"Without [the appropriate] findings and conclusions, appellate courts are left to wonder on what basis the trial court reached its ultimate decision." In re S.S.-G., No. M2015-00055-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 7259499, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015). When a trial court fails to comply with the requirements of section 36-1-113(k), "[we] must remand the case with directions to prepare the required findings of fact and conclusions of law."

In re S.S.-G., No. M2015-00055-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 7259499, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015) (quoting Lee v. Hall, 790 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)). As such,

, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2019) (quoting In re S.S.-G., No. M2015-00055-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 7259499, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015)).

It is true that on some occasions, this Court has held that a trial court's failure to specify the definition of severe abuse it relied upon mandated vacatur. For example, in In re S.S.-G., the trial court based its termination of the father's parental rights on a finding that he had "sexually abused the child . . . pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-1-602 and that this sexual abuse constitute[d] severe abuse pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-1-102(b)(2[1]) which constitute[d] grounds for termination of parental rights[.]" No. M2015-00055-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 7259499, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015). Because "child sexual abuse" and "severe child abuse" were both set out by statutes containing numerous definitions, this Court was "unable to conduct meaningful appellate review of the trial court's decision."

This Court has vacated a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights on this ground when we were unable to discern the applicable definition. See In re L.F., No. M2020-01663-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 3782130, at *12-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2021) (vacating the trial court's decision to terminate on this ground because it was unclear "whether the trial court relied on one of the many offenses listed in definition (C) or some other definition"); In re S.S.-G., No. M2015-00055-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 7259499, at *9-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015) (vacating because the "trial court's failure to include the specific statutory definitions that it relie[d] upon" precluded "meaningful review"). But a missing citation is not always fatal.

But recounting the proof presented is not the same as making the findings of fact required to adjudicate an issue. Cf. Rosebrough v. Caldwell, No. W2018-01168-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 6898218, at*4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2019) (quoting In re S.S.-G., No. M2015-00055-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 7259499, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015) ("'[A] lengthy summary of the testimony adduced at the hearing and a few credibility observations' without further indicating which testimony or other evidence the trial court relied upon in making its decision is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of making specific findings of fact.")). Without these findings, we are left to guess whether the trial court considered Father's conduct to amount to abuse.

When considering the ground of abandonment, this Court has held that "[s]imply stating that parent has 'abandoned the child' is insufficient." In re S.S.-G., No. M2015-00055-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 7259499, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015); see e.g., L.D.N. v. R.B.W., No. E2005-02057-COA-R3-PT, 2006 WL 369275, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2006); In re Adoption of T.L.H., No. M2008-01408-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 152475 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2009) (holding that the trial court's finding that "the abandonment of the minor child . . . was willful" was not sufficient to establish "whether [the trial court] found abandonment based on failure to visit, failure to support, or both.").

In the absence of such specificity, this Court cannot conduct a meaningful appellate review." In re S.S.-G., No. M2015-00055-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 7259499, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015) (vacating and remanding severe abuse ground where the trial court did not identify the "exact definition(s) relied upon"), no perm. app. filed. The ground of severe abuse in this case was not res judicata and was tried during the termination trial, requiring the juvenile court to identify the exact definition of severe abuse it relied upon.

However, on appeal, Roberto argues that there was a fatal error in the circuit court's termination order with respect to the ground of severe child abuse because the circuit court did not "specify [] which of the definitions it was relying on." Roberto relies on this Court's decisions in In re L.F., No. M2020-01663-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 3782130 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2021), and/« re S.S.-G., No. M2015-00055-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 7259499 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015). In In re S.S.-G., this Court was reviewing on appeal a trial court's "independent, de novo, finding of severe child abuse," but the trial court's order stated only that the appellant had "sexually abused the child . .. pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-1-602 and that this sexual abuse constitutes severe abuse" pursuant to section 37-1-102(b).

. See Rosebrough v. Caldwell, No. W2018-01168-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 6898218, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2019) (holding that an extensive trial court order was nevertheless deficient where it largely consisted of "conclusory statements regarding the evidence presented and not specific findings of fact as required"); see also In re S.S.-G., No. M2015-00055-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 7259499, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015) ("[T]he court must go beyond mere summation [of the evidence] by linking the evidence to its clearly stated findings of fact and conclusions of law.").