Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. CK76609 Valerie Skeba, Juvenile Court Referee.
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.
Office of the Los Angeles County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and O. Raquel Ramirez, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
CHANEY, J.
S.R. (Father) appeals from an order at the dispositional hearing requiring that his visitation with S.R. (Daughter) be monitored. We affirm because Father fails to show any error, insufficiency of the evidence, or abuse of discretion.
BACKGROUND
Father had a prior history of domestic violence toward V.P., with whom he had a romantic relationship. They had two children together, L.P. (female, born in 1993) and J.P. (male, born in 1998). The violence occurred in the presence of L.P. Father also has an extensive criminal history that includes numerous arrests and a half dozen misdemeanor and felony convictions. Though Father’s romantic relationship with V.P. ended in 1999, she permitted him to stay in her home in 2001 when he got out of jail. In 2001, about two weeks into his stay, Father sexually abused L.P., who was then eight or nine years old, by placing his penis in her vagina.
By 2009 Father was married to T.R. (Mother), with whom he had a daughter, S.R., born in 2008 (Daughter). Father and Mother engaged in acts of mutual domestic violence on several occasions. They came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) when Father hit Mother while he was holding Daughter.
On March 14, 2009 DCFS detained Daughter with Mother on the condition that Father not reside in the family home. DCFS filed a petition containing allegations against Father under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (d) (sexual abuse), and (j) (abuse of sibling) and recommended only monitored visitation for Father. At the detention hearing the court found a substantial danger existed to the physical or emotional health of Daughter and there were no reasonable means to protect her without removal from Father’s custody. Daughter was released to Mother with family maintenance services. Without objection by Father, the court ordered monitored visitation for Father with Daughter. At a pre-trial resolution conference one month later, the court continued the visitation order, again without objection.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
In preparing a report for the adjudication/disposition hearing, a social worker spoke to L.P. L.P. reported details of the 2001 sexual abuse and indicated she had no relationship with Father and did not desire any visitation. The social worker also obtained letters from Illiniza M. Baty, a licensed clinical social worker, and Ruth Bujanda-Moore, a psychologist, both of whom had treated L.P. Ms. Baty reported that during treatment, L.P. “expressed a great deal of worry for her own, her mother’s and sibling’s safety. The recurrent themes during treatment were fear that her father would be released from prison and return home, anxiety that if he were to come home, her mother would not be able to refrain from allowing him entrance, and worry that there would be more fighting and that she would not be safe.” Dr. Bujanda-Moore stated L.P. “reported that she saw her father physically abusing her mother in their home” and V.P. disclosed that Father “had been physically, sexually, and emotionally abusive toward her.”
At the adjudication and disposition hearing on May 14, 2009, L.P. testified about Father’s sexual abuse of her and her witnessing his violence toward V.P. The court found her to be “very, very credible,” and stated, “I think she is disappointed and feels abandoned by her father, with good reason. But I also think that the sex abuse did occur. She was very, very clear about that.”
The juvenile court declared Daughter a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b), (d) and (j), based on her parents’ “history of violent altercations” and Father’s sexual abuse of L.P. The court stated, “I think [the domestic violence] poses great risk to [Daughter] and to her mother if father does not get treatment and if mother does not get treatment because, again, there’s no reason for me to believe that it is going to stop. Father seems to resort to violence when he gets angry. So I think it is a very, very dangerous situation.” Regarding Father’s sexual abuse of L.P., the court stated the abuse of her sibling is “very clearly something that would put [Daughter], maybe not at a year old but certainly at some point in the future, at risk if it’s not addressed. And just because it hasn’t occurred since, that we know of, does not mean it’s not going to occur again.”
The court removed Daughter from Father and ordered her placed with Mother. Mother was ordered to attend parenting classes and domestic violence support group or individual counseling. Father was ordered to attend parenting classes, domestic violence counseling, and individual counseling to address sexual abuse issues.
With respect to visitation, the court ordered, without objection, that Father’s visits be monitored.
Father appeals from the May 14, 2009 jurisdictional findings and orders finding jurisdiction under section 300 and removing Daughter from his custody. He does not, in the notice of appeal, challenge the visitation order.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Father expressly concedes the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and ignores its jurisdiction and removal orders. He therefore abandons any appeal based on those findings or orders. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994 [appeal unsupported by a claim of reversible error or presentation of argument and authority may be deemed abandoned].) Father contends only that the monitored visitation restriction is unsupported by substantial evidence and constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Preliminarily, we disagree with DCFS’s contention that Father forfeited any challenge to the juvenile court’s visitation order because he failed to object to it below. True, failure to object to certain visitation orders below precludes the right to challenge an abuse of discretion on appeal. (See In re Anthony P. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 635, 641 [failure to request sibling visitation waived issue on appeal]; In re Daniel D. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1823, 1830-1831 [failure to request alternative placement].) “[A]ny other rule would permit a party to trifle with the courts. The party could deliberately stand by in silence and thereby permit the proceedings to reach a conclusion in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and avoid if unfavorable. [Citations.]” (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339.) But we construe Father’s contention regarding visitation to be tantamount to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that substantial danger to Daughter’s well-being would exist if visitation were not monitored. We thus address the merits of his claim. (In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 200 [to the extent parents argue substantial evidence does not support a court’s finding, the argument is not waived by failure to object below].)
Father’s claim has no merit.
“Visitation is an essential component of any reunification plan. [Citation.] To promote reunification, visitation must be as frequent as possible. [Citation.]” (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972.) “But a parent’s liberty interest in the care, custody, and companionship of children cannot be maintained at the expense of their well-being. [Citation.] While visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the children ‘and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm specified in section 300.’ [Citation.]” (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 50.)
We review a juvenile court’s visitation order under the abuse of discretion standard. (In re Emmanuel R. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 452, 465.) The question is whether the court’s determination that the visitation provided is in the best interest of the child exceeded the bounds of reason. (Ibid.)
Though Father admits on appeal that “[t]here is evidence of domestic turmoil sufficiently strong to justify jurisdiction,” he contends the juvenile court’s order that his visits with Daughter be monitored is “based upon ancient history,” i.e., his sexual abuse of L.P. eight years ago. He argues the sexual abuse, “if it actually occurred,” “was a one time event that was not indicative of any tendencies on the part of [Father] to be a pedophile.”
We disagree. The order that Father’s visits with daughter be monitored by someone other than Mother is not based on ancient history, but on Father’s sexual abuse of his eight-or-nine-year-old daughter eight years ago. Sexual abuse of one’s own, young child is so substantial a departure from the norms of human emotional life and reflects such a widely aberrant psychology that the passage of a few years does little to diminish the risk that other young children will be victimized. Father offers nothing—no changed circumstances in his life—to indicate Daughter will be safe in his presence once she turns eight or nine. The juvenile court therefore reasonably concluded Father’s sexual abuse of Daughter’s sibling indicates Daughter would be at risk if his visitation was unmonitored.
Father’s contention fails also because the juvenile court ordered monitored visitation based not only on his sexual abuse of L.P. but also his violence toward Mother. Father admitted to much of the violence below and admits here that it justifies jurisdiction. We conclude it also justifies that visitation be monitored, and that it be monitored by someone other than mother. As the juvenile court reasonably concluded this “is a very, very dangerous situation.”
The visitation order was supported by substantial evidence and was well within the discretion of the juvenile court.
DISPOSITION
The orders of May 14, 2009 are affirmed.
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J., JOHNSON, J.