Opinion
F041677.
7-17-2003
In re STEVEN C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEVEN C., Defendant and Appellant.
Camela J. McLaren, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Robert P. Whitlock and Kelly C. Fincher, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After admitting to committing vandalism/graffiti (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a)), appellant, Steven C., was found to be a ward of the court and placed on one years probation. When appellant violated his probation, the court committed him to boot camp for one year, with one day of custody credit. On appeal, appellant contends that he should have received custody credit for the 30 days he spent on electronic monitoring. We will affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c) provides, "In any case in which the minor is removed from the physical custody of his ... parent ... as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense ... which brought ... the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. [P] As used in this section and Section 731, `maximum term of imprisonment means the longest of the three time periods set forth in [Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (a)(2)], but without the need to follow the provisions of [Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)] or to consider time for good behavior or participation pursuant to [Penal Code sections 2930 through 2932], plus enhancements which must be proven if pled."
In In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, our Supreme Court held that a minor is entitled to credit for any time spent in physical confinement, not through direct application of Penal Code section 2900.5 or via equal protection concepts, but as an interpretation of legislative intent behind the expression "maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult" in Welfare and Institutions Code section 726. (In re Randy J. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1503.) Moreover, Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 specifically defines "physical confinement" as excluding time not spent in a secure facility. (Id. at p. 1505.)
Although appellants liberty was restricted by wearing an electronic monitor, his home did not qualify as a secure placement within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 726. Appellant relies on People v. Lapaille (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1159 for the proposition that because of its restrictiveness, electronic monitoring constitutes physical confinement. The case does not stand for that proposition. Rather, the case found that a "home detention" program for an adult qualified for precustody credits under Penal Code section 2900.5 by analogy to electronic monitoring. Electronic monitoring was specifically added to section 2900.5 by the Legislature in 1991. (15 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1163-1164.) However, Penal Code section 2900.5 does not apply to the juvenile court system. (In re Michael W. (1980) 102 Cal. App. 3d 946, 953-954, 162 Cal. Rptr. 744.) The Legislature could have provided similarly for juveniles. The Legislature has not.
Thus, we conclude that appellant is not entitled to credit for the days he participated in the electronic monitoring program. (Cf. In re Randy J., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505 [minor not entitled to credit for time he spent under home arrest].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.