and every word given effect, and what is stated in one part of a will may be called upon to explain what is meant in another part which is uncertain or unclear. Succession of Martin, 262 So. 2d 46, 48 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 262 La. 472, 263 So. 2d 729 (1972). A testamentary disposition should be interpreted so that it may be given effect, but the court must interpret the will as written. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1612; Succession of Mydland, 94-0501, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/3/95), 653 So. 2d 8, 11-12.
Furthermore, the first and natural impression conveyed to the mind on reading the will as a whole is entitled to great weight. Carter v. Succession of Carter, 332 So. 2d 439, 442 (La. 1976). When a will is tree from ambiguity, the will must be carried out according to its written terms, without reference to information outside the will. Succession of Mydland, 94-0501 at p. 5, 653 So. 2d at 12. However, when a provision in a will is subject to more than one equally reasonable interpretation, then the court may consider all circumstances existing at the time of the execution of the will (and not just the language of the will) which may aid in determining the intent of the testator. Succession of Williams, 608 So. 2d 973, 975 (La. 1992). Extrinsic evidence may be used to determine what the words of the testator, as written, actually mean. That evidence must be used only to resolve ambiguity. Succession of Mydland, 94-0501 at p. 5 n.2, 653 So. 2d at 12 n.2.
In cases where the trial court is presented evidence on the testator's intent, the appellate court is constrained to review those findings under the manifest error or clearly wrong standard. See Pittman v. Magic City Memorial Co., Inc., 07-1567 at p. 4, 985 So. 2d at 158. However, when a trial court finds that the language of a testament is clear and unambiguous, the testament is enforced as written. Succession of Martin, 262 So. 2d at 47-48. On the issue of ambiguity, the determination of ambiguity is a question of law. Pittman v. Magic City Memorial Co., Inc., 07-1567 at p. 4, 985 So. 2d at 158. Appellate review of questions of law is simply review of whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect. Succession of Mydland, 94-0501 at p. 3, 653 So. 2d at 11.
Mr. Tantillo argues that there is no provision in Mr. Vullo's testament specifying any distribution of the residual estate in the event the decedent's spouse did not die first. Mr. Tantillo avers that it was not Mr. Vullo's intent that listing residua] legatees in one paragraph of the testament would mean that said persons are residual legatees in all other contexts. Without a disposition of the residual estate, Mr. Tantillo asserts the residual estate passes intestate to the surviving spouse as it relates to community property. See La. Civil Code Ann. arts. 880 and 889. Mr. Tantillo argues that it is clear from the will itself that there is no testamentary disposition of property in the event Mrs. Vullo survived the decedent, other than the particular bequests.
Ms. Chaucer argues that upon a reading of the will, in logical order, Mr. Vullo clearly intended to dispose of all of his property and possessions through paragraph 4, whereby Mr. Vullo disposes of his residual property to his residual legatees. Ms. Chaucer contends that whether the decedent was survived by Mrs. Vullo is immaterial to the residual property disposition.
From our reading of the testament, we cannot detect Mr. Vullo's intention regarding the disposition of his residual property based on the language of his testament. We disagree with the district court that the text of this legacy is unambiguous.
One interpretation of the testament's dispositive provisions is that Mr. Vullo intended to bequeath his residual property to his surviving spouse, in the event Mrs. Vullo did not predecease him (which as we previously noted, did not occur). Without an applicable testamentary disposition of the residual estate, the residual estate passes intestate to the testator's surviving spouse, as it relates to community property. La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 880 and 889. Although the decedent died in 2006, his succession was not opened until after his spouse's death in 2011, presumably because Mrs. Vullo had access and use of all of the former assets of the couples' community of acquets and gains. Based on dispositive paragraph 3, whereby Mr. Vullo named residual legatees of his property only in the event Mrs. Vullo predeceased him, the contention was that dispositive paragraph 4 of Mr. Vullo's testament is not a valid disposition of the decedent's residual estate. Therefore, the cash assets at issue, classified as community property, would flow intestate to Mrs. Vullo in accordance Louisiana Civil Code Annotated articles 880 and 889.
Furthermore, without an applicable testamentary disposition of the residual estate, the residual estate, as it relates to separate property, passes intestate to the testator's descendants, ascendants, collaterals, or the surviving spouse. La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 891-894. In this matter, the entirety of the decedent's estate consisted of community property.
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However, as the district court was of the opinion that in applying paragraph 4, another interpretation of this provision is that it created a disposition of the decedent's residual estate to the residual legatees named in paragraph 3. It is logical to conclude that Mr. Vullo intended that in the event his wife predeceased him, his interest in the house and vehicles be sold and that sum divided in accordance with paragraph 3, with the household items to be offered to the residual legatees for purchase at fair market value, avoiding the possibility of a dispute over the items. However, if paragraph 4 applies in the case where Mrs. Vullo survived her husband, this interpretation requires the conclusion that Mr. Vullo intended to bequeath his interest in the home and vehicles to his wife, but required his interest in the household furnishings, movables, and other assets or other furniture and non-attached fixtures be sold, and his interest in the cash assets be placed into the residual estate to be distributed to the residual legatees listed in paragraph 3, to the exclusion of his surviving spouse.
Because the dispositive provision regarding Mr. Vullo's residual estate is subject to more than one equally reasonable interpretation, we hold that the district court erred in ruling that this provision of the testament was unambiguous. Evidence is required to determine Mr. Vullo's intent regarding the disposition of his residual estate, particularly the cash assets at issue in this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the February 15, 2012 judgment of the Twenty-First Judicial District Court is reversed. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.