Opinion
No. 340922
06-26-2018
In re H. A. R. STACHNIK, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Kalamazoo Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 2016-000102-NA Before: MURRAY, C.J., and MARKEY and TUKEL, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals as of right a circuit court order terminating his parental rights to the minor child, HS, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), MCL 712A.19b(3)(h) (parent imprisoned and child will be deprived of home for two years), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (child will be harmed if returned to parent). We affirm.
On January 13, 2015, respondent was arrested for breaking and entering. After he was released on bond, he committed a retail fraud in March 2015, which resulted in his return to jail. He was convicted of breaking and entering and sentenced to 19 months' to 15 years' imprisonment on May 26, 2015. While he was in prison, HS was born on December 22, 2015. Approximately three months later, because of mother's drug abuse and neglect, the trial court placed HS in the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services' (DHHS) care and custody, which placed her with a foster family with whom she has remained since.
When DHHS petitioned for the termination of mother's parental rights, she identified another man as HS's putative father. Petitioner investigated and determined through DNA testing that the man was not HS's biological father. Because of mother's ongoing drug and alcohol abuse problems, at a permanency planning hearing on May 24, 2017, HS's caseworker, Tannah Harvey, of the Kalamazoo DHHS office, recommended changing the permanency goal from reunification to adoption. The referee agreed, and the goal was changed. The referee asked mother if she knew the name of HS's putative father. Mother identified respondent for the first time and advised the referee that he was in prison.
On August 9, 2017, petitioner filed a petition for the termination of HS's putative father's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (h), and (j). The petition alleged facts that respondent was serving a 19 months to 15 years sentence and that he had no relationship with HS. On September 7, 2017, the trial court held the termination hearing for determination of respondent's parental rights to HS. The parties stipulated to the admission of respondent's recent DNA test report that indicated a 99.998% probability that respondent was HS's biological father. Respondent's counsel advised the trial court that respondent and mother signed an affidavit of parentage that day and that mother intended to file it with the state to establish respondent as HS's legal father.
At the end of the two-day termination hearing, the trial court found that a preponderance of the evidence established that respondent was incarcerated for HS's entire life and had established no relationship with her, and it took jurisdiction over respondent and, through him, HS pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1)-(5) because by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, depravity, on the part of respondent, the home environment was an unfit place for HS to live. Further, the trial court found that, although legally responsible, respondent neglected to provide HS care and maintenance when able to do so and failed or refused to provide proper and necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for HS's health and morals and subjected her to a substantial risk of harm to her mental well-being. The trial court also found by clear and convincing evidence that the facts alleged in the petition were true and established grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (h), and (j), which provide:
(3) The court may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
(h) The parent is imprisoned for such a period that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period exceeding 2 years, and the parent has not provided for the child's proper care and custody, and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.
The trial court also found that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of HS. Accordingly, the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights, and this appeal followed.
Respondent first argues that the trial court and DHHS violated his statutory rights to reasonable efforts to reunite him with HS and by prematurely terminating his parental rights. We disagree. To preserve an issue challenging the reasonableness of petitioner's reunification efforts, a parent must object to a service plan when it is adopted or shortly thereafter. In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 247; 824 NW2d 569 (2012); In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 27; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). Respondent never raised this issue at the trial court; accordingly, the issue is not preserved, and our review is for plain error affecting respondent's substantial rights. In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 703; 859 NW2d 208 (2014).
"In general, petitioner must make reasonable efforts to rectify conditions, to reunify families, and to avoid termination of parental rights." In re LE, 278 Mich App 1, 18, 29; 747 NW2d 883 (2008). However, respondent does not acknowledge that at the beginning of these proceedings, he was only a putative father, and petitioner is not obligated to provide such services to a putative parent. Id. Respondent and mother did not sign an affidavit of parentage until the day of the termination hearing, and the affidavit only later was filed with the state, making him the legal father of HS while the termination proceedings were pending. Indeed, by the time respondent was located, the trial court had already changed its goal from reunification to adoption and approved the filing of a petition requesting the termination of parental rights. Furthermore, when termination is requested in the initial petition, as occurred here with respondent, petitioner is not required to provide reunification services. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 91; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). Therefore, respondent has failed to establish any plain error with respect to petitioner's failure to provide reunification services to him.
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred when it found that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of HS. We disagree.
Once a statutory ground for termination is established, the trial court must order termination of parental rights if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90. We review for clear error a trial court's best-interest decision. In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). In In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713-714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014), this Court summarized:
The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children's best interests. To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests, the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home. The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption. [Citation and quotation marks omitted.]When considering best interests, the trial court must focus on the child rather than the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. The trial court may also consider how long the child has lived in the present home, and the likelihood that she "could be returned to [the] parent's home within the foreseeable future, if at all." In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248-249.
In this case, the record reflects that the trial court considered all of the evidence for its best-interest decision and a preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court's decision. Harvey testified that HS had been in her current foster placement for nearly her entire life. HS bonded with her caregivers and trusted them. Harvey further testified that HS had progressed very well developmentally in her current placement. HS achieved her developmental milestones and had a safe and stable environment in which to thrive. HS lived with a half-brother and had opportunity to visit with another sibling. Her caregivers adopted her half-brother and had interest in adopting HS. Harvey testified that HS needed stability and permanency so that she could continue to develop without interruption or potential trauma. Harvey also testified that respondent had no relationship with HS and no parental bond. Indeed, respondent admitted that he had no relationship or parental bond with HS. Respondent also admitted his long criminal history. The record also reflects that respondent had a history of domestic violence and drug addiction. Although respondent expressed a desire to parent HS, respondent's incarceration, his lack of a job or home, his history of criminality and drug addiction, and his capacity for violence, all weighed in favor of termination being in the best interests of HS. Further, respondent never provided anything for HS's care or custody and had no means of doing so. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not clearly err when it found that a preponderance of the evidence showed that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of HS.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Jonathan Tukel