Opinion
04-22-00050-CV
03-31-2023
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF Hugh Bob SPILLER, Deceased
From the 452nd District Court, Menard County, Texas Trial Court No. 2013-02059 Honorable Polly Jackson Spencer, Judge Presiding
Sitting by assignment.
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
This appeal arises out of a probate proceeding involving the estate of Hugh Bob Spiller. Appellant Sharan Spiller Linebaugh argues the trial court erred in granting a motion seeking to dismiss a paragraph of her pleading and no-evidence motion for summary judgment filed by appellee Mary Lee Spiller Kothmann. We affirm the trial court's order granting Mary Lee's no-evidence motion for summary judgment, and we reverse the remainder of the trial court's order and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Background
When Hugh Bob Spiller died in 2013, his wife, Mary Lee, initiated a probate proceeding by filing an application to probate a will dated August 21, 2009 ("the 2009 Will"). Hugh Bob's daughter, Sharan, and his grandson, Reagan Willman, filed will contests to Mary Lee's application. Sharan and Reagan each claimed Hugh Bob lacked testamentary capacity and was under undue influence when he signed the 2009 Will. Reagan later amended his pleading and included a request to probate a will dated November 8, 2006 ("the 2006 Will"). Sharan ultimately nonsuited her contest regarding the 2009 Will.
Later, at a pretrial hearing, Mary Lee and Reagan announced they had reached an agreement, known as the Spiller Family Settlement Agreement. Among other things, they agreed to probate the 2006 Will. Sharan was not a party to this agreement. At the end of the hearing, the trial court approved the agreement and indicated it would sign an order admitting the 2006 Will to probate in accordance with the agreement. However, before the trial court signed a final judgment admitting the 2006 Will to probate, Reagan withdrew his consent. The trial court denied Reagan's attempt to rescind his consent to the agreement and entered an order admitting the 2006 Will to probate. Reagan appealed, and we vacated the trial court's order as void and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. See In re Matter of Estate of Spiller, No. 04-15-00449-CV, 2016 WL 3557206, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio June 29, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reasoning Reagan could revoke his consent to Spiller Family Settlement Agreement because trial court had not yet rendered judgment on agreement).
Mary Lee then amended her pleadings, alleging Reagan breached the Spiller Family Settlement Agreement. The trial court ultimately severed Reagan's will contest involving the 2009 Will from Mary Lee's breach of contract case, and the parties proceeded to a jury trial on the will contest. After a jury trial, the trial court declared the 2009 Will null and void. As to the breach of contract case, Reagan and Mary Lee filed competing motions for summary judgment, and the trial court denied Reagan's motion and granted Mary Lee's motion. On May 28, 2018, the trial court entered a final judgment admitting the 2006 Will to probate in accordance with the Spiller Family Settlement Agreement ("the 2018 Final Judgment"). Reagan appealed, and we dismissed Reagan's appeal concluding he had waived his right to appeal in the Spiller Family Settlement Agreement. See In the Matter of the Estate of Hugh Bob Spiller, No. 04-18-00522-CV, 2019 WL 2360100, at *5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio June 5, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
On April 24, 2020, Sharan filed a petition contesting the validity of the 2006 Will. Specifically, she alleged Hugh Bob lacked testamentary capacity and was under undue influence when he signed the 2006 Will. Mary Lee filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, arguing there was no evidence Hugh Bob lacked testamentary capacity or was under undue influence when he signed the 2006 Will. Sharan later amended her petition, additionally alleging the trial court improperly admitted the 2006 Will to probate because it did not have any evidence the 2006 Will met the statutory criteria for a valid will. This additional allegation comprised Paragraph 5A of Sharan's amended pleading. Mary Lee filed a "Motion to Dismiss Paragraph 5A of [Sharan's] Amended Pleading," specifically seeking to dismiss Sharan's additional allegation. According to Mary Lee, Sharan's additional allegation challenged the validity of the 2018 Final Judgment, and the trial court did not have jurisdiction to alter the 2018 Final Judgment admitting the 2006 Will to probate. Mary Lee also asserted Sharan's additional allegation constituted a collateral attack and was barred by the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The trial court granted Mary Lee's motions and entered a take nothing judgment against Sharan. Sharan now appeals.
Mary Lee's "Motion to Dismiss Paragraph 5A of [Sharan's] Amended Pleading"
Sharan first contends the trial court erred in granting Mary Lee's "Motion to Dismiss Paragraph 5A of [Sharan's] Amended Pleading" because the allegation she added to her amended petition is not a collateral attack or barred by the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Specifically, Sharan contends her allegation is a direct attack of the 2018 Final Judgment permitted by section 256.204 of the Texas Estates Code, which authorizes the filing of a will contest within two years from the date the will is admitted to probate. She further contends law of the case does not apply because the prior appellate decisions concerning this case do not relate to her allegation, and neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel preclude her allegation because she was not a party to any of the prior litigation.
A. Nature of Mary Lee's Motion and Our Standard of Review
Neither Sharan nor Mary Lee indicates what standard of review to apply in our analysis. To determine our standard of review and whether the trial court erred in granting Mary Lee's motion, we must examine the motion's nature. "It is well settled that the nature of a motion is determined by its substance, rather than its title or caption." Cuba v. Williams, No. 01-18-00122-CV, 2019 WL 1716061, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 18, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). Therefore, to determine what standard of review to apply to analyze the motion, we examine the substance of the motion and the relief sought. Id.
Here, Mary Lee filed what she titled a "Motion to Dismiss Paragraph 5A of [Sharan's] Amended Pleading," arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the additional ground alleged in Paragraph 5A of Sharan's amended pleading. As indicated earlier, Paragraph 5A alleged the trial court failed to comply with the statutory requirements to probate the 2006 Will. Mary Lee also argued several legal doctrines precluded Sharan from raising this additional ground. Mary Lee did not cite a procedural basis for her motion or move to dismiss the entire will contest or any of the other grounds asserted by Sharan; instead, she specifically moved to dismiss only Paragraph 5A of Sharan's amended pleading, essentially asking the trial court to eliminate the additional ground. Accordingly, we construe her motion as a motion to strike a portion of the petition, which we review under an abuse of discretion standard. See Henderson v. Shanks, 449 S.W.3d 834, 841 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (stating trial court's ruling, which struck portion of petition, is reviewed for abuse of discretion); In re McComb, No. 10-19-00001-CV, 2019 WL 1066441, at *2 (Tex. App.-Waco Mar. 6, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (orig. proceeding) (construing bill of review as "Counter-Application to Determine Heirship"). To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Mary Lee's motion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles; in other words, whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. See Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam).
B. Jurisdiction
Turning to Mary Lee's motion, we begin with Mary Lee's jurisdictional argument to determine whether any of the grounds she argued support the trial court's decision to grant the motion. According to Mary Lee, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Sharan's additional allegation attacking the 2018 Final Judgment admitting the 2006 Will to probate. Mary Lee contends without elaboration the trial court was "without jurisdiction or authority to enter any order which changes or limits the 2018 Final Judgment" because mandate had issued in Reagan's appeal to the 2018 Final Judgment.
We review questions of jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks and Wildlife, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). In general, "[a] mandate is directed to a lower court to notify it of the appellate court's action and to order it to duly recognize, obey, and execute the appellate court's judgment." Geisendorff v. Fenwick, No. 04-94-00457-CV, 1995 WL 612406, at *3 (Tex. App.- San Antonio Oct. 18, 1995, writ denied) (mem. op.) (citing Lewelling v. Bosworth, 840 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ)). When mandate issues, a trial court does not have jurisdiction to review or interpret the appellate court's judgment. Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, Inc., 824 S.W.2d 254, 255-56 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.). It is allowed, however, "some reasonable exercise of discretion in fulfilling the terms of the mandate." Id.
Here, our previous opinion involving the 2018 Final Judgment held Reagan waived his right to appeal when he signed the Spiller Family Settlement Agreement, and mandate issued on October 29, 2019. Sharan was not a party to that appeal, and she was not a party to the underlying breach of contract case on which it was based. After mandate issued, Sharan filed a will contest pursuant to section 256.204 of the Texas Estates Code, which permits an interested person to contest a will no later than two years after the will is admitted to probate. See Tex. Est. Code § 256.204. In paragraph 5A of her amended petition, Sharan argued the trial court failed to comply with the statutory requirements necessary to admit the 2006 Will to probate. Nowhere in Paragraph 5A did she ask the trial court to review or interpret our previous appellate judgment. Thus, we cannot conclude the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider Sharan's argument, and Mary Lee's jurisdictional complaint cannot be a basis to support the trial court's order granting her motion.
C. Collateral Attack
We next consider Mary Lee's assertion Paragraph 5A is an impermissible collateral attack on the validity of the 2018 Final Judgment admitting the 2006 Will to probate. Mary Lee's argument ignores the nature of a will contest. "A will contest is a direct attack on the order admitting a will to probate." Stoll v. Henderson, 285 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.); see Ladehoff v. Ladehoff, 436 S.W.2d 334, 336-37 (Tex. 1968) (explaining Legislature has provided interested persons with several alternative methods, including will contest statute, to directly attack judgment admitting will to probate). It provides a person with a means to contest a will's validity by challenging the failure to comply with either "those things essential under the statute to the making of a will" or "those requirements necessary to clothe the probate court with the power to make valid probate." Ladehoff, 436 S.W.2d at 337 (quoting Franks v. Chapman, 61 Tex. 576, 582 (Tex. 1884)) (internal quotations omitted); Stoll, 285 S.W.3d at 105. "Grounds for contesting the validity of a will include: failure to comply with statutory requirements; lack of testamentary capacity; undue influence; mistake; fraud or forgery; duress; and existence of an agreement not to probate." Dickson v. Dickson, 993 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Here, Paragraph 5A contests the validity of the 2006 Will by directly attacking the 2018 Final Judgment admitting the 2006 Will to probate and arguing the trial court failed to comply with the statutory requirements necessary to make valid probate. Accordingly, Sharan's assertion is not a collateral attack, but instead a direct attack on the 2018 Final Judgment. See id. As a result, Mary Lee's collateral attack argument cannot be a basis to support the trial court's order granting her motion.
D. Law of the Case
Mary Lee also argues Paragraph 5A is barred by the doctrine of law of the case, which is designed to "put this litigation to an end." "The 'law of the case' doctrine provides that a decision of a court of last resort on a question of law will govern a case throughout its subsequent stages." In re Benavides, 605 S.W.3d 234, 238 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2020, pet. denied) (quoting Cody Tex., L.P. v. BPL Expl., Ltd., 619 S.W.3d 735, 741-42 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Dec. 11, 2019, pet. denied)); e.g., City of Houston v. Jackson, 192 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. 2006). "The doctrine does not apply when the issues presented in a successive appeal are not substantially the same as those previously decided." Benavides, 605 S.W.3d at 238; see Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1986). As explained by the Texas Supreme Court, in a second trial or proceeding, the issues and facts may have sufficiently changed causing law of the case to no longer apply. Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630. Here, neither of the prior litigation nor subsequent appeals involving this probate proceeding contested the validity of the 2006 Will. Accordingly, because the issues presented in this case are not substantially similar as those previously litigated or decided by this court, Paragraph 5A is not barred by law of the case. See id.
E. Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel
Finally, Mary Lee contends res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude Sharan's argument outlined in Paragraph 5A. In general, res judicata precludes the relitigation of claims which "have been finally adjudicated or that arise out of the same subject matter as a prior action and could have been litigated in the prior action." In re Est. of Ayala, 986 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 1999) (citing Barr v. Resol. Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992)). To successfully assert res judicata as an affirmative defense, a party must prove the following elements: "(1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims as were raised or could have been raised in the first action." Id. (citing Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996)). Collateral estoppel prevents relitigating issues already resolved in a previous lawsuit. Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 628.
Here, neither of the previously appealed judgments involved litigation contesting the 2006 Will; thus, there is no prior final judgment on the merits. Moreover, the allegation asserted in Paragraph 5A is not based on the same claims or issues raised in either Reagan's will contest to the 2009 Will or Mary Lee's breach of contract case. Accordingly, neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel preclude Sharan from asserting Paragraph 5A, and therefore neither are a basis to support the trial court's order granting Mary Lee's motion.
Having determined none of the grounds asserted in Mary Lee's motion could support the trial court's order granting of it, we hold the trial court abused its discretion in granting Mary Lee's "Motion to Dismiss Paragraph 5A of [Sharan's] Amended Pleading."
No-Evidence Summary Judgment
Sharan next argues the trial court erred in granting Mary Lee's no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Sharan claims "although she should not have had any burden of proof," she provided more than a scintilla of evidence Hugh Bob showed signs of mental illness, vascular dementia, memory loss, and erratic behavior in late July 2005 before signing the 2006 Will. Mary Lee, however, asserts the trial court properly granted her no-evidence motion because Sharan failed to offer any evidence indicating Hugh Bob lacked testamentary capacity or was under undue influence when he executed the 2006 Will.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is essentially a pre-trial directed verdict. Est. of Koontz, No. 04-15-00820-CV, 2016 WL 6775593, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Nov. 16, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 581-82 (Tex. 2006)). "When such a motion is filed, 'the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence raising an issue of material fact as to the elements specified in the motion.'" Id. (quoting Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 582). "'We review the evidence presented by the motion and response in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.'" Id. (quoting Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 582).
A no-evidence summary judgment is improperly granted if the nonmovant brings forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(i); Koontz, 2016 WL 6775593, at *1. "More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions." King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., In re Est. of Grimm, 180 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet.). "Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is 'so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion' of a fact." King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 751 (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)); see, e.g., Grimm, 180 S.W.3d at 607.
B. Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence
When, as in this case, a will contest case is filed after a will is admitted to probate, the party contesting the will bears the burden of proving the testator lacked testamentary capacity. See Koontz, 2016 WL 6775593, at *2. "A testator has testamentary capacity when he has sufficient mental ability to understand he is making a will, the effect of making a will, and the general nature and extent of his property." Id. "The testator also must know his next of kin and the natural objects of his bounty, the claims upon them, and have sufficient memory to collect in his mind the elements of the business transacted and hold them long enough to form a reasonable judgment about them." Id. The ultimate issue centers on whether the testator had testamentary capacity on the day he executed the will. Id. However, circumstantial evidence of the testator's state of mind at other times may be considered if such evidence shows a condition affecting the individual's testamentary capacity was persistent and likely present at the time the will was executed. Id.
Undue influence implies the existence of testamentary capacity, but occurs when there is evidence showing the testator is subject to and controlled by a dominant influence or power. Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963). "The burden of proving undue influence is upon the party contesting [a will's] execution." Id. "To show undue influence, a contestant must prove: (1) the existence and exertion of an influence (2) that subverted or overpowered the testator's mind when she executed the will, (3) such that she executed a will that she would not have otherwise executed but for the influence." Altice v. Hernandez, No. 01-22-00019-CV, 2022 WL 16756383, at *9 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 8, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922).
Here, as the nonmovant, Sharan bore the burden of producing evidence raising a fact issue on her testamentary capacity or undue influence allegations. See Koontz, 2016 WL 6775593, at *2. In her response, Sharan attached certified records from the Menard County Sheriff's Office showing on July 30, 2005, Hugh Bob was detained under a warrant for emergency detention because he exhibited signs of "a mental illness that create[d] an imminent and substantial risk of serious harm to himself or others" if not immediately restrained. The records included a letter dated July 27, 2005 from Hugh Bob's doctor stating Hugh Bob had a past history of vascular dementia and memory loss. The doctor further stated Hugh Bob had woken up that Monday "in a state of confusion and altered mental status." According to the doctor, Hugh Bob needed a pacemaker, but Hugh Bob refused despite being told of the risks of passing out or sudden death. The doctor concluded the letter stating he had received a call from Hugh Bob's wife that day indicating Hugh Bob was frantically cutting down trees, and she feared him.
At most, the certified records provide evidence of Hugh Bob's capacity in July 2005. However, the pivotal issue in Sharan's lack of testamentary capacity challenge is whether Hugh Bob had testamentary capacity on the day he executed the will. See id. In this case, the 2006 Will was signed on November 8, 2006, and there is nothing in the certified records regarding Hugh Bob's capacity on that day. The certified records also fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Hugh Bob's condition in July 2005 was persistent and likely present at the time the will was executed. Finally, there is nothing in the records raising a fact issue on the existence of an undue influence that overpowered Hugh Bob when he signed the 2006 Will. Accordingly, because Sharan's evidence was insufficient to raise a fact issue on the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence, summary judgment was proper. We therefore hold the trial court did not err in granting Mary Lee's no-evidence motion for summary judgment.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the portion of the trial court's order granting Mary Lee's no-evidence motion for summary judgment. However, because we hold the trial court abused its discretion in granting Mary Lee's "Motion to Dismiss Paragraph 5A of [Sharan's] Amended Pleading," we reverse the remaining portion of the trial court's order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.