Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. NJ13836, Harry M. Elias, Judge.
HALLER, J.
John T. appeals an order removing his daughter, S.T., from his custody. He contends no substantial evidence was presented to show the previous custody order had not been effective or that S.T. was at substantial risk in his custody. We affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 27, 2007, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) petitioned under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) on behalf of seven-month-old S.T., alleging she was at substantial risk of harm because she had been exposed to violent confrontations in the family home between her parents and she had been exposed to her mother, Kristina R.'s, violent outbursts.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
John told the social worker he had left the home with S.T. several times during the past month because Kristina had been breaking things. He believed Kristina might have stopped taking her psychiatric medications. John's criminal history dates to 1994 and includes numerous drug-related arrests. He said he was on probation for a drug-related conviction and claimed he had not used methamphetamine for eight months.
The court ordered S.T. detained, but gave the Agency discretion to place her with John on the condition his home was safe and he was having negative drug tests. The court ordered Kristina would have liberal supervised visitation, but John could not be the supervisor. It issued a restraining order requiring Kristina stay 150 yards away from John.
On February 6, 2008, the court found the allegations of the petition true, declared S.T. a dependent child of the court and ordered John to follow the provisions of his case plan. It recalled the restraining order and placed S.T. with John on the condition Kristina not reside in the family home.
On March 5, 2008, the Agency filed a supplemental petition under section 387, alleging placement with John had not been effective because John had allowed Kristina to have overnight visits with S.T. At the detention hearing on March 6, the court detained S.T. with John on the condition Kristina not go to John's home unless she had first contacted him and had permission from the social worker. On March 27 the court dismissed the section 387 petition.
In August 2008 the social worker recommended John be provided with six more months of family maintenance services. She reported John's home was clean and S.T. appeared to be clean, happy and strongly bonded to John. On August 5 the child abuse hotline received a referral that Kristina and John had had a physical altercation in the home. John came to the Agency offices with S.T. and said he had been to the family court seeking a restraining order against Kristina because she had come to his home the day before and was acting irrationally.
On September 26, 2008, the Agency filed a new section 387 supplemental petition, alleging S.T.'s placement with John was no longer effective because he had been arrested for selling methamphetamine, and open alcohol containers were found in the home accessible to S.T. The social worker reported John had been arrested, he was in jail, his home was dirty, police described it as looking "like a typical tweeker pad" and there were open alcohol containers within S.T.'s reach. Also, S.T. was dirty, her hair was greasy and she was wearing soiled clothing. John was released from custody on November 4. He told the social worker he had been arrested on a parole violation and the other charges had been dropped. He was working as a limousine driver for three different companies, but had lost his home and was staying with relatives. The uncle with whom he was living refused to be fingerprinted or to have a live-scan criminal check.
At the adjudication hearing on November 18, 2008, the court considered the documentary evidence and argument from counsel. It amended the petition by striking the allegation that John was arrested for selling methamphetamine, but added that drug paraphernalia had been located in the home accessible to S.T. It found the allegations of the petition as amended to be true and removed S.T. from John's custody.
DISCUSSION
John asserts the order removing S.T. from his custody was not supported by substantial evidence. The Agency argues the issue is moot because S.T. has been returned to John's custody and, thus, this court cannot grant the relief he seeks.
An appellate court will not review questions which are moot and only of academic importance, nor will it determine abstract questions of law at the request of a party who shows no substantial rights can be affected by the decision. (Keefer v. Keefer (1939) 31 Cal.App.2d 335, 337.) An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief. (In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315-1316.)
We decline to dismiss the appeal on the basis of mootness. As John argues, although S.T. has been returned to his custody, the adverse finding against him remains and could be used in the future as evidence of his pattern of unsafe parenting should the Agency again determine S.T. should be removed. We thus consider the merits of John's appeal. In so doing we hold the order removing S.T. from his custody was supported by substantial evidence.
A reviewing court must uphold a juvenile court's findings and orders if they are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1036-1037.) "[W]e must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court [citation], and we must also '... view the record in the light most favorable to the orders of the juvenile court.' " (In re Luwanna S. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 112, 114.) The appellant bears the burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) provides a child may not be taken from the custody of his or her parents unless the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence:
"There is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent's... physical custody."
The court has broad discretion to determine a child's best interests when fashioning a disposition order. (Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 863.) The focus of the removal statute is to avert harm to the child. (In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 536.) The court may consider past conduct as well as present circumstances if past conduct is probative of future conduct. (In re Troy D. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 889, 900.) At disposition the juvenile court considers all relevant evidence that refers to the allegations of the petition, and it considers the conditions as they existed at the time of the hearing. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824.)
Substantial evidence supports the order removing S.T. from John's custody. John has an extensive criminal history that includes arrests for drug-related crimes and domestic violence. When police arrested him on September 25, 2008, on a parole warrant that was issued for sale of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, they found open beer cans and alcohol bottles within S.T.'s reach. The house was dirty and the police described it as a "typical tweeker pad." S.T. was dirty, had greasy hair and soiled clothing. John proposed to leave S.T. with his housemate, who customarily provided child care. However, the housemate's boyfriend, who was a parolee, was present in the home. By the time John was released from custody on November 4, he had lost his home. He was staying with relatives, and the uncle with whom he was living refused to be fingerprinted or have a live-scan for criminal history. All of this evidence taken together provides substantial evidence to support the court's finding under section 361, subdivision (c)(1) that at the time of the dispositional hearing there was a substantial danger to S.T. in John's custody and there were no other means to protect her without removal.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., IRION, J.