Opinion
NUMBER 2018 CJ 0088
06-01-2018
STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF A.A.S AND A.M.C.S.
Andrea Cheramie Stentz Thibodaux, LA Attorney for Appellant Mother - A.A.R. Greg G. Stahlnecker, Jr. Cut Off, LA Attorney for Appellant Father - M.C.S. Linda A. Mitchell Houma, LA Attorney for Appellee Department of Children and Family Services Vanessa L. Zeringue Houma, LA Attorney for Appellees Minor Children - AA.S. and A.M.C.S.
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the 17th Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Lafourche, Louisiana
Trial Court Number 13139 Honorable F. Hugh Larose, Judge Andrea Cheramie Stentz
Thibodaux, LA Attorney for Appellant
Mother - A.A.R. Greg G. Stahlnecker, Jr.
Cut Off, LA Attorney for Appellant
Father - M.C.S. Linda A. Mitchell
Houma, LA Attorney for Appellee
Department of Children and
Family Services Vanessa L. Zeringue
Houma, LA Attorney for Appellees
Minor Children - AA.S. and A.M.C.S. BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND THERIOT, JJ. WELCH, J.
The mother, A.A.R., and father, M.C.S., of two children previously adjudicated in need of care, A.A.S. and A.M.C.S., appeal the judgment of the juvenile court, which terminated their parental rights as to those children and freed those children for adoption. We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court and issue this memorandum opinion in compliance with Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.1(B).
The Seventeenth Judicial District Court exercises original juvenile jurisdiction for the parish within its district pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 302(2). As a court exercising juvenile jurisdiction, it has exclusive jurisdiction, in conformity with any special rules prescribed by law, over any child alleged to be in need of care and the parents of any such child. La. Ch.C. art. 604.
The children and their parents are referred to by their initials to preserve their anonymity in this confidential proceeding. See Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 5-2.
On November 6, 2015, the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"), obtained an instanter custody order removing A.A.S. and A.M.C.S. from the custody of their parents, A.A.R. and M.C.S., and placing them in the custody of DCFS, based on allegations of physical abuse/minor head-facial injuries and physical abuse/passive physical abuse. A.A.R.'s three other children with a different father, B.U., T.U., and A.U., were also removed from the custody of A.A.R. and M.C.S. at the same time; however, those children are not at issue in this appeal. Following the initial removal of A.A.S. and A.M.C.S. from the custody of A.A.R. and M.C.S., the children were maintained in the custody of DCFS pursuant to a continued custody order issued by the juvenile court, and on January 25, 2016, they were adjudicated in need of care.
DCFS subsequently developed, and the juvenile court approved, an initial case plan wherein the permanent case plan goal for the children was stated as adoption. As to A.A.R., the case plan required her to: maintain physically safe and stable housing; have her mental health and substance abuse needs assessed in order to focus on the needs of her children; demonstrate fiscal responsibility by contributing payments towards the cost of her children's care ($25.00 per month per child) while they were in foster care; and learn how domestic violence impacts her children and her ability to effectively parent her children by attending, participating, and successfully completing domestic violence classes. As to M.C.S., the case plan required him to: maintain physically safe and stable housing; have his mental health and substance abuse needs assessed in order to focus on the needs of his children; demonstrate fiscal responsibility by contributing payments towards the cost of his children's care ($25.00 per month per child) while they were in foster care; and learn how domestic violence impacts his children and his ability to effectively parent his children by attending, participating, and successfully completing the Batterer's Intervention Program to address domestic violence.
On June 14, 2017, DCFS filed a petition for the termination of the parental rights of A.A.R. and M.C.S as to A.A.S. and A.M.C.S. Therein, DCFS maintained that A.A.R. and M.C.S had not substantially complied with their case plans. See La. Ch.C. art. 1015(6). More specifically, DCFS alleged that A.A.R. had failed to: demonstrate an ability to provide for the ongoing health and safety needs of her children; demonstrate an ability to provide a safe, stable, and healthy living environment for her children; successfully complete a parenting program; and demonstrate skills learned through her participation in and completion of a domestic abuse treatment program. In addition, DCFS alleged that M.C.S. had failed to: demonstrate an ability to provide for the ongoing daily health and safety needs of his children; provide documentation to the agency of successful completion of a domestic abuse treatment program; to provide documentation to the agency of successful completion of an anger management program; and demonstrate an ability to provide a safe, stable, and healthy living environment for his children. DCFS also asserted that despite the interventions it attempted, there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in A.A.R. and M.C.S.'s condition or conduct, considering the children's age and need for a stable and permanent home. As such, DCFS maintained that it was in the children's best interest that they be freed for adoption.
After a hearing on September 13, 2017, the juvenile court issued extensive oral reasons for judgment finding that DCFS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that both A.A.R. and M.C.S. failed to substantially comply with their case plans and that it was in the best interest of the children that they be freed for adoption. Therefore, the juvenile court rendered judgment, which was signed on November 2, 2017, terminating the parental rights of A.A.R. and M.C.S. as to A.A.S. and A.M.C.S and decreeing that A.A.S. and A.M.C.S were certified free and eligible for adoption. It is from this judgment that A.A.R. and M.C.S. separately appeal, essentially claiming that the juvenile court erred in finding that the grounds for the termination of their parental rights had been met and that the termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of the children.
Title X of the Louisiana Children's Code governs the involuntary termination of parental rights. The grounds for termination of parental rights, as applicable to this matter, is found in paragraph (6) of La. Ch.C. art. 1015 as follows:
Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed since a child was removed from the parent's custody pursuant to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent's condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child's age and his need for a safe, stable, and permanent home.
The method of proving the grounds set forth in La. Ch.C. art. 1015 is set forth in La. Ch.C. art. 1036(C) and (D), which provide, in pertinent part:
C. Under La. Ch.C. art. 1015(6), lack of parental compliance with a case plan may be evidenced by one or more of the following:
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(5) The parent's repeated failure to comply with the required program of treatment and rehabilitation services provided in the case plan.
(6) The parent's lack of substantial improvement in redressing the problems preventing reunification.
(7) The persistence of conditions that led to removal or similar potentially harmful conditions.
D. Under Article 1015(6), lack of any reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent's conduct in the near future may be evidenced by one or more of the following:
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(3) Any other condition or conduct that reasonably indicates that the parent is unable or unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for the child, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.
In order to terminate parental rights, the petitioner must prove each element of a ground for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. La. Ch.C. art. 1035(A). When the court finds that the alleged grounds set forth in any paragraph of La. Ch.C. art. 1015 have been proven by the evidentiary standard set forth in La. Ch.C. art. 1035 and that it is in the best interests of the child, it shall order the termination of the parental rights of the parent against whom the allegations are proven. La. Ch.C. art. 1037(B).
In oral reasons for judgment, the juvenile court stated as follows:
This issue first [came] to light in this court when [M.C.S.] was arrested by ... the Thibodaux Police Department. He was covered with blood, lying in the street, foaming at the mouth as the result of a drug overdose. When they began to inquire about the matter, it was soon discerned ... [from B.U. and A.U] that he physically assaulted them and that he did so against their mother [(A.A.R.)] on a repeated basis.
The children were taken into custody because of the severity of the nature of the charges and the concern for the safety and well-being under the Child in Need of Care....
Since that time, almost two years have expired. Of that time, [M.C.S.] has somehow found his way into a jail cell for eleven of those months. That's a voluntary circumstance. You voluntar[ily] decided that going [to] buy some more drugs was a good idea while you were working a case plan. You got arrested. That wasn't enough, you decided to sneak contraband into jail, which apparently added more time because you ended up serving, by your own testimony, eleven months, eleven months of the time you should have been working your case plan was spent sitting in a jail cell. Now I'm suppose[d] to accept that as an excuse for what has been termed by your attorney as substantial completion. It's not substantial.
A case plan is not just a check list that you go through and mark like a grocery list. It is a requirement that the individual understand the nature of the situation which brought them to this point, accept responsibility, and does things in their lives [sic] that will correct the situation. You testified here today that you never ever under any circumstances touched your wife. Yet, she testified today that there was at least one physical altercation. Her mother testified that she is aware of one other one.
The problem with domestic abuse is that it seldom occurs outside of the presence of the two individuals. There are seldom witnesses to such a crime. The fact that there is one validated case is pretty astounding that you would actually strike her in front of her mom while operating a vehicle.
I have seen nothing in your actions that would indicate to the [c]ourt that you even understand the Child in Need of Care proceedings. Much less, have arrived at a point where the children should be returned to your custody or even unsupervised visitation.
There is little question of this [c]ourt that [DCFS] has proven well beyond any standards that this [c]ourt is aware of that you should not be around these children....
It also does not surprise me that as to [A.A.R.,] she failed parenting class a second time. Again, its not a simple matter of going through a check mark. It's not a simple matter that you need to go to this parenting class, sign off on the form and leave. It is that you accept a responsibility to take care of your children. That you accept a responsibility of understanding that they are first and paramount in every decision you make in your life.
Instead, you made a clear decision. It is one that needed no testimony, no introduction of evidence, you clearly indicated to this [c]ourt by the fact that you have walked back into this court again living with this gentlem[a]n that you have no regard for the safety of your children. Whether it's your fault or not your fault, whether it's a failure in your social make-up or whatever it may be, this [c]ourt is not willing to place those children back in peril because you refuse to place them before yourself and your personal happiness[,] because that's exactly what this comes down to.
You are more interested in being with [M.C.S.] than you are with your children and you have demonstrated that in a very clear, concise manner. You've also clearly indicated to this [c]ourt that you are without the ability to offer maternal protection to your children. That is to say that you would opt to go to work three jobs a day to be out of the situation rather than have to confront [M.C.S.] as he attacks your children.
This court finds that [La. Ch.C. art. 1015(6)] has been completely proven. These parents have utterly failed for two years to work their case plan in any meaningful manner at all. The [c]ourt further finds that these children are deserving of a home where they can have a permanency situation, where they can grow and understand what love is, and they can be nurtured and raised.
I will not leave these children in limbo any longer. It has been two years. We are not there yet, we're not getting there, and I'm not leaving these children on a leash while y'all two decide what y'all want to do with y'all lives.
Court grants the [petition] for termination of both parents [rights.]
Thus, the juvenile court specifically found that DCFS had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that neither A.A.R. nor M.C.S. had made a substantial effort to comply with their case plans pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 1015(6), that there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the near future given their pattern of conduct, and that it was in the best interest of the children to be freed for adoption. After a thorough review of the record, we find the juvenile court's factual findings, as set forth above, are reasonably supported by the record and are not clearly wrong. The testimony at the termination of parental rights hearing established A.A.R. and M.C.S. have not accepted responsibility for the abuse and/or neglect of their children caused by the violence—both physical and verbal—in their home. In addition, almost two years after the children had come into the custody of the DCFS, neither parent had successfully completed the services identified as necessary for a safe return of the children, i.e., the successful completion of the parenting program by A.A.R. and the successful completion of the Batterer's Intervention Program by M.C.S., both of which were critical components of DCFS's case plan due to the reason the children came into the custody of DCFS. Therefore, the November 2, 2017 judgment is affirmed.
It is well-settled that an appellate court cannot set aside a juvenile court's findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly wrong. In Re A.J.F., 2000-0948 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 47, 61. --------
All costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellants, A.A.R. and M.C.S.
AFFIRMED.