Opinion
D041141.
10-16-2003
In re STACY S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STACY S., Minor and Appellant.
The juvenile court declared Stacy S. a ward (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after she admitted assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). The court committed her to Breaking Cycles for a maximum 90 days, placed her on probation, and ordered her to pay $18,915.40 restitution. Stacy contends the trial court erred in ordering her to pay $18,915.40 restitution.
FACTS
On May 6, 2002, Stacy and another youth, Z., argued and called one another names at an El Cajon apartment complex. Stacy returned and slashed Z. on the stomach with a box cutter.
DISCUSSION
Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 provides in pertinent part:
"(a)(1) It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of conduct for which a minor is found to be a person described in Section 602 who incurs any economic loss as a result of the minors conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor.
"(2) Upon a minor being found to be a person described in Section 602, the court shall . . . order the minor to pay, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the law . . . : [¶] . . . [¶] (B) Restitution to the victim or victims, if any, in accordance with subdivision (h). [¶] . . . [¶]
"(h) Restitution ordered pursuant to subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) shall be imposed in the amount of the losses, as determined. . . . The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record. A minors inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling or extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution order, nor shall inability to pay be a consideration in determining the amount of the restitution order. . . ."
Stacy does not argue that the victim sustained less than $18,915.40 medical costs as a result of her offense. Rather, she argues the trial court failed to provide her with a full hearing on the restitution question and abused its discretion in "disregarding the compelling and extraordinary circumstances" that justified ordering less restitution. She argues that Z. did not request restitution, that Med-Cal paid his hospital bill, and ordering her to pay so much restitution would be debilitating.
A restitution hearing does not require the same formalities as other phases of a criminal prosecution. (People v. Rivera (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1153, 1160-1161.) Due process requires notice and reasonable opportunity to prepare and present evidence and argument. (People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 607.) Here, at the disposition hearing on June 5, 2002, the prosecution advised the court the hospital care for the victim amounted to $18,915.40. The court set a restitution hearing for July 29. On July 29, the court rescheduled the restitution hearing for September 25. On September 18, the People filed points and authorities and a list of medical expenses. On September 24, Stacys counsel filed points and authorities on the restitution question. On September 25, the court held a restitution hearing, heard counsels arguments, asked questions, and ordered Stacy to pay $18,915.40 restitution. Stacy received notice at the disposition hearing of the amount claimed. More than three months later the court held a hearing on the issue.
Stacy argues she was denied a full hearing because the court did not state specifics why the extraordinary circumstances it found here did not cause the case to fall within the exception to payment of full restitution. We consider the exception to payment of full restitution expressed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 as authorization for the trial court to consider mitigation caused by extraordinary circumstances in determining the amount of restitution. The trial court need not state reasons for minimizing or disregarding circumstances in mitigation. (People v. Salazar (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 799, 813). Stacy was not denied a full hearing on the question of the amount of restitution.
Regarding the claim that the trial court abused its discretion in disregarding compelling and extraordinary circumstances, Stacy recognizes, it is generally presumed that a court properly performs its official duty (People v. Rodriguez (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 555, 560), but quoting Rodriguez she argues that "presumption must give away to fact when irregularity is clearly shown" as it is here. (Ibid.)
Here, after the trial court received and reviewed pleadings on the question of restitution, held a restitution hearing and heard argument on the issue, it concluded:
"Im going to set restitution in the amount of $18,915.40. I think People v. Hove [(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266] does apply. I believe that while I understand in law there is a recognition of the rehabilitation aspect of it, I cannot figure out where that level is for rehabilitation and yet meet what I believe to be clear legislative and statutory as well as case law that requires — as well as constitutional law — that requires victims be made whole, and that restitution directly flow from the criminal acts that resulted in the victim being damaged monetarily.
"Having said all that, I appreciate that this is an extraordinary case. The question is, does it rise to the level of the exception that California law provides. And I dont think it does.
"I think that while it is a tragic scenario that Stacy found herself in, Im concerned about the facts and the admission that she made of attacking the victim with a box cutter. That victim was unrelated to prior traumatic events that she had experienced. I do recognize, however, and accept the psychological evaluation that indicated that
Stacey is suffering from depression and post-traumatic stress syndrome at the time of these events. However, I dont think that that reaches an extraordinary and compelling circumstance for not meeting, I believe, the statutory and constitutional requirements of victim restitution.
"I also recognize that this case is unique and that the victim is not seeking restitution, because the victim received Medi-Cal payments that paid for the $18,000 plus dollar of medical treatment, but I think case law is clear, and I think [People v.] Hove does apply. And notwithstanding that, I believe it is appropriate to impose victim restitution in the amount of $18,915.40. Its the order of this court."
Stacy argues the court abused its discretion in finding the case extraordinary apparently because the victim did not personally seek restitution, the debilitating effect ordering her to pay $18,915.40 will have, her depression resulting from sexual abuse as a child, and a recent unrelated rape. The court abuses its discretion only when acting arbitrarily or in a capricious manner. (People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 316.) Because Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 precludes the court from considering the minors ability to pay restitution, and the victim not personally seeking restitution is not a factor to be considered in determining the amount of restitution (see People v. Hove, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1272-1273), and because it is assumed the court gave proper weight to the victims emotional and mental state in determining to order her to pay full restitution (see Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Stacy to pay $18,915.40 restitution.
DISPOSITION
The restitution order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. and OROURKE, J.