Opinion
NUMBER 2012 CA 0393
01-23-2013
IN THE MATTER OF THE SUCCESSION OF MARIE COUVILLION CAMP
C. Jerome D'Aquila New Roads, LA Attorney for Appellee Plaintiff - William Harold Robillard Joseph A. Prokop, Jr. Courtney K. Humphrey Barry E. Waguespack Baton Rouge, LA Attorneys for Appellants Defendants - Sherilyn Couvillion Paul, Esma Couvillion Geoghagen, Carolyn Robillard Lowe, Matt Robillard, Rosalyn Robillard Glaze, Gene Couvillion Hayes, and Roy Joseph Robillard
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the
18th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Pointe Coupee, Louisiana
Trial Court Number 42,603
Honorable Alvin Batiste, Jr., Judge
C. Jerome D'Aquila
New Roads, LA
Attorney for Appellee
Plaintiff - William Harold
Robillard
Joseph A. Prokop, Jr.
Courtney K. Humphrey
Barry E. Waguespack
Baton Rouge, LA
Attorneys for Appellants
Defendants - Sherilyn
Couvillion Paul, Esma
Couvillion Geoghagen, Carolyn
Robillard Lowe, Matt
Robillard, Rosalyn Robillard
Glaze, Gene Couvillion Hayes,
and Roy Joseph Robillard
BEFORE: PARRO, HUGHES, AND WELCH, JJ.
WELCH , J.
The appellants, Sherilyn Couvillion Paul, Esma Couvillion Geoghagen, Carolyn Robillard Lowe, Matt Robillard, Rosalyn Robillard Glaze, Gene Couvillion Hayes, and Roy Joseph Robillard, challenge the trial court's determination that the decedent's March 23, 2005 last will and testament be probated according to law. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This proceeding arises out of the succession of Marie Couvillion Camp, who died on August 11, 2009. Ms. Camp was preceded in death by her husband, Luder I. Camp, and she did not have any children. On April 17, 2002, Ms. Camp executed a last will and testament, wherein she left the entirety of her estate to various nieces and nephews, including, but not limited to, the appellants herein. On November 5, 2002, Ms. Camp suffered a severe stroke, resulting in a need for rehabilitative therapy and assisted living.
In January 2003, Ms. Camp was admitted to Clinton Rehabilitation Hospital. She later transferred to Sherwood Manor Nursing Home and Rehabilitation Center and thereafter, in September 2004, she was moved to Lakeview Manor Nursing Home in Pointe Coupee Parish. William Harold Robillard ("Harold"), one of Ms. Camp's nephews, apparently moved Ms. Camp to Lakeview Manor without the knowledge of the other members of Ms. Camp's family. However, he purportedly did so at the request of Ms. Camp, because she wanted to live with her sister, Mae Robillard, Harold's mother, who was living at Lakeview Manor.
Approximately a month after moving to Lakeview Manor, on October 21, 2004, Ms. Camp executed a power of attorney naming Harold and his daughter, Jennifer Robillard Thurman, as agents. The power of attorney was drafted and notarized by an attorney, Thomas A. Nelson, whom Harold had contacted to handle Ms. Camp's personal affairs. Approximately five months later, on March 23, 2005, Ms. Camp executed another Last Will and Testament, which was also drafted and notarized by Mr. Nelson. In the March 23, 2005 testament, Ms. Camp gave her home to her niece, Judy Couvillion Piker, and she gave the remainder of her estate to Harold.
According to the record, Harold subsequently used this power of attorney to transfer large sums of money from Ms. Camp's bank account to himself and to his wife. Barbara Robillard, and to make cash withdrawals from automatic teller machines (ATMs) at Harrah's Casino.
Ms. Piker was also the particular legatee of Ms. Camp's home under the April 17, 2002 testament. Nonetheless, on May 1, 2006, Ms. Camp executed an act of donation inter vivos of immovable property wherein she donated her home to Ms. Piker. This act of donation was neither prepared nor notarized by Mr. Nelson and was apparently executed without the knowledge of Harold. Interestingly, Harold discovered that Ms. Camp had donated the home to Ms. Piker when he attempted to have the home appraised.
Following Ms. Camp's death, Harold sought to have the March 23, 2005 testament probated in proceedings commenced in Pointe Coupee Parish; the appellants opposed the probate of that testament, alleging that it was invalid because Ms. Camp lacked testamentary capacity (both mental capacity and ability to read) and was unduly influenced by Harold at the time the testament was executed. They further claimed that the testament was null, because Ms. Camp could not read and the attestation clause contained in the testament was not the proper attestation clause for a testator who is unable to read, as set forth in La. C.C. art. 1579. Eventually, the matter proceeded to a bench trial.
At trial, various witnesses for the parties gave conflicting testimony regarding Ms. Camp's mental capacity or lack thereof, ability to see or read, and whether she was under the influence of Harold. At the close of the appellants' case, the trial court granted an involuntary dismissal on the issue of undue influence. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court took the remaining issues under advisement. On November 28, 2011, the trial court rendered judgment, which also contained extensive written reasons, ordering that the March 23, 2005 testament be probated according to law.
In the reasons for judgment, the trial court recognized that its inquiry into the validity of the will was fact intensive and concluded, based on the evidence, that the appellants failed to carry their burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Ms. Camp was not capable of understanding generally the nature and extent of her disposition when she executed the March 23, 2005 testament and that Ms. Camp could not physically read the testament when she executed it. Further, the trial court noted, based on its conclusion regarding Ms. Camp's mental capacity and ability to read, that the issue of whether the will contained the proper attestation clause was moot.
From this judgment, the appellants appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) determining that Ms. Camp possessed the mental capacity to execute the March 23, 2005 testament; (2) determining that Ms. Camp was physically able to read when she executed the March 23, 2005 testament; (3) failing to declare the March 23, 2005 testament an absolute nullity because it did not contain the attestation clause for a testator who is unable to read; and (4) dismissing the undue influence claim
APPLICABLE LAW AND DISCUSSION
Testamentary Capacity
Capacity to donate mortis causa must exist at the time the testator executes the testament. La. C.C. art. 1471. To have capacity to make a donation mortis causa, a person must be able to comprehend generally the nature and consequences of the disposition that he is making. La. C.C. art. 1477. There is a presumption in favor of testamentary capacity. Succession of Lyons, 452 So.2d 1161, 1164 (La. 1984). A person who challenges the capacity of a donor must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the donor lacked capacity at the time the donor executed the testament. La. C.C. art. 1482(A). To prove a matter by clear and convincing evidence means to demonstrate that the existence of a disputed fact is highly probable, that is, much more probable than its nonexistence. Succession of Crawford, 2004-0977 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/23/05), 923 So.2d 642, 647, writ denied, 2005-2407 (La. 4/17/06), 926 So.2d 511.
The issue of capacity is factual in nature, and the trial court's finding that the testator possessed or lacked capacity will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of manifest error. Succession of Brantley, 99-2422 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/00), 789 So.2d 1, 5, writ denied, 2001-0295 (La. 3/30/01), 788 So.2d 1192. In the evaluation of mental capacity, the trial court may consider medical evidence, other expert testimony, and lay testimony; as such, there is no "litmus paper" test to apply to the evaluation of mental capacity. See La. C.C. art. 1477, comment (f); Cupples v. Pruitt, 32,786 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 3/1/00), 754 So.2d 328, 333, writ denied, 2000-0945 (La. 5/26/00), 762 So.2d 1108.
The ability to read is an element of testamentary capacity in the execution of a notarial will. Succession of Theriot, 2008-1233 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/23/08), 4 So.3d 878, 882; see also Succession of Sullivan, 509 So.2d 844, 847 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987); Succession of Comeaux, 428 So.2d 1081, 1082-1083 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); and La. C.C. art. 1577, comment (e). Whether the testator can read at the time of the execution of the will is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court and its findings will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of manifest error. Sullivan, 509 So.2d at 847; see also Theriot, 4 So.3d at 882.
Although Sullivan and Comeaux provide that the ability to read is an element of testamentary capacity in the execution of a statutory will 'under former La. R.S. 9:2442. the substance of former La. R.S. 9:2442 has been reproduced in La. C.C. art. 1577 and did not change the law. See La. C.C. art. 1577, comment (a). Thus, the ability to read remains an element of testamentary capacity in the execution of a notarial will under the provisions La. C.C. arts. 1577, 1578, 1580, and 1580.1; otherwise, the will must comply with La. C.C. art. 1579.
Under the manifest error standard of review, a trial court's reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed on review, even though the court of appeal is convinced that had it been the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Driscoll v. Stucker, 2004-0589 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 32, 46. As the trier of fact, a trial court is charged with assessing the credibility of witnesses and, in doing so, is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Pelican Point Operations, L.L.C. v. Carroll Childers Co., 2000-2770 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/15/02), 807 So.2d 1171, 1176, writ denied, 2002-0782 (La. 5/10/02), 816 So.2d 293. When factual findings are based upon determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error standard demands that great deference be accorded to the trier of fact's findings. Hitchen v. Southland Steel, 2005-1708 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/9/06), 938 So.2d 123, 126.
At trial, the evidence concerning Ms. Camp's mental capacity (or lack thereof) to execute the March 23, 2005 testament consisted of medical records and the testimony of lay witnesses. The appellants presented the testimony of Roy Joseph Robillard (a nephew of Ms. Camp, a particular legatee under the April 17, 2002 testament, and an appellant herein) and Earl Geoghagen, the spouse of Esma Couvillion Geoghagen (a niece of Ms. Camp and likewise a particular legatee under the April 17, 2002 testament, and an appellant herein). These witnesses testified that during their visits with Ms. Camp in the weeks leading up to and following the execution of the March 23, 2005 testament, Ms. Camp did not communicate with them, nor did she acknowledge their presence in any meaningful way.
In response, Harold produced testimony from several witnesses, including that of Mr. Nelson, the attorney who drafted and notarized the March 23, 2005 testament. Mr. Nelson testified that around March 15, 2005, days prior to the execution of the 2005 testament, he met with Ms. Camp to get the information necessary to draft the testament, and during that meeting, she was alert, coherent, and had no problems communicating with him. Although Mr. Nelson admitted that he made no formal inquiry into Ms. Camp's mental state beyond what he personally observed, such as reviewing her personal medical records, he explained that based on his meeting with her—both before and at the time of executing the testament—he had no reason to believe further inquiry into her mental state was warranted. Essentially, Mr. Nelson testified that he was satisfied that, at the time Ms. Camp executed the testament, she knew the nature and consequences of her testamentary disposition.
Mr. Nelson's testimony as to Ms. Camp's mental capacity, at or around the time of executing the testament, was corroborated by the testimony of Belinda Jones (one of the witnesses to the March 23, 2005 testament, who was also Mr-Nelson's legal secretary at the time) and Brandy Armstrong (the other witness to the March 23, 2005 testament), as well as by the testimony of Harold, Barbara Robillard (Harold's wife), and Jennifer Robillard Thurman (Harold's daughter).
The trial court, in its reasons for judgment, noted that the testimony of Roy Joseph Robillard and Earl Geoghagen shed ' 'some light" on the issue of Ms. Camp's mental state near the time of the execution of the March 23, 2005 testament, but found that Mr. Nelson's testimony was entitled to "great weight in view of the fact that typically, the [n]otary on a testament is the best witness for the proponents of the testament, as the notary, in the function of his or her duties, is in a unique position to assess and gauge the capacity of the donor." Thus, the trial court found the testimony of Mr. Nelson, along with the testimony of Belinda Jones, Brandy Armstrong, Harold, Barbara Robillard, and Jennifer Thurman, persuasive and credible evidence of Ms. Camp's ability to understand the nature of her disposition, as each of these witnesses had occasion to observe Ms. Camp on the date in question.
Additionally, the appellants offered, in support of their contention that Ms. Camp lacked the mental capacity to execute the March 23, 2005 testament, medical records and social progress notes from Lakeview Manor from the time period of approximately two weeks prior to the execution of the testament and two weeks after execution of the testament. In social progress notes, notations were made concerning Ms. Camp's apparent short and long term memory lapses. However, the trial court noted that this evidence was refuted by the testimony of Mr. Nelson, Belinda Jones, Brandy Armstrong, Harold, Barbara Robillard, and Jennifer Thurman, as well as Ms. Camp's medical records from Pointe Coupee General Hospital dated April 16, 2005, wherein on Ms. Camp's admission assessment, her psychosocial factors were reported as "[a]lert," "[c]ooperative," "[c]heerful," "[f]orgetful [at times]," and "[s]peaks clearly." Additionally, the social progress notes from Lakeview Manor from March 16, 2005, days prior to the execution of the testament, indicate that Ms. Camp was "alert, verbal, and coherent" and was capable of "making concrete requests."
Based on the evidence, the trial court found that, although the medical records and testimony of Earl Geoghagen and Roy Joseph Robillard indicated that Ms. Camp's condition had deteriorated badly since the time of her stroke in November 2002 and up to the time she executed the testament, such evidence alone was not sufficient to meet the burden of proof required of the appellants to overcome the presumption of capacity, and further, that the documentary evidence offered by Harold rebutted the evidence offered by the appellants. Thus, the trial court concluded that Ms. Camp was capable of understanding generally the nature and extent of her disposition when she executed the March 23, 2005 testament.
Next, with regard to Ms. Camp's ability to read, the appellants offered medical records consisting of nurses' notes and assessment sheets from hospitals and rehabilitative homes over a period of approximately three years, from November 2002 to 2005. These medical records indicated that Ms. Camp's eyesight ranged from poor to limited vision from the time of her stroke in 2002 to after executing the 2005 testament. Harold also relied on medical records, including nurses' notations from 2003 to 2008. The trial court found this documentary evidence to be of limited probative value in determining Ms. Camp's physical ability to read, because the records were couched in subjective and relative terms, and the records were inherently speculative without testimony as to their meaning. The appellants also offered testimonial evidence from Ms. Camp's treating ophthalmologist, Dr. Scott Nelson, as well as testimony from Roy Joseph Robillard. Roy Joseph Robillard testified that during his visits with Ms. Camp, before and after the execution of the testament, he never saw Ms. Camp read anything. However, his testimony was contradicted by the testimony of Harold, Barbara Robillard, and Jennifer Thurman, each of whom testified that Ms. Camp was physically able to read Christmas cards, the clock, and the newspaper and that she often did so.
Dr. Nelson, who last examined Ms. Camp approximately seventeen months prior to her execution of the March 23, 2005 testament, testified that Ms. Camp suffered from extensive geographic dry macular degeneration in both eyes, which was an irreversible condition that would not improve over time. He opined that Ms. Camp would not have been able to read the March 23, 2005 testament at the time she executed it. Dr. Nelson further testified that at the time of his last visit with Ms. Camp, her eyesight had improved, although he did not check her "best corrected vision," meaning that he did not examine Ms. Camp's vision while she wore her glasses. Dr. Nelson admitted that his conclusions were based solely on looking at Ms. Camp's eyes, a subjective observation, without further objective testing.
Dr. Nelson's testimony as to Ms. Camp's actual ability to read was disputed by the testimony of Dr. Joe Gannon, an eye physician. Dr. Gannon did not treat Ms. Camp, but testified that even though someone may suffer from macular degeneration, there was no way to tell how well that person could or could not see without objective testing procedures or verbal communication from the person. Dr. Gannon opined that if Ms. Camp was wearing her glasses on the day she executed the testament, she could have physically read the testament. Additionally, according to the testimony of Mr. Nelson, Ms. Camp appeared to read along as he read the testament out loud, although he testified that he could not recall whether Ms. Camp was wearing glasses at the time she executed the testament. Based on this evidence, the trial court concluded that the appellants failed to meet their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Camp was physically unable to read at the time she executed the March 23, 2005 testament.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record before us and find no error in the trial court's conclusion that the appellants failed to satisfy their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Camp lacked testamentary capacity (both mental capacity and the ability to read). The trial court's conclusions were based on reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact, which must be afforded great deference and were not manifestly erroneous.
Attestation Clause
Next, the appellants claim that the March 23, 2005 testament was null, because the attestation clause contained in the testament was not the proper attestation clause for a testator who is unable to read, in accordance with La. C.C. art. 1579. The trial court found that because the appellants failed to carry their burden of proving that Ms. Camp could not read, the issue of whether the testament contained the proper attestation clause was moot. As we have determined that there was no manifest error in the trial court's conclusion that the appellants failed to carry their burden of proving that Ms. Camp was not able to read, the attestation clause set forth in La. C.C. art. 1579 was not required.
Louisiana Civil Code article 1579 provides:
When a testator does not know how to read, or is physically impaired to the extent that he cannot read, whether or not he is able to sign his name, the procedure for execution of a notarial testament is as follows:
(1) The written testament must be read aloud in the presence of the testator, the notary, and two competent witnesses. The witnesses, and the notary if he is not the person who reads the testament aloud, must follow the reading on copies of the testament. After the reading, the testator must declare or signify to them that he heard the reading, and that the instrument is his testament. If he knows how, and is able to do so, the testator must sign his name at the end of the testament and on each other separate page of the instrument.
(2) In the presence of the testator and each other, the notary and witnesses must sign the following declaration, or one substantially similar: "This testament has been read aloud in our presence and in the presence of the testator, such reading having been followed on copies of the testament by the witnesses [, and the notary if he is not the person who reads it aloud,] and in our presence the testator declared or signified that he heard the reading, and that the instrument is his testament, and that he signed his name at the end of the testament and on each other separate page; and in the presence of the testator and each other, we have subscribed our names this _day of _, _."
(3) If the testator does not know how to sign his name or is unable to sign because of a physical infirmity, he must so declare or signify and then affix his mark, or cause it to be affixed, where his signature would otherwise be required; and if he is unable to affix his mark he may direct another person to assist him in affixing a mark or to sign his name in his place. The other person may be one of the witnesses or the notary. In this instance, the required declaration must be modified to recite in addition that the testator declared or signified that he did not know how to sign his name or was unable to do so because of a physical infirmity; and that he affixed, or caused to be affixed, his mark or name at the end of the testament and on each other separate page.
(4) A person who may execute a testament authorized by either Article 1577 or 1578 may also execute a testament authorized by this Article.
According to Mr. Nelson's testimony, when he met with Ms. Camp prior to drafting the March 23, 2005 testament, Ms. Camp told him that she could not physically make her mark due to her physical infirmity. Based on this meeting, Mr. Nelson determined that Ms. Camp was physically able to read. Following this meeting, Mr. Nelson drafted the testament.
Louisiana Civil Code article 1578 provides:
When a testator knows how to sign his name and to read, and is physically able to read but unable to sign his name because of a physical infirmity, the procedure for execution of a notarial testament is as follows:
(1) In the presence of the notary and two competent witnesses, the testator shall declare or signify to them that the instrument is his testament, that he is able to see and read but unable to sign because of a physical infirmity, and shall affix his mark where his signature would otherwise be required; and if he is unable to affix his mark he may direct another person to assist him in affixing a mark, or to sign his name in his place. The other person may be one of the witnesses or the notary.
(2) In the presence of the testator and each other, the notary and the witnesses shall sign the following declaration, or one substantially similar: "In our presence the testator has declared or signified that this is his testament, and that he is able to see and read and knows how to sign his name but is unable to do so because of a physical infirmity; and in our presence he has affixed, or caused to be affixed, his mark or name at the end of the testament and on each other separate page, and in the presence of the testator and each other, we have subscribed our names this _day of _, _"
Based on our review of the March 23, 2005 testament, we find that it meets all of the requirements set forth in La. C.C. art. 1578. The attestation clause contained in the March 23, 2005 testament provides as follows:
In our presence, the Testatrix has declared that she is able to see and read and knows how to sign her name but is unable to sign her name because of a physical infirmity, and she has affixed her mark at the end and on each other separate page of this testament, and declared or signified in our presence that this instrument is her last will and testament, and in the presence of the testatrix and each other we have subscribed our names on the 23rd day of March, 2005, at New Roads, Louisiana.
Accordingly, the trial court's refusal to nullify the March 23, 2005 testament based on an improper attestation clause was proper.
Undue Influence
In the appellants' last assignment of error, they contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their claim that the March 23, 2005 testament was invalid based on undue influence.
The undue influence claim was dismissed pursuant to a motion for involuntary dismissal urged by Harold. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1672(B) provides that "[i]n an action tried by the court without a jury, after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, any party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal of the action as to him on the ground that upon the facts and law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief." See Cupples, 754 So.2d at 332. On a motion for involuntary dismissal, the trial judge is required to evaluate the evidence and render a decision in accord with the applicable burden of proof. Id. Thus, a judgment of involuntary dismissal is subject to manifest error review. Id.
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Louisiana Civil Code article 1479 provides "A donation inter vivos or mortis causa shall be declared null upon proof that it is the product of influence by the donee or another person that so impaired the volition of the donor as to substitute the volition of the donee or other person for the volition of the donor."" (Emphasis added.) The burden of proof for one challenging a donation based on undue influence is found in La. C.C. art. 1483:
A person who challenges a donation because of fraud, duress, or undue influence, must prove it by clear and convincing evidence. However, if, at the time the donation was made or the testament executed, a relationship of confidence existed between the donor and the wrongdoer and the wrongdoer was not then related to the donor by affinity, consanguinity or adoption, the person who challenges the donation need only prove the fraud, duress, or undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence. (Emphasis added).
As with testamentary capacity, the trial court's finding of, or failure to find, undue influence is fact intensive, and such a finding cannot be disturbed on appeal in the absence of manifest error. Succession of Gilbert, 37,047 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 6/5/03), 850 So.2d 733, 735-736, writ denied, 2003-1887 (La. 11/7/03), 857 So.2d 493. Reversal is warranted only if the appellate court finds that no reasonable factual basis for the trial court's finding exists in the record, and that finding is clearly wrong. Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La. 1987).
When seeking to annul a donation on the basis of undue influence, it is not sufficient to merely show that the donee exercised some degree of influence over the donor; instead the challenger must show that the donee's influence was so substantial that the donee substituted his or her volition for that of the donor. See Succession of Anderson, 26,947 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 5/10/95), 656 So.2d 42, 45, writ denied, 95-1789 (La. 10/27/95), 662 So.2d 3. To annul a testamentary disposition on the basis of undue influence, the influence must be operative at the time the testament is executed. Gilbert, 850 So.2d at 736. When the evidence shows that the execution of a testament was well within the discretion of the testator, the court should find that the testator's volition has not been substituted by the volition of any donee. Id.
In dismissing the appellant's claim of undue influence, the trial court said: "... from what I've heard of the evidence presented today, despite the suppositions that have been put forth to the Court, that there has been no evidence of any undue influence on the part of Mr. Robillard or any of the other witnesses associated with Mr. Robillard; so, therefore, the court will grant the [involuntary dismissal] on the issue of undue influence."
The appellants claim that the facts established at trial clearly indicate that Ms. Camp was the victim of undue influence by Harold when she executed the March 23, 2005 testament. Specifically, the appellants contend that Harold had the opportunity to influence Ms. Camp, because Harold initially contacted Mr. Nelson regarding the power of attorney and the March 23, 2005 testament, he received the invoice for Mr. Nelson's legal services, and he received a copy of the March 23, 2005 testament after it was executed.
The testimony at trial established that Ms. Camp lived in a nursing home and never lived in Harold's home. Harold testified that he did not see Ms. Camp on a daily basis. Although Harold admitted that he initially contacted Mr. Nelson before the March 23, 2005 testament was drafted, he claimed that he did so at the request of Ms. Camp, because Ms. Camp wanted to use the same attorney that his mother (Ms. Camp's sister, with whom she lived at the nursing home) had used with regard to her personal affairs. Mr. Nelson testified that he met with Ms. Camp prior to drafting the March 23, 2005 testament and that Harold was not present during that meeting. Mr. Nelson also testified that Harold was not present in Ms. Camp's room at the nursing home when the March 23, 2005 testament was executed.
Based on our review of the record, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that the appellants failed to offer any evidence that the March 23, 2005 testament was the product of undue influence by Harold.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above and foregoing reasons, we find no error in the trial court's determination that the March 23, 2005 testament was valid and should be probated according to law. Accordingly, the November 28, 2011 judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellants, Sherilyn Couvillion Paul, Esma Couvillion Geoghagen, Carolyn Robillard Lowe, Matt Robillard, Rosalyn Robillard Glaze, Gene Couvillion Hayes, and Roy Joseph Robillard.
AFFIRMED.