Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. KJ28515, Daniel S. Lopez, Judge.
Tonja R. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillete, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran and Tannaz Kouhpainezhad, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ALDRICH, J.
INTRODUCTION
After the juvenile court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 against minor and appellant Steven H., the court, among other things, imposed various conditions of probation. The minute order, however, does not accurately reflect the conditions imposed. We therefore modify the judgment to reflect the conditions imposed, and affirm the judgment as modified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 18, 2006, Felipe Renteria was headed to a party when he heard Steven H. call out to him. Felipe and Steven H. knew each other from a prior confrontation. Steven H. taunted Felipe, saying, “hit me, hit me.” He repeatedly pushed Felipe to the ground. Steven H. told Felipe to take off his shirt or he would hit him. Afraid, because six or seven of Steven H.’s friends were surrounding him, Felipe gave his shirt to Steven H., and Steven H. took Felipe’s hat.
On June 22, 2006, the People filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that Steven H. committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). On October 20, the juvenile court sustained the petition, declared Steven H. to be a ward of the court, placed him home on probation, and ordered conditions of probation.
DISCUSSION
The parties agree that the minute order does not conform to the conditions of probation orally imposed. Generally, when the record of the court’s oral pronouncement regarding sentencing conflicts with the clerk’s minute order, the oral pronouncement controls. (People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2; People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) We therefore correct the minute order as follows.
Defendant’s appellate counsel filed a letter on appeal stating that appellant and respondent agree regarding what each of the probation terms at issue should be per the juvenile court’s oral pronouncements.
First, although the minute order reflects that the juvenile court ordered Steven H. not to “be within one block of any school ground unless enrolled, attending classes, on approved school business, or with school official, parent or guardian,” the court did not impose that condition (condition 12). It therefore must be stricken.
Second, the juvenile court orally ordered Steven H. not to be outside his residence between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. (condition 13). The minute order incorrectly states he was ordered not to be outside his residence between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
Third, the juvenile court orally ordered Steven H. not to “use or possess any narcotics unless you have a valid prescription.” Condition 21, however, does not reflect that order. It therefore must be modified to include it.
Fourth, condition 21, as stated in the minute order, orders Steven H. not to “use or possess narcotics, controlled substances, poisons, or related paraphernalia; stay away from places where users congregate.” The juvenile court, however, expressly imposed a knowledge requirement. The court said, “Stay away from places, from people that you know are involved in illicit drug business.” The condition must therefore be modified to reflect the knowledge requirement as stated by the court. (See generally In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890-891 [probation condition forbidding juvenile defendant from associating with “anyone ‘disapproved of by probation’ ” was unconstitutionally vague, since it did not contain an express requirement that the defendant know the identity of those individuals of whom probation disapproved]; People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090 [if a knowledge requirement is not explicitly stated, it will be implied].)
Fifth, although the minute order reflects that the juvenile court imposed condition 22—“Do not associate with persons known to be users or sellers of narcotics/controlled substances, except with the prior written permission of the Probation Officer”—the court did not impose that condition. It therefore must be stricken.
Finally, the minute order does not reflect the juvenile court’s specific order to participate in anger management counseling as arranged by probation (condition 36). The minute order must therefore be amended to include this order.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed as modified as set forth in the opinion.
We concur: KLEIN, P.J. KITCHING, J.