Opinion
No. COA12–350.
2012-07-17
In the Matter of S.T.
Twyla Hollingsworth–Richardson for Petitioner Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services. Sydney Batch for Respondent-father.
Appeal by Respondent-father from order entered 20 December 2011 by Judge Elizabeth T. Trosch in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 June 2012. Twyla Hollingsworth–Richardson for Petitioner Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services. Sydney Batch for Respondent-father.
Pamela Newell, GAL Appellate Counsel, North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts, for Guardian ad Litem.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Respondent, the father of the juvenile S.T., appeals from an order terminating his parental rights. After careful review, we affirm.
Initials are used to protect the identity of the juvenile.
S.T. was born in July 2008. On 8 September 2008, the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging that S.T. was a neglected and dependent juvenile due to inappropriate supervision, the death of another juvenile in the home, and the family's history of reports with Child Protective Services. On 3 December 2008, S.T. was adjudicated a neglected and dependent juvenile. DSS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents on 4 November 2009.
Respondent-father signed a relinquishment of all parental rights on 31 March 2010. As a result, DSS voluntarily dismissed the petition to terminate Respondent-father's parental rights on 12 April 2010. However, in July 2011, DSS informed Respondent-father that his signed relinquishment of parental rights was missing and asked him to execute a second relinquishment. Respondent-father responded that he wished to be reunified with S.T. On 16 August 2011, DSS filed a new petition to terminate Respondent-father's parental rights. On 20 December 2011, the trial court entered an order of termination. Respondent-father appeals.
Respondent-father's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by concluding that grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111 (2011) to terminate his parental rights. We disagree.
Section 7B–1111 sets out the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. A finding of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to support termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C.App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233–34 (1990). “The standard of appellate review is whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” In re D.J.D., 171 N.C.App. 230, 238, 615 S.E.2d 26, 32 (2005) (citation omitted).
In the case sub judice, one of the grounds found by the trial court to support termination of Respondent-father's parental rights was abandonment. Pursuant to subsection 7B–1111(a)(7), parental rights may be terminated when a “parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion....” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(7). The motion to terminate Respondent-father's parental rights was filed on 16 August 2011. Thus, the relevant statutory period was from 16 February 2011 to 16 August 2011.
We note, however, that the statute requires that the child be abandoned for “ at least ” six months prior to the filing of the motion or petition to terminate parental rights. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(7) (emphasis added). Therefore, trial court's have discretion to consider events occurring before the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition.
Abandonment has been defined as:
Wil[l]ful neglect and refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of parental care and support.... [I]f a parent withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and wil[l]fully neglects to lend support and maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the child.
Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962) (citation omitted). “To constitute an abandonment[,] ... it is not necessary that a parent absent himself continuously from the child for the specified six months, nor even that he cease to feel any concern for its interest.” Id. at 503, 126 S.E.2d at 609. However, when a parent's “conduct over the six[ ]month [ ] period evinces a settled purpose and a wil[l]ful intent to forego all parental duties and obligations and to relinquish all parental claims to the child there has been an abandonment[.]” Id.
In support of its conclusion that Respondent-father abandoned S.T ., the trial court found, inter alia, that:
19. On 31 March 2010, after YFS [Youth and Family Services] filed a termination of parental rights petition, [Respondent-father] signed a document relinquishing any and all of his parental rights, evidencing a clear determination and a clear settled purpose to release his parental duties and claims.
....
21. It was not until July 2011 when [Respondent-father] was contacted by YFS adoption social worker and notified that [the] surrenders had been misplaced. At that time after over 15 months since he signed a relinquishment did [Respondent-father] say he wanted to establish a relationship with [S.T.] [sic].
....
24. From 31 March 2010 through July 2011, [Respondent-father] completely withheld his parental care and affection from [S.T.] and took no steps to provide a home for her outside of YFS care and custody besides attending hearing[s] on 16 August 2011 and 1 September 2011....
As noted supra, on 31 March 2010, Respondent-father relinquished all of his parental rights to S.T. Respondent-father acknowledged that he was aware that relinquishment would terminate his parental rights to S.T. Respondent-father never attempted to revoke his relinquishment and concedes that he withheld both his financial support and parental care and affection from S.T. between 31 March 2010 and July 2011, a period of some sixteen months. However, Respondent-father asserts that, “[t]he trial court should not be able to use [Respondent-father's] decision to [relinquish his parental rights and] allow his daughter to be adopted as a basis for abandonment.” We firmly reject this patently meritless argument.
We cannot conceive of a willful and intentional action by a parent that could more clearly and firmly “evince[ ] a settled purpose and a wil[l]ful intent to forego all parental duties and obligations and to relinquish all parental claims to [a] child[,]” id., than to voluntarily relinquish all parental rights so that the child can be adopted by another. For reasons satisfactory to himself, Respondent-father decided he did not want to be a parent to S.T., a decision he was entitled to make. Having voluntarily relinquished his parental rights, he made no attempt to revoke that decision for some sixteen months. Respondent-father asserts that “with almost one-hundred percent certainty, if [he] had contacted [DSS] between April 2010 and July 2011, DSS would have informed him that he had no right to contact his daughter[.]” We cannot know if this assertion is correct, but we do know with one-hundred percent certainty that Respondent-father never made the slightest attempt to contact S.T. or even inquire about her well-being for almost half her life. It was not until DSS contacted him in July 2011 that Respondent-father expressed any interest in his parental rights to his daughter. Even assuming it to be sincere, this apparent change of heart by Respondent-father was simply a day late and dollar short. It would be nonsensical for this Court to hold that a parent's voluntary relinquishment of parental rights cannot be considered as evidence of an intent “to forego all parental duties and obligations and to relinquish all parental claims.” Id. The findings of fact quoted above fully support the trial court's finding that Respondent-father abandoned S.T. Accordingly, the court did not err by concluding that this ground existed to terminate Respondent-father's parental rights.
Respondent-father also argues that the trial court erred by concluding that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights pursuant to subsections 7B–1111(a)(2) (willfully leaving the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing reasonable progress in correcting the conditions which led to the juvenile's removal) and (3) (willfully failing to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of the juvenile's care during foster care or other placement outside the home although able to do so). However, because the existence of any single statutory ground for termination is sufficient to support the court's order, we need not address these arguments. Taylor, 97 N.C.App. at 64, 387 S.E.2d at 233–34. Accordingly, the order terminating Respondent-father's parental rights is
AFFIRMED. Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUNTER, ROBERT C., concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).