Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4859-13T1
11-23-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF J.M., a minor.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant J.M. (Joshua D. Sanders, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Jane Deaterly Plaisted, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Alvarez and Manahan. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FJ-07-3049-13. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant J.M. (Joshua D. Sanders, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Jane Deaterly Plaisted, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
J.M., a juvenile, appeals from the denial of his motion to enforce the terms of a dispositional agreement for a referral in lieu of a plea. Having determined that J.M.'s reliance on the agreement, later withdrawn by the State, was not detrimental to his interests, we affirm.
We confine our recitation of the statement of facts and the procedural history to that required for the purpose of our decision.
On June 21, 2013, J.M. was charged in a juvenile complaint with two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1), and two counts of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). The charges arose out of allegations that on Memorial Day weekend, J.M., then fifteen years of age, engaged in acts of sexual penetration with a six-year-old female victim.
The "Statement of Reasons for Presumptive Waiver of Juvenile" stated the victim was five-years-old at the time of the incidents.
On July 22, 2013, the State filed a motion seeking a jurisdictional waiver pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 and Rule 5:22-2. The waiver was premised upon the nature of the offense and the need for deterrence.
While the motion was pending, the State and J.M., through his counsel, engaged in discussions regarding the disposition of the charges. Although it is not entirely clear from the record, it appears as though counsel for J.M. sought the State's agreement to a dismissal of the complaint based upon J.M.'s successful completion of treatment. In furtherance thereof, on July 15, 2013, J.M. submitted to a psychosexual evaluation and actuarial risk assessment performed by a licensed psychologist. The purpose of the evaluation was "to assess J.M.'s emotional functioning, his mental status, his need for offender-specific therapy, if any, and to estimate J.M.'s risk for sexually re-offending" if adjudicated delinquent.
In the report of the evaluation, the psychologist addressed J.M.'s background, which included his placement in a group home due to behavioral issues. J.M. was noted to have had "an extensive history of antisocial behaviors," as well as "school-related" behavior problems and had received treatment for these problems and for anger management. The report also noted that J.M. had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Oppositional Defiant Disorder and was subjected to repeated psychiatric hospitalizations. The psychologist found J.M.'s "sexual offense recidivism risk level [to be] low to moderate."
At the time of the evaluation, J.M. was in a residential placement that provided round-the-clock supervision and mental health services. The placement took place after the incident that lead to the complaint.
On September 12, 2013, the State and J.M. reached an agreement regarding the disposition. At the time of the agreement, J.M. had completed the risk assessment, was in a residential facility, and was receiving counselling. However, the plea was not placed on the record that day as the State noted that the victim was unavailable to make a victim impact statement. One week later, on the next court date, the State informed J.M.'s counsel that the victim's mother was opposed to the proposed disposition and, therefore, the State was withdrawing the offer.
In response, J.M. filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement. The court conducted a hearing on October 18, 2013. After considering the arguments of counsel and the briefs submitted in support of the motion and in opposition thereto, the court denied the motion in an oral decision.
The court concluded that although the withdrawal of a plea offer "does inure to the detriment of the accused," the State had the right to withdraw the offer "as they choose." The court framed the issue as "at what point [is the State] bound by the need to honor the offer[?]" The court determined that, notwithstanding J.M.'s compliance with the evaluation, "juveniles are referred for evaluation for placement all the time. I just do not find that the juvenile's . . . evaluation for the Voorhees program or even the submission of the treatment plan, inured to the detriment of [J.M.]."
J.M. argues that the court erred in denying the motion to enforce the plea agreement. In support of the argument, J.M. cites on appeal, as before the motion judge, our decision in State v. Rosario, 391 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2007), as the controlling law.
In Rosario, the defendant, a juvenile, was facing charges for murder and kidnapping in New Jersey. Id. at 4. Before the charges were filed against defendant, he was arrested and incarcerated for murder in New York. Ibid. Defendant's New York attorney engaged in plea discussions with the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office relative to the resolution of the New Jersey charges as part of a disposition of the open charges in both jurisdictions. Ibid. Acting upon the belief that a global resolution had been reached — yet not finalized by a formal plea on the New Jersey charges — defendant pled guilty in New York. Id. at 4-5. When the prosecutor refused to honor the agreement, defendant sought to enforce the New Jersey "plea" based upon his detrimental reliance. Id. at 8.
When the defendant's motion to enforce the plea was denied, he voluntarily waived to the Law Division, Rosario, supra, 391 N.J. Super. at 8, and was convicted after a jury trial of eleven counts. Id. at 3. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate of life imprisonment with a sixty-year parole disqualifier consecutive to the New York sentence. Ibid.
Following a protracted procedural history, which included a remand by our Supreme Court for an evidentiary hearing, this court reversed the conviction contingent upon defendant entering a guilty plea acceptable to the court and in accord with the plea agreement's sentence exposure. Id. at 16.
In reaching our determination in Rosario, we noted that "[a] defendant may enforce a plea offer which has not been approved by the court when the defendant can make a showing of detrimental reliance upon a prosecutorial promise." Id. at 13-14 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We also noted that "[a] defendant must, however, do something substantial to his disadvantage in reliance on the offer." Id. at 14 (citations omitted). Further, we recognized that "negotiated pleas must be approved by the court and are generally non-enforceable until approved by the judge." Ibid. (citations omitted).
A juvenile's plea is subject to the procedural requirements of Rule 3:9-2. See R. 5:21A; See also State in the Interest of J.R., 244 N.J. Super. 630, 637-638 (App. Div. 1990). Rule 3:9-2 requires judicial approval of the plea agreement. --------
J.M.'s argument, viewed in the abstract, has some attraction. There can be little question of J.M.'s disappointment in not receiving the benefit of the plea offer extended (and then withdrawn) by the State. Nonetheless, our decision must take into account the distinction between "disappointment" and "detrimental reliance."
In Rosario, we found that the defendant pled guilty to the New York murder charge with the understanding that his plea was part of a resolution of the criminal charges he faced in both states. Since defendant performed his obligations to his detriment by his New York plea, we concluded defendant's "reasonable expectations" must be fulfilled by enforcement of the plea agreement. Id. at 14-16.
By contrast, to the extent J.M. relied upon the proposed plea, he did not incur a detriment; and certainly not a "substantial" detriment. J.M.'s participation in the evaluation and the counselling served a dual purpose. It was to demonstrate his amenability to a referral disposition and to demonstrate he was not a suitable candidate for waiver. As such, to the extent that the State did not pursue the waiver, J.M. benefited from that which he now argues was detrimental.
Moreover, J.M.'s evaluation facilitated the favorable plea offer he ultimately received and accepted. In addition to not being waived, defendant was adjudicated delinquent and placed on two years' probation with Megan's Law requirements. If defendant was tried and convicted on the original charges as an adult, he would have, among other aspects of the sentence, been exposed to a long period of incarceration in state prison subject to parole disqualification.
After a careful analysis of the facts and the applicable law, we conclude that the decision of the court denying the motion was not erroneous.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION