In re Spenler

35 Citing cases

  1. Lee v. Field (In re Lee)

    889 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2018)   Cited 20 times
    Declining to "adopt a hypertechnical interpretation of Rule 4003 where its purpose to 'provide the debtor with timely notice' has been clearly satisfied"

    "However, Rule 4003(b), unlike some other bankruptcy rules, proscribes no particular form for objections to exemption claims." In re Spenler , 212 B.R. 625, 629 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1997). In addition, Rule 4003 imposes some procedural requirements.

  2. Wharton v. Schwartzer (In re Wharton)

    BAP No. NV-16-1218-JuFY (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2017)

    Trustee argued that he raised a timely and sufficient objection to Debtors' claimed exemption in the Corvette under Rule 4003; i.e., Debtors amended their schedules to claim the exemption on November 5, 2015, and he objected to the exemption on November 12, 2015, in his reply brief to the Turnover Motion. Accordingly, Trustee maintained that his objection was within 30 days of Debtors' amended Schedule C. Trustee further argued that his objection satisfied Rule 4003, which does not require any particular form for an objection to an exemption under the holding in Spenler v. Siegel (In re Spenler), 212 B.R. 625, 629 (9th Cir. BAP 1997). According to Trustee, all that Rule 4003 requires is notice of Trustee's objection and its basis, which must be raised within the applicable time period.

  3. Wharton v. Schwartzer (In re Wharton)

    563 B.R. 289 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2017)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that a trustee or other interested party has satisfied Rule 4003(b) by "set[ting] forth the basis for his objection" in a brief supporting a turnover motion

    Trustee argued that he raised a timely and sufficient objection to Debtors' claimed exemption in the Corvette under Rule 4003; i.e., Debtors amended their schedules to claim the exemption on November 5, 2015, and he objected to the exemption on November 12, 2015, in his reply brief to the Turnover Motion. Accordingly, Trustee maintained that his objection was within 30 days of Debtors' amended Schedule C. Trustee further argued that his objection satisfied Rule 4003, which does not require any particular form for an objection to an exemption under the holding in Spenler v. Siegel (In re Spenler), 212 B.R. 625, 629 (9th Cir. BAP 1997). According to Trustee, all that Rule 4003 requires is notice of Trustee's objection and its basis, which must be raised within the applicable time period.

  4. Kane v. Zions Bancorporation

    631 F. Supp. 3d 854 (N.D. Cal. 2022)   Cited 4 times

    The purpose of the rule is to "provide the debtor with timely notice that the trustee or other interested party objects to a debtor's claimed exemption." In re Spenler, 212 B.R. 625, 630 (9th Cir. BAP 1997); In re Lee, 889 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018).

  5. Lee v. Field (In re Lee)

    CIVIL NO. 15-00278 SOM/RLP (D. Haw. Nov. 17, 2015)   Cited 8 times

    Section 522(l) does not mandate the form an objection must take, stating only that, "[u]nless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt." See In re Spenler, 212 B.R. 625, 629 (B.A.P. 9 Cir. 1997) ("Rule 4003(b), unlike some other bankruptcy rules, proscribes no particular form for objections to exemption claims."); In re Betz, 273 B.R. 313, 320 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (noting that § 522(l) and Rule 4003(b) are silent on what constitutes a sufficient objection).

  6. In re Errez

    BAP WW-09-1282-MkHMo (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2010)   Cited 1 times

    The construction and application of Rule 4003(b), which governs procedure for objecting to exemption claims, also is a question of law reviewed de novo. Spenler v. Siegel (In re Spenler), 212 B.R. 625, 628 (9th Cir. BAP 1997). A debtor's intent to reside on property, for purposes of determining the validity of a homestead exemption claim, is a factual issue which we review under the clearly erroneous standard.

  7. In re Oakmore Ranch Management

    BAP CC-05-1068-BMaMc (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 22, 2005)

    The bankruptcy court's application of California exemption law is a question of statutory construction which we review de novo. In re Spenler, 212 B.R. 625, 628 (9th Cir. BAP 1997); In re Toplitzky, 227 B.R. 300, 302 (9th Cir. BAP 1998). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, even where the issue was not expressly considered by the bankruptcy court.

  8. In re Heretakis

    Case No. 03-10041-JNF (Bankr. D. Mass. May. 6, 2003)   Cited 4 times

    He stated: "[a]n overwhelming majority of courts have held that, at least in the instance where some form of written objection was manifested within the 30 day deadline, Rule 4003(b) is satisfied even though no formal objection was filed." 273 B.R. at 320 (citing, inter alia, Applebee v. Brawn (In re Brawn), 138 B.R. 327, 333 n. 29 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992), andSpenler v. Siegel (In re Spenler), 212 B.R. 625, 630-31 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997)). As the court in Spenler noted, Rule 4003(b) does not require a particular form for an objection to exemption, and the purpose of rule "is to provide timely notice to the debtor that the creditor objects to the debtor's claimed exemption."

  9. In re Betz

    273 B.R. 313 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002)   Cited 22 times
    Noting that § 522(l) and Rule 4003(b) are silent on what constitutes a sufficient objection

    See generally, Kenneth D. Ferguson, Repose or Not? Informal Objections to Claims of Exemptions After Taylor v. Freeland, 50 Okla.L.Rev. 45 (1997) (discussing differing rationales used by courts to conclude that failure to file a formal objection does not preclude objection to a § 522(f) or (h) claim). See also, In re Brawn, 138 B.R. at 333 n. 29 ("[R]esponse to § 522(f) motion qualifies, in and of itself, as the 'objection' Rule 4003 requires."); Premier Capital, Inc. v. DeCarolis, 259 B.R. 467, 471 n. 8 (1st Cir. BAP 2001) (In re DeCarolis) (citing to In re Maylin, 155 B.R. 605, 613 (Bankr.D.Me. 1993)) ("[E]ven if Taylor were applicable, 'its rule does not foreclose a secured creditor from defending a § 522(f) or 522(h) action by denying that the property involved is exempt under applicable law.'"); Spenler v. Siegel, 212 B.R. 625, 630-31 (9th Cir. BAP 1997) (In re Spenler); In re Harry, 151 B.R. 735, 738 (Bankr.W.D.Va. 1992) (objection in response to the debtor's motion to avoid lien constitutes sufficient objection under Rule 4003(b)); In re Young, 64 B.R. 611, 613 (E.D.La. 1986) (trustee's motion to compel debtor's turnover of property was sufficient objection). But see, In re Snyder, 215 B.R. 477, 478 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.

  10. In re Reed

    422 B.R. 214 (C.D. Cal. 2009)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that one of the purposes of BAPCPA was to “streamline case administration by implementing a series of measures that required debtors to comply with strict deadlines”

    Prior to the BAPCA, the understanding was that the "first meeting of creditors" was not a discrete moment, but could stretch over a period of time. See In re Spenler, 212 B.R. 625, 627 (9th Cir. BAP 1997) ("The first meeting of creditors began on August 4, 1995, and, after two continuances, was concluded on September 29, 1995"). As the Cadwallder court noted, "[t]he word `first' in the statute is problematic.