Opinion
H051021
08-19-2024
Estate of HORACE SPIKES, Deceased. v. LISA CARUTH et al., Objectors and Appellants. ELIZABETH QUADROS et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 21PR189814
WILSON, J.
This appeal arises from a probate proceeding involving the division of assets from a trust created by decedent Horace Spikes. Following Spikes' passing away in 2021, respondent Elizabeth Quadros, one of eight beneficiaries of the trust, reached a settlement agreement with the remaining beneficiaries on November 22, 2022, regarding the disposition of trust assets. After Quadros filed a petition requesting the trial court's approval of the settlement agreement on December 5, 2022, appellants Lisa Caruth and Lynnette Robinson filed objections to the petition, claiming that they were Spikes' twin daughters, whom he had not been aware of, and therefore should be considered omitted heirs to the trust pursuant to Probate Code section 21622.
For consistency with the parties' briefings and brevity, we refer to the parties by their last names.
As the interim trustee, Silicon Valley Bank, filed a joint responsive brief with Quadros, we refer to them collectively as "respondents" where appropriate.
Undesignated references are to the Probate Code.
The trial court subsequently approved the settlement agreement and overruled appellants' objections, finding that appellants had no standing to participate in the trust proceedings as they were not beneficiaries and provided no admissible evidence demonstrating they constituted omitted heirs.
Appellants, representing themselves, now appeal the trial court's order approving the settlement agreement, including the court's determination that they did not constitute omitted heirs under section 21622. For the reasons set forth below, we find that appellants lack standing to appeal the order and dismiss the appeal.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Factual Background
On June 23, 2002, Spikes created a revocable living trust entitled "THE HORACE SPIKES FAMILY TRUST." A restatement of the trust, which confirmed the original terms with no changes, was prepared on April 26, 2016. The trust identified seven beneficiaries, including Spikes' nieces and nephew, and four friends, and specifically disinherited Spikes' biological son and his descendants, as well as other named relatives. Spike later amended the trust on October 30, 2020, which specified that his house be sold to Quadros for $300,000. Upon Spike's passing away on December 22, 2020, the trust became irrevocable.
According to Quadros, she had known Spikes her entire life and lived next door to him for more than ten years prior to his passing away. During the last several years of Spikes' life, Quadros had provided him with "friendship and assistance," including visiting him daily, preparing meals for him, taking him to his medical appointments, and coordinating with his caregivers as his health deteriorated during his final years. Because Quadros did not accept any financial compensation from Spike for helping him, Spikes offered to leave his house to her after he died. Quadros refused to accept the house as a gift, but agreed to purchase the home after Spikes' death, at a below-market purchase price of $300,000. Spikes subsequently amended his trust to include this agreement for the sale of his house.
B. Procedural History 1. Notification of Trustee and Correspondence from Appellants
On January 27, 2021, trustee James Wright, who was also one of the named beneficiaries in the trust, sent the beneficiaries a Notification by Trustee pursuant to section 16061.7 , where he indicated his suspicions that the 2020 amendment to the trust regarding the sale of Spikes' house to Quadros was not enforceable.
This section provides, in relevant part, that a trustee shall serve a notification on each beneficiary and heir of the trust "[w]hen a revocable trust or any portion thereof becomes irrevocable because of the death of one or more of the settlors of the trust[.]" (§16061.7, subd. (a)(1) & (b)(1)-(2).)
On February 16, 2021, Wright's counsel received a letter on behalf of appellants from their former counsel requesting a copy of Spikes' trust. Appellants' counsel indicated that Spikes may not have been aware of appellants' existence until after he had executed the trust such that they may constitute omitted or pretermitted heirs. Wright's counsel requested that appellants provide evidence in support of their claims, as well as legal support for their contentions. Appellants' counsel responded that according to appellants' mother, Linda Mikell Meredith, Spikes, who was "like a member of her family[,]" had taken her to an event where she became too disabled to consent, where he "fathered" appellants. Meredith did not immediately realize this interaction had resulted in her pregnancy. However, once she became aware of his paternity, she did not inform Spikes that he was appellants' father due to their family relationship.
In response, Wright's counsel indicated that he did not find this letter to be sufficient to prove Spikes' paternity or appellants' entitlement to any recovery as omitted heirs. Nevertheless, on June 3, 2021, Wright's counsel sent appellants' counsel a copy of the trust and the Notification by Trustee. The Notification by Trustee contained the following language: "WARNING: You may not bring an action to contest the Trust more than 120 days from the date this notification by the Trustee is served upon you or 60 days from the date on which a copy of the terms of the Trust is mailed or personally delivered to you in response to your request during that 120-day period, whichever is later." The record does not reflect appellants filed a petition to contest the trust within this time period.
2. Trust Proceedings and Settlement Agreement
On March 22, 2021, Wright filed a petition for instructions with the probate court (Santa Clara County Superior Court Case No. 21PR189814) to determine the validity of the amendment. Quadros objected to the petition, and subsequently requested that Wright be removed as trustee for breaches of trust and failure to perform his duties as trustee. On May 6, 2022, the court partially granted Quadros' request by temporarily removing Wright as trustee.
On November 22, 2022, Quadros and Wright participated in a court-mediation session, which the other beneficiaries chose not to participate in. At the conclusion of mediation, Quadros and Wright reached an agreement that Spikes' home would be sold to Quadros for a higher purchase price of $594,500. If Quadros was unable to obtain financing for the purchase, the home would be sold to a third party for fair market value, and Quadros would receive $120,000 from the net sale proceeds. On December 5, 2022, Quadros filed a petition with the probate court to approve the settlement agreement and instruct the interim trustee to execute the terms therein.
3. Proceedings Related to Settlement Agreement
a. Appellant's Objections
On January 25, 2023, appellants appeared at the hearing on Quadros' petition to approve the settlement agreement. Although the proceeding was not transcribed, the minute order reflects that the court heard argument from the parties as to whether appellants had standing and granted appellants' counsel's request to file and serve objections to Quadros' petition.
Appellants filed their objections on February 15, 2023. They claimed that they were omitted heirs within the meaning of section 21622 because Spikes was unaware that he had twin daughters when he executed his trust in 2002 and restated the terms in 2016. Appellants also argued that they were not provided proper notice of the Notification of Trustee because it was only mailed to their former counsel, who had never filed anything in court confirming his representation of appellants. Similarly, appellants contended they were not provided notice of the mediation proceedings, and therefore they could not be bound by the terms therein due to their failure to participate. Finally, appellants argued that the agreement did not appear to be reached pursuant to an "arms-length" mediation because only two of the beneficiaries, Quadros and Wright, participated in mediation, and the agreed-upon purchase price for Spikes' residence was significantly below market value.
This section provides as follows: "If, at the time of the execution of all of decedent's testamentary instruments effective at the time of decedent's death, the decedent failed to provide for a living child solely because the decedent believed the child to be dead or was unaware of the birth of the child, the child shall receive a share in the estate equal in value to that which the child would have received if the decedent had died without having executed any testamentary instruments." (§ 21622.)
Appellants also submitted individual declarations in support of their objections, as well as a declaration from Meredith (their mother). Meredith stated that in April 1962, Spikes took her to a party and kept giving her alcohol, then took her to his house and raped her. Meredith indicated she was too disabled to consent, but claimed that when she asked Spikes why he had not taken her home, he told her it was "because of what [Meredith's] brother did to [Spikes'] sister." Once Meredith discovered she was pregnant, she was afraid to tell anyone about what happened because Spikes' sister was married to her brother. She subsequently married another man who she had already been involved with, and gave birth to appellants on January 8, 1963. Approximately four years later, a paternity test revealed that Meredith's husband was not appellants' father. Meredith claimed she did not tell appellants that Spikes was their father until a year before his passing because she noticed that Spikes' mental condition was deteriorating.
In their declarations, appellants confirmed that they were unaware Spikes was their father until a year prior to his death and did not have a relationship with him. However, appellant Robinson claimed that when she found out Spikes was her father, she called him on the pretext of wishing him happy birthday and told him she was Meredith's daughter. She subsequently spoke to Spikes a few more times and sent him a family photograph of her and appellant Caruth with their children and grandchildren, which he allegedly never received. Appellant Robinson also contended that during one of her phone calls with Spikes, he "apologized" for the condition appellants grew up in. Both appellants further indicated that Spikes suffered from dementia and brain damage prior to preparing his trust, and claimed that Quadros and Wright had engaged in an "elaborate plan" to isolate Spikes from his friends and family.
b. Quadros' and Wright's responses
In her response, Quadros contended that appellants had no standing to object to the settlement agreement because they failed to establish that the sole reason Spikes did not provide for them in his trust was because he was unaware of their birth, as required under section 21622. Quadros claimed that in order for appellants to meet this requirement, they would have to demonstrate that Spikes intended to give his estate to his children if he had any, but chose to give it to others solely because he was unaware, he had any children. Quadros further argued that even if appellants could prove that Spikes did not provide for them solely because he was unaware of their birth, they would only be entitled to whatever share of his estate they would have received if he had passed away intestate. Under section 6402, subdivision (a), only the" 'issue'" of a decedent may receive a share of the decedent's estate, and" 'issue'" is specifically defined under section 50 as someone who has a parent and child relationship with the decedent. Quadros claimed that appellants could not establish that they had a parent and child relationship with Spikes because: (1) he never married their mother; (2) he never received appellants into his home and held them out as his own; (3) a court order had never been entered establishing his parentage; and (4) appellants could not demonstrate parentage through clear and convincing evidence, such as genetic DNA evidence acquired during Spikes' lifetime. Quadros therefore contended that because appellants had no standing to object to the agreement, their arguments regarding proper notice should be disregarded.
The definitions of a parent and child relationship are found in section 6450, which refers to a parent and child relationship existing between a person and their natural parents, as well as section 6453, which sets forth specific circumstances under which a person can be determined to be a" 'natural parent.' "
Wright raised similar arguments in his response regarding appellants' failure to demonstrate they constituted omitted heirs within the meaning of section 21622, and had a parent and child relationship with Spikes such that they would qualify as his "issue." Wright also submitted a declaration indicating that he had known Spikes for over 46 years and maintained a close relationship with him until Spikes' passing away. Wright stated that Spikes had never mentioned appellants to him, and "resented" appellants' allegations regarding any conspiracy between him and Quadros regarding Spikes' trust. He also denied appellants' claims that Spikes had dementia, and stated that Spikes was "very specific" about the terms of his trust and who was to receive which assets. In addition, Wright indicated that based on his personal knowledge of Spikes, Spikes most likely would have disinherited appellants if he had been aware of their claims regarding his paternity. Finally, Wright's counsel submitted copies of appellants' birth certificates, which both listed Meredith's husband as their father.
In response, Meredith submitted a supplemental declaration claiming that she had asked Wright, in his capacity as Spikes' court-appointed conservator, for a DNA test to confirm appellants' paternity, but Wright refused to have Spikes submit to testing.
c. Hearing and Trial Court Order
On February 27, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Quadros' petition and took the matter under submission. The trial court subsequently issued an order the next day on February 28, 2023, approving the settlement agreement. In its order, the trial court overruled appellants' objections and found that because they were not beneficiaries, they did not have standing to participate in the trust administration proceedings. The trial court ruled that appellants did not offer any admissible evidence that they were Spikes' daughters or that the sole reason he did not provide for them was because he was unaware of their birth, as required under section 21622. The trial court also found that appellants did not offer any evidence demonstrating that there was a parent and child relationship between them and Spikes that would qualify them as Spikes' issue under the Probate Code. Based on this lack of evidence, the trial court concluded that appellants had no interest in Spikes' estate and lacked standing to object to the settlement agreement.
Appellants timely appealed.
II. Discussion
Respondents claim that the appeal must be dismissed without reaching the merits of appellants' claims for two reasons: (1) appellants fail to demonstrate the appealability of the order in question; and (2) appellants lack standing to appeal the order.
As appellants filed no reply brief, they did not respond to this, or any other point, raised in respondents' brief.
The existence of an appealable judgment or order "is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal" (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126), and reviewing courts must resolve any doubts regarding appealability before turning to the merits of the appeal. (Ibid.) Similarly," 'standing to appeal is "jurisdictional and therefore cannot be waived." [Citations.]' Thus, if a party has no standing to appeal, [the reviewing] court has no jurisdiction to consider the appeal." (Estate of Bartsch (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 885, 890 (Bartsch).) We therefore shall address both of respondents' contentions first as threshold matters.
A. Appealability of Order
Respondents contend that appellants did not indicate that the order being appealed from is a final and appealable order, or otherwise demonstrate a statutory basis for their appeal in their opening brief, as required under California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(B). Accordingly, respondents claim that appellants' failure to address or establish appealability is grounds for dismissal.
The Code of Civil Procedure provides that a civil appeal may be taken from a final judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1)), an order made after an appealable judgment (id., subd. (a)(2)), or "an order made appealable by the provisions of the . . . Probate Code" (id., subd. (a)(10)). "Generally, rulings in probate proceedings are not appealable unless expressly made appealable by statute. [Citations.]" (Estate of Martin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1441-1442 (Martin).) With respect to a trust, the following orders are appealable: a grant or denial of "[a]ny final order under Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 17200)[.]" (§ 1304, subd. (a).)
In reviewing the opening brief, respondents are correct that appellants simply state "[t]his judgment is appealable," without indicating that the order was final or providing statutory authority confirming the appealability of the order. However, under California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(e)(2)(C), we exercise our discretion to disregard the noncompliance because the order in question is clearly reviewable. To explain, although section 17200 does not specifically refer to granting or denying settlement agreements regarding trust assets, it does include the following proceedings: "(4) [ascertaining beneficiaries and determining to whom property shall pass or be delivered upon final or partial termination of the trust, to the extent the determination is not made by the trust instrument. [¶] (5) Settling the accounts and passing upon the acts of the trustee, including the exercise of discretionary powers. [¶] (6) Instructing the trustee." (§ 17200, subds. (b)(4)-(6).) Moreover, "the appealability of an order of the probate court is determined not from its form, but from its legal effect." (Martin, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 1442.) Here, even though the specific proceeding in question is not listed under section 17200, the legal effect of the court's February 28, 2023 order was to ascertain that appellants were not beneficiaries, settle the accounts regarding the sale of Spikes' house to Quadros, and instruct the trustee to perform under the terms of the settlement agreement. (See, e.g., Martin, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 1442 [finding that the legal effect of an order denying a request to void a sale of property was to authorize or approve the underlying sale, which was an appealable order under section 1300]; see also Estate of Miramontes-Najera (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 750, 755 [finding that an order denying a petition to set aside a nonconsensual nonprobate transfer of community property had the same legal effect as an order to determine distribution of pay-on-death accounts, which was an appealable order under section 1303].) Therefore, we find that the order in question constitutes an appealable order within the meaning of section 1304.
Notably, in her petition for approval of the settlement agreement, Quadros cited section 17200 and indicated that her petition was "to instruct a trustee to take action."
B. Appellants' Standing to Appeal
"The issue of whether a party has standing to appeal is a question of law. [Citation.]" (Bartsch, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 890.) Under Code of Civil Procedure, section 902, "[a]ny party aggrieved may appeal in the cases prescribed in [title 13, Appeals in Civil Actions]." This rule applies to appeals from probate court orders. (See Bartsch, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 890; see also Crook v. Contreras (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1201.) "One is considered 'aggrieved' whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment [or order.] [Citations.] Appellant's interest' "must be immediate, pecuniary, and substantial and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment." '" (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 (County of Alameda).)
Respondents claim that appellants lack standing to appeal the order because they cannot establish they have been "aggrieved" by the order. As appellants never filed a petition to establish heirship or a claim to a portion of Spikes' estate, respondents argue that they would have been entitled to no assets even if the court had disproved the settlement agreement. Respondents further argue that any interest appellants might have in the judgment is "extremely speculative, remote and contingent," as it would require them to successfully contest the trust outside of the 120 day time frame, prove that they constituted omitted heirs within the meaning of section 21622, and established a right to inherit under the law of intestacy, all of which they "could not possibly do."
Appellants and respondents both indicate that in December 2023, appellants filed a petition to contest the trust and revoke probate. Because appellants' petition was not before the trial court when it issued the order approving the settlement agreement, it is not a proper part of our appellate record (See, e.g., People v. Avila (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 771, 780, fn. 4 ["We review the correctness of the trial court's ruling at the time it was made and not by reference to evidence produced at a later date"].)
The case of Bartsch is particularly instructive in determining the standing to appeal by persons claiming to be heirs to an estate, like appellants in this case. In Bartsch, appellant had a pending claim in the trial court under section 21622 regarding his rights to inherit from his alleged father's estate as an omitted heir. (Bartsch, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 890.) While appellant's claim was pending, the executor of the estate requested, and was granted, an order for interim payment of his attorney fees and expenses. (Id. at p. 889.) Appellant subsequently appealed the order for fees, arguing that if he prevailed in his underlying section 21622 action, the order for fees would diminish the estate and place him at a financial disadvantage. (Id. at p. 891.) While the court found standing to appeal where the right to inherit claim was still pending in the underlying proceeding, it clearly stated that "[t]he controlling principle of law as to the standing of disinherited heirs to appeal an order of the probate court is stated in Estate of Thor (1935) 11 Cal.App.2d 37, 37-38 []: 'It is well settled that, in view of the admitted fact that since the surviving but disinherited husband occupied the position of a stranger to the estate of his deceased wife, he had no standing in court in the matter either of the settlement of the account of the executor of the will of [decedent], or of the manner in which distribution of her estate should be ordered. [Citations.] [¶] It follows that, having no right to be heard in the matter before the probate court, the surviving husband likewise had no right of appeal from any order that might be made in the premises.'" (Bartsch, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at pp. 890-891.)
Here, it is undisputed that appellants constitute "disinherited" heirs not provided for in the trust. Thus, based on the rule in Estate of Thor, supra, 11 Cal.App.2d 37, as restated in Bartsch, it follows that appellants have no right to appeal from a probate court order related to Spikes' trust. Moreover, unlike in Bartsch, appellants did not have a pending claim under section 21622 at the time the trial court issued its order; indeed, they only raised their claims under section 21622 as part of their objections to Quadros' petition to approve settlement. Accordingly, because appellants cannot demonstrate any entitlement to the trust assets, they failed to demonstrate that they were aggrieved by the order by suffering consequences that were "immediate, pecuniary, and substantial." (County of Alameda, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 737.) We therefore conclude that appellants lack standing to appeal the order approving the settlement agreement.
III. Disposition
The appeal is dismissed.
WE CONCUR: Greenwood, P. J., Bamattre-Manoukian, J.