Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J03-01947
SIMONS, Acting P. J.
After the juvenile court sustained a third supplemental petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) alleging that Steven M. had committed a battery with injury upon a peace officer (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243, subd. (c)(2)), appellant appealed from the judgment contending that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 27, 2006, at approximately 3:45 p.m., Officer Fowler was driving in his personal car with his wife. He observed four to five juveniles on a street corner nearby his home. Fowler believed a fight was about to start. Fowler, off duty and in civilian clothes at the time, dropped his wife off at home, clipped his badge onto the collar of his shirt, and drove back to the location of the juveniles. Fowler observed several members of the group surrounding one individual and posturing as if they were about to beat him up. Fowler exited his car and identified himself as a police officer to the group. One of the juveniles insulted and threatened Fowler. When Fowler attempted to arrest that individual, he fled the scene. Fowler then told the rest of the group to go home and transported the victim to the victim’s house. Fowler then proceeded home.
On his way home, Fowler observed the same individual who had threatened him among another group of individuals, who appeared to Fowler to be mostly juveniles. Appellant was among the juveniles. Fowler stopped his car near the group and exited his vehicle.
Fowler testified that he identified himself as an officer and attempted to detain the individual who had threatened him earlier. Fowler stated, “Police officer. . . . Why did you threaten me? You’re under arrest.” The individual responded, “Fuck you.” When attempting to approach that individual, other persons in the group blocked Fowler’s path. Fowler stated, “Police officer, get out of the way.” Fowler placed his hand on the individual in front of him, and that individual resisted. Fowler then attempted to place his forearm around that individual’s neck. Fowler testified that at that point he saw a fist coming at him and then lost consciousness.
Witnesses Austin Brown and Herman Herzog, Jr., testified that they saw the entire group of individuals surround Fowler, who had fallen to the ground, and stomp, kick and hit the officer. The group then took off running down the street.
Officer Switzer interviewed appellant shortly after the incident. Appellant told Switzer that as the group was running away, one of the individuals said, “That was a cop back there.”
Fowler’s injuries included contusions on his left eye, both cheeks, right ear and lip, smashed tendons in his fingers, and abrasions on both knees. He missed work for a month and a half and, seven months after the incident, he still had pain in his fingers.
The juvenile court adjudged appellant a ward of the court with no termination date and ordered appellant committed to the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility for a period of six months on a regular program.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that appellant knew or reasonably should have known that Fowler was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties.
The standard of review to be applied is well established: “On appeal, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.) “The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citations.]” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) It is not within our province to reweigh the evidence or redetermine issues of credibility. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
We disagree with appellant’s contention. Fowler testified that he identified himself as an officer when approaching the group of individuals including appellant. Fowler also testified that he had his police badge displayed on his shirt at that time. Police photographs taken at the scene show the police badge displayed on his collar, which corroborates his testimony.
That one of the participants in the attack reportedly said, “That was a cop back there,” while running away from the scene, indicated to the trial judge that the group knew that Fowler was a police officer, and contradicts defense testimony and argument that Fowler was not wearing his badge and did not announce that he was a police officer. The trial judge noted that there was no evidence of any intervening source of the information, i.e., nobody came to tell them it was a policeman. A reasonable trier of fact therefore could conclude that each member of the group, including appellant, knew or reasonably should have known Fowler was an officer engaged in the performance of his duties at the time of the battery.
Appellant points to the testimony of Austin Brown and Herman Herzog, Jr., to argue that Fowler was not wearing or displaying his badge at the time he confronted the group of individuals including appellant. Appellant further contends that since Fowler gave a conflicting statement about when he placed his badge around his collar, his testimony is not credible. “Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.)
The trial court found Fowler’s testimony to be credible. This testimony alone provides substantial evidence that appellant knew or reasonably should have known that Fowler was a peace officer engaged in his duties.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GEMELLO, J., NEEDHAM, J.