We have explained that, "once the Court decides that there has been a breach of judicial ethics, its goal is not so much to punish the offending judge as to restore and maintain the dignity and honor of the position and to protect the public from future excesses." In re Subryan, 187 N.J. 139, 153, 900 A.2d 809 (2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We "review a disciplinary matter presented by the [Advisory Committee] de novo under the [clear and convincing evidence] standard of proof."
"We have also found relevant consideration of whether a judge found guilty of misconduct will engage in similar misconduct in the future, or whether the inappropriate behavior is susceptible to modification."[ In re Subryan, 187 N.J. 139, 153-54, 900 A.2d 809 (2006) (alterations in original) (quoting Seaman, 133 N.J. at 98-100, 627 A.2d 106 ).] In this matter, the aggravating factor of public policy -- in this instance the public policy of ensuring the safety of a community by promptly arresting suspects in violent crimes -- weighs in favor of a significant sanction.
See Alvino, supra, 100 N.J. at 97 n. 2, 494 A.2d 1014. That said, a case-by-case approach has been a hallmark of the judicial discipline system in view of the general nature of the Code and its standards, taking into account that “ ‘[t]he single overriding rationale behind our system of judicial discipline is the preservation of public confidence in the integrity and the independence of the judiciary.’ ” In re Subryan, 187 N.J. 139, 153, 900 A.2d 809 (2006) (quoting In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 96–97, 627 A.2d 106 (1993)). In sum, the judicial disciplinary system operates for the primary purpose of restoring and maintaining public confidence in our system of delivering justice, in recognition of the importance of the public's respect for the men and women who daily dispense justice in their courtrooms.
Similar to our de novo review of a judicial disciplinary proceeding, here we must give "due" though "not controlling" deference to the Special Master's conclusions based on his "assessment of the demeanor and credibility of witnesses." See In re Subryan, 187 N.J. 139, 145, 900 A.2d 809 (2006) (quoting In re Disciplinary Procedures of Phillips, 117 N.J. 567, 579-80, 569 A.2d 807 (1990) ); see also In re Alcantara, 144 N.J. 257, 264, 676 A.2d 1030 (1995) (agreeing with the District Ethics Committee's determination that witnesses were credible and noting "[t]he [District Ethics Committee] observed the witnesses’ demeanor"); In re Norton, 128 N.J. 520, 535, 608 A.2d 328 (1992) ("We agree generally with the [District Ethics Committee's] analysis of the events, which is based primarily on its assessment of the witnesses’ credibility."). However, when the credibility findings are not fairly supported by the record, we owe no deference and may reject those findings.
The matter is before this Court de novo on the record established. In re Subryan, 187 N.J. 139, 145, 900 A.2d 809 (2006); In re Williams, 169 N.J. 264, 271, 777 A.2d 323 (2001). The Court's task is to independently ascertain whether the record demonstrates conduct that departed from the strictures delineated in the Canons of Judicial Conduct. Williams, supra, 169 N.J. at 271, 777 A.2d 323; In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 74–75, 627 A.2d 106 (1993).
As noted earlier, judicial discipline is not designed to punish judges; it is meant to restore and maintain the dignity of judicial office and to preserve and promote confidence in the Judiciary's integrity and independence. In re Subryan, 187 N.J. 139, 153, 900 A.2d 809 (2006) ; Seaman, 133 N.J. at 96-97, 627 A.2d 106. The public's interest is our principal concern.
Those standards can instead be found- in the Code of JudicialConduct, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and certain other rules. See, e.g., R. 1:18 ("It shall be the duty of every judge to abide by and to enforce the provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the provisions of R. 1:15 [(limiting practice of law)] and R. 1:17 [(limiting political activity)]. "). We recognize that language in certain prior cases, see,e.g., in re Subryan, 187 N.J. 139, 153, 900 A.2d 809 (2006); In re Mathesius, 188 N.J. 496, 520, 910 A.2d 594 (2006), could lead to an alternative view and therefore direct that, going forward, Rule 2:15-8 not be used as a basis for a substantive ethical violation. To be sure, judges must take adequate steps, to the best of their ability, to avoid an appearance of impropriety.
Clear and convincing evidence . . . "produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established"[; it is] evidence "so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the fact finder] to come to a clear conviction without hesitancy, of the precise facts in issue."[In re Subryan, 187 N.J. 139, 144 (2006) (quoting In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 74 (1993)).] Such proofs are required to bring about a steadfast assurance in the correctness of the claims sought to be established.