Opinion
Argued and Submitted Oct. 16, 2001.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION. (See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 36-3)
Debtor brought adversary proceeding to dissolve partnership and quiet title in land. The Bankruptcy Court held for debtor. The United States District Court for the Central District of California, Richard A. Paez, J., affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that defendant waived defenses to debtor's contract claim that it did not raise in answer or preserve in pretrial conference order.
Affirmed.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Richard A. Paez, District Judge, Presiding.
Before BOOCHEVER, FERNANDEZ, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Specialty Restaurants Corporation, the debtor in bankruptcy, commenced this adversary action against Praxis Development Group. Specialty sought dissolution of a partnership with Praxis and a declaration quieting title to real property subject to an option. The bankruptcy court granted judgment in favor of Specialty. The district court affirmed. We also affirm.
The bankruptcy court determined that under the contract the time for exercise of the option commenced on April 18, 1994, when it became known that a freeway interchange would not be built at the location of the property, and expired April 18, 1996. That was a proper construction of the contract, and Praxis does not really dispute that, unless some other provision or principle extended the time.
None of the bases for extension, which Praxis now submits to us, were delineated in its answer or preserved in the pretrial conference order. That being so, as far as this adversary proceeding is concerned Praxis has waived those issues. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(c); Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass'n v. United P. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir.2000); N. W. Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir.1988); Donovan v. Crisostomo, 689 F.2d 869, 875 (9th Cir.1982).
Nor is Praxis aided by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7013, which indicates that counterclaims need not be pled in an adversary proceeding brought by the debtor. Nothing in that rule says that those unpled claims become part of the adversary proceeding
Page 708.
itself. At any rate, even were they deemed to have become part of the proceeding ab initio, they were not preserved in the pretrial order.
Because we will not consider the claims on appeal, it follows that we hold the bankruptcy court did not err.
See Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir.2001); Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380, 389 n. 6 (9th Cir.1996).
AFFIRMED.