Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J0601925
NEEDHAM, J.
Ronald P. appeals from an order terminating his parental rights after a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He contends the juvenile court erred in denying his oral motion for a continuance on the day of the hearing and in terminating his parental rights without, he claims, a finding of his unfitness. He further complains that he did not receive a copy of the adoption assessment report in advance of the hearing. We will affirm the order.
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 2006, Children and Family Services of Contra Costa County (CFS) filed a petition alleging that the minor child, S.P., came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under subdivisions (b), (c), (d), and (g) of section 300. The petition alleged that S.P.’s mother failed to protect S.P. from sexual abuse, neglected S.P.’s hygiene, did not provide her with adequate clothing, and chronically neglected her. The petition further alleged that appellant, S.P.’s father, was unable and unwilling to protect S.P. from severe and chronic neglect.
The jurisdictional report advised, among other things, that the mother named appellant as S.P.’s biological father and that he was so identified on S.P.’s birth certificate.
At the contested jurisdictional hearing in December 2006, the juvenile court sustained the dependency petition as amended.
CFS’s disposition report, dated January 8, 2007, recommended family reunification services to the mother and no services “for [appellant], as his paternity status is alleged.” According to the report, appellant told the social worker he was not providing financial support to S.P. because he was unemployed and he was not interested in participating in the court proceedings.
Appellant did not appear at the contested dispositional hearing on February 8, 2007. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that placement with appellant would be detrimental to S.P. and determined that he was a noncustodial parent who had not requested custody. The court removed S.P. from her mother’s custody and ordered a reunification plan for the mother, with no reunification services to appellant.
In connection with a six-month review hearing in June 2007 under section 366.21, subdivision (e), CFS’s status review report recommended six additional months of services to the mother and offered no additional information about appellant’s circumstances or relationship to S.P.. The report was mailed to appellant by certified mail. At the hearing, the juvenile court adopted the CFS’s recommendations and set a 12-month review hearing.
CFS filed a status review report for the 12-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (f)) in December 2007. CFS recommended setting a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing because the mother had not participated meaningfully in her case plan. The social worker did not know appellant’s whereabouts, and a due diligence search was underway. Appellant had contacted the social worker once to request a visit with S.P., but did not leave a telephone number where the social worker could contact him and did not contact the social worker again. The foster mother reported that appellant telephoned to talk with S.P. fairly regularly and said hello to them on the street. As a result of CFS’s search, appellant called the social worker and confirmed his address.
Appellant did not appear at the contested review hearing on December 27, 2007. After hearing testimony from the mother and the social worker and considering the arguments of counsel, the court adopted CFS’s recommendations, terminated the mother’s reunification services, and set a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26 for April 15, 2008. Appellant did not seek writ review of the order setting the section 366.26 hearing.
CFS sent notice of the section 366.26 hearing to appellant at his confirmed address. However, a process server filed a declaration stating he had attempted to serve appellant at the address and could not locate him. A woman at the address told the process server that appellant no longer lived there. By court order, appellant was served by publication.
CFS’s report for the section 366.26 hearing, dated March 31, 2008, asked the court to terminate mother’s and appellant’s parental rights and to find adoption to be the appropriate permanent plan for S.P.. The report advised that appellant’s name appeared on S.P.’s birth certificate, but he had not supported S.P. or held her out to the community as his own. Nor had he appeared in court or requested the court to elevate his paternity status from alleged father to presumed father. Appellant had telephoned the social worker and said he was homeless and wanted to visit S.P., but when she returned appellant’s call, the person who answered told her he was not there and to “never, ever call this number again.” Appellant did not contact CFS again.
On April 15, 2008, CFS filed its March 31 section 366.26 report. Appellant did not appear for the section 366.26 hearing. The court continued the section 366.26 hearing to August 12, 2008, to allow an opportunity for S.P. to begin family therapy with her foster parents. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was likely S.P. would be adopted, and suspended the mother’s visits with S.P.. Appellant was served with notice of the new date for the section 366.26 hearing.
In an interim report dated August 7, 2008, CFS informed the court that S.P. had been removed from her concurrent parents’ home and was transitioning into a new concurrent home. CFS believed that the prior concurrent parents were unable to handle S.P.’s behaviors appropriately or give S.P. required emotional support.
On August 12, 2008, appellant failed to appear at the continued section 366.26 hearing. The court again continued the hearing to January 30, 2009, because of S.P.’s transition to her new concurrent home. Notice of the new date of the section 366.26 hearing was served on appellant.
CFS’s addendum report, dated January 2009, continued to recommend terminating the parental rights of mother and appellant and finding adoption as the appropriate permanent plan. CFS reported that S.P.’s placement in her concurrent home was going well, and S.P. wanted to be adopted by her caretakers. S.P.’s caretakers had not seen the negative behavior described by her previous foster parents. The caretakers, who had an approved adoption home study on file, expressed their strong desire to adopt S.P., who was thriving in the placement.
On January 30, 2009, the matter convened for the section 366.26 hearing. Appellant appeared in court for the first time in the proceedings. The court again continued the section 366.26 hearing to February 20, 2009, and referred appellant for appointment of counsel.
On the same date, appellant filed a Statement Regarding Parentage in which he indicated that he wanted an attorney and that he married S.P.’s mother on March 14, 1999 (in other words, before S.P. was born). However, appellant did not check the box on the form indicating that he believed he was S.P.’s father.
On February 6, 2009, counsel for appellant accepted his representation.
On February 20, 2009, appellant and his attorney appeared at what was supposed to be the section 366.26 hearing. Appellant asserted that he had Indian heritage, and appellant’s attorney expressed a desire to obtain discovery and cross-examine the social worker, who had become unavailable for the hearing. The court continued the section 366.26 hearing to April 6, 2009. The court advised counsel that it was in possession of the section 366.26 report and CFS’s addendum report.
The contested section 366.26 hearing finally commenced on April 6, 2009. CFS filed its addendum report, lauding S.P.’s continued progress in the concurrent home in which she was placed nearly eight months earlier. Appellant appeared with his attorney, who orally requested a continuance to allow time to raise appellant’s status to that of presumed father, and to obtain additional discovery (particularly, the CFS reports) in order to prepare for the section 366.26 hearing. As to his status, appellant’s counsel argued that appellant’s status should be raised from alleged father to presumed father because he was married to S.P.’s mother at the time of S.P.’s birth. It was noted, however, that appellant had never requested a change in status. The court declined to find good cause to continue the hearing based on the representations of appellant’s counsel, concluding it was “too little, too late at this time.”
On the issue of discovery, appellant’s attorney informed the court that she did not have the section 366.26 report, and all she had received in discovery was a “Due Diligence report” and a copy of S.P.’s birth certificate. The court denied the request for a continuance based on counsel’s argument. It was noted that the reason counsel had not received additional documents in discovery was due to appellant’s failure to request that his status be raised to that of presumed father.
After S.P.’s mother testified, appellant’s counsel attempted to make an offer of proof that appellant had contact with S.P. when he transported her to and from her therapy appointments. The court refused to accept appellant’s offer of proof and suggested he testify, but appellant’s counsel replied: “No, he does not wish to testify.” Counsel for appellant also argued that she did “not feel... able to offer [appellant] adequate legal counsel without access to any of the reports.”
County counsel advised the court of the following, contained in a communication from S.P.’s therapist: “I am happy to report that S.P. has finally begun to blossom with the current placement. She has progressively and rather rapidly grown into a creative, articulate, happy child under the caregivers’ guidance and love. She has even developed a social and environmental consciousness and has become increasingly concerned with others and the world around her. [¶] [S.P.] at least seems to have been placed with mature, intelligent, responsible adults who have a deeper psychological understanding of how to raise a traumatized child. The caregivers seem to have created a safe and secure structured environment and seem to apply limits, boundaries and consequences in an age-appropriate manner. They also seem congruent in applying the same rules to themselves that further is reinforcing [their] trustworthiness in [S.P.]’s eyes.”
After hearing closing arguments, the court remarked that S.P. was finally in a home with people who understood her, and that the change in her was “like a miracle.” The court noted that even if appellant’s paternity status had been raised to presumed father, the outcome of the hearing would not change “one iota... because he’s had no relationship with the child since she was quite young.” The court then found S.P. was adoptable, that continuing parental rights would be detrimental to her, and that termination of parental rights was in her best interests. The court terminated mother’s and appellant’s parental rights, making possible the adoption of S.P. by her caretakers.
This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in denying his motion for a continuance and terminating his parental rights. He further argues that he was entitled to the status of presumed father and to the CFS assessment report and addendum prepared for the section 366.26 hearing.
A. Denial of Request to Continue the Section 366.26 Hearing
Section 352, subdivision (a), permits the juvenile court to continue a hearing if the continuance is not contrary to the interest of the minor and good cause has been shown. (See also § 366.26, subd. (g) [“court may continue the proceeding for a period of time not to exceed 30 days as necessary to appoint counsel, and to enable counsel to become acquainted with the case”].) We review the court’s denial of a continuance for an abuse of discretion. (In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 585.)
The court’s denial of appellant’s oral motion for a continuance was well within its discretion. In the first place, appellant did not comply with the procedural requirements for obtaining a continuance. The party seeking a continuance must file written notice of the motion at least two court days before the date set for the hearing, along with a supporting declaration. (§ 352, subd. (a).) Appellant did not file any written notice of his motion for a continuance, let alone a timely one. Nor did he provide any supporting declaration.
An exception applies when the court for good cause entertains an oral motion for a continuance. (§ 352, subd. (a).) Here, no such good cause was found or apparent.
In addition, appellant’s stated grounds for the continuance – to seek presumed father status and obtain the discovery to which a presumed father is entitled – did not establish good cause for a continuance because of the tardiness of the request. By the time of the motion, appellant had known of the dependency proceedings for over two years, told the social worker from the outset that he did not want to participate in the proceedings, and, despite contacting CFS on just two occasions over the years, never provided a means for CFS to return his call. When he finally appeared in court on the date scheduled for the section 366.26 hearing on January 30, 2009, he did not seek presumed father status. Although he was represented by counsel for at least two months before the scheduled section 366.26 hearing date, he never sought a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing or requested that his paternity status be elevated to presumed father status until the day of the section 366.26 hearing. Whether or not his conduct constituted a waiver of his right to assert presumed father status, his delay in asserting it reasonably supported the conclusion that he had not established good cause to delay the proceedings any further.
Moreover, appellant’s stated ground for the continuance did not establish good cause because he did not demonstrate that he would be entitled to presumed father status even if the continuance were granted. Appellant contended that he met the statutory definition of a presumed father, because he married S.P.’s mother in March 1999 and S.P. was born in August 1999. (See Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (a) [a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if “[h]e and the child’s natural mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the marriage”].) However, he never requested the court to recognize him as a presumed father. (See Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, 585 [father has burden of proving he was the presumed father].) Indeed, even on the day of the section 366.26 hearing, his attorney did not request that he be recognized as a presumed father, but merely that the hearing be continued so his status could be elevated. Additionally, by the time he finally mentioned the issue, the reunification period had passed and any request for such status required the filing of a section 388 petition, which he did not file. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 442, fn. 5; In re Eric E. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 252, 258.) And even if he had gotten around to filing a petition, there was no indication it would have been granted: section 388 requires not only a change in circumstances and new evidence, but also that the proposed modification from alleged father to presumed father status would promote the child’s best interests (In re Eric E., at p. 260; § 388, subd. (a), (c)); appellant presented nothing to show that an order awarding appellant presumed father status would have been in S.P.’s best interests. Accordingly, there was no stated basis for appellant to obtain presumed father status, and without being able to obtain presumed father status, there was no basis for delaying the hearing in order to obtain discovery that purportedly only a presumed father could obtain.
Not only was appellant’s request for a continuance procedurally defective and without good cause, it failed to demonstrate that a continuance would not be contrary to S.P.’s best interests. (§ 352, subd. (a).) In considering S.P.’s interests in this context, substantial weight must be given to matters such as her need for a prompt resolution of her custody status and the need to provide her with a stable environment. (§ 352, subd. (a).) In light of appellant’s failure to play any meaningful part in S.P.’s life, his delay in raising the issue of presumed father status, his failure to comply with the procedural requirements for obtaining a continuance and obtaining presumed father status, his failure to demonstrate a basis for awarding him presumed father status given the procedural posture of the case, and the fact that the permanent plan of adoption was overwhelmingly in S.P.’s best interests, continuing the section 366.26 hearing yet again would have been quite plainly contrary to S.P.’s best interests.
Appellant’s arguments to the contrary are without merit. He contends the court applied the wrong legal standard in denying the motion for a continuance, urging that the court applied a “ ‘doesn’t matter’ standard instead of the ‘good cause’ standard.” He tries to support this argument by citing to the court’s statement that its decision would have been the same even if appellant had been granted presumed father status. The court made that statement, however, when it was explaining the disposition, not when it ruled on the motion for a continuance. When denying the continuance, the court expressly ruled: “I don’t find good cause to continue the matter.” (Italics added.) The court therefore plainly based its ruling on the good cause standard, and supported its finding of a lack of good cause by observing that appellant’s last-minute oral motion, on the day of the section 366.26 hearing that had been continued multiple times over a span of several months, was “too little, too late.” The court’s later statement – that the elevation of appellant’s status from alleged to presumed father would not have affected the outcome of the hearing – only highlights the fact that if there had been an error in denying the continuance – which there was not – it would have been harmless.
Appellant also argues that the notice of the permanent plan hearing advised that if he appeared at the hearing, counsel would be appointed if he could not afford one and a continuance granted to allow counsel an opportunity to become familiar with the case, but “that did not happen.” Appellant’s assertion is untrue. When appellant finally appeared at the section 366.26 hearing on January 30, 2009, he was appointed counsel, and a continuance was granted to allow counsel an opportunity to become familiar with the case, first to February 20 and then to April 6, 2009.
Lastly, appellant contends that he was entitled to a further continuance of the section 366.26 hearing because his attorney had not been provided with CFS’s adoption assessment report, to which he claims entitlement whether he was a presumed father or not. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(c).) However, while appellant’s counsel requested a continuance to obtain further discovery and also indicated she did not have the section 366.26 report, she never argued that a continuance should be granted specifically on the ground that delivery of the assessment report was required by the Rules of Court, as appellant now argues. (We address that issue post.) Nor did appellant’s counsel even ask for the section 366.26 report at the hearing and request a recess in the hearing to review it.
In any event, assuming appellant’s request for a continuance was premised in part on CFS’s failure to provide the adoption assessment report as required, the continuance was still properly denied for two reasons we have already discussed: appellant’s failure to file a timely written motion for a continuance, and appellant’s failure to show, when requesting the continuance, that the continuance would not be contrary to S.P.’s best interests.
Although appellant’s counsel claimed that she felt unable to advocate zealously on appellant’s behalf without the report, there was no showing then, and no showing now, that another delay of S.P.’s permanent plan would not have harmed S.P.’s best interests. Furthermore, counsel’s claimed inability to represent appellant adequately does not hold water. She had two months between her acceptance of the appointment as appellant’s counsel and the continued April 6 section 366.26 hearing to prepare. She therefore had twice the preparation time envisioned by section 366.26, subdivision (g), which permits continuance of a section 366.26 hearing for just 30 days for new counsel to become familiar with the case. Furthermore, counsel could have raised her non-receipt of the adoption assessment report long before the April 6 hearing. She had attended the previously-calendared section 366.26 hearing on February 20 without having received the adoption assessment report before that hearing, yet did not bring the absence of the report to the court’s or CFS’s attention, even though the provision of the report was not dependent upon a discovery request or appellant being a presumed father. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(c).) To the extent counsel found herself unable to represent appellant’s interests zealously, it was not due to the court’s refusal to continue the section 366.26 hearing yet again.
Appellant fails to establish that the court committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion in declining to continue the section 366.26 hearing.
B. Provision of the Assessment Report
Appellant contends he and his attorney were entitled to a copy of the adoption assessment report prepared for the section 366.26 hearing, whether or not appellant was a presumed father, and that CFS’s failure to provide a copy of the report compels reversal. We disagree.
When a juvenile court orders a hearing pursuant to section 366.26, it must order preparation of an adoption assessment report. (§ 366.21, subd. (i)(1).) A copy of the report must be provided to the parents and all counsel of record at least 10 calendar days before the hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(c).) There is no dispute that CFS prepared an adoption assessment report as well as an addendum for the section 366.26 hearing, and that appellant and his counsel had not received them before the hearing.
Cf. § 366.21, subd. (c) [requiring social worker to file a report before a status review hearing and provide it to the parents and the child’s counsel and advocate at least 10 calendar days before the review hearing].
We therefore must determine whether the failure to provide appellant and his attorney a copy of the adoption assessment report (the section 366.26 report and the addendum report) was harmless. (See In re Angela C. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 389, 395 [error in failing to give mother notice of a continued section 366.26 hearing was subject to harmless error analysis]; In re Sabrina H. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1419 [agency’s failure to provide timely written notice of its intent to detain children outside the county was subject to harmless error analysis].)
We conclude the failure to provide appellant and his counsel with the reports was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The reports were before the court and in the possession of the mother’s attorney, S.P.’s attorney, and County Counsel. There was nothing in the section 366.26 report or the addendum report that appellant could have used to effect an outcome more favorable to appellant. The reports confirmed that S.P. was in a home with caretakers who wanted to adopt her and who had an approved home study on file, S.P. wanted to be adopted by them, and S.P. was showing remarkable progress in their care. They also confirmed that appellant had no meaningful relationship with S.P.. Overwhelming evidence supported the court’s findings of S.P.’s adoptability, the termination of appellant’s parental rights, and adoption as the permanent plan.
Appellant’s arguments that his review of the case file would have changed the result of the proceeding ring hollow. He claims his counsel would have been alerted to request S.P.’s presence at the section 366.26 hearing or to ask the court to inquire under section 349, subdivision (d) whether S.P. was properly notified of the hearing. However, appellant’s counsel knew from the birth certificate she received that S.P. was a minor child, which was enough to prompt her to request S.P.’s attendance or to ask the court to inquire about notice. Furthermore, because S.P. was only nine years old at the time of the hearing, the court had no obligation to make such an inquiry, even if appellant had requested it. (§ 349; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(c); cf. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(d) [child must be present at § 366.26 hearing if child or child’s attorney requests it or court so orders].)
Appellant also argues that “a review of the file documents reveals information pertinent to the issue of whether [S.P.] was adoptable.” The section 366.26 report advised that S.P.’s concurrent parents were unable to handle S.P.’s behavior or give S.P. the required emotional support, and appellant urges that after her removal “these problems had moderated, [but] they had not evaporated.” Appellant claims his attorney did not know these facts and therefore could not argue that S.P. was not adoptable.
Appellant’s argument is untenable. The snippet of the report to which appellant refers described S.P.’s troubled behavior with her prior concurrent parents. Since then, she had lived and progressed for months in the home of her prospective adoptive parents, and both the adoptive parents and S.P. wanted the adoption to occur. Whether a child is adoptable turns on whether the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor. (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) Since the prospective adoptive parents wanted to adopt S.P. and had an approved home study on file, and S.P. was thriving in their care, there was nothing in the reports to indicate she was not adoptable.
Appellant mischaracterizes the report in his contention that it indicated the problems had moderated but not evaporated. The social worker advised that the current foster parents had “not seen the manipulative and defiant behavior” noted by the previous caretakers, and although Sierra displayed an attitude when she was tired, the current caretakers “have not experienced temper tantrums.” (Italics added.)
Appellant contends the failure to provide him or his counsel with a copy of the assessment report prepared for the section 366.26 hearing is structural error, relying on Judith P. v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 535 (Judith P.). In that case, the juvenile court had ordered the termination of reunification services at a 12-month status review hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) The department of children and family services (DCFS) had not, however, served the mother or her counsel with the section 366.21 report until the day of the hearing, contrary to the statute’s requirement that it be served at least 10 days before the hearing. (Id. at pp. 541-543.) The appellate court determined that the 10-day statutory deadline was mandatory. (Id. at pp. 549-553.) Relying on precedent pertaining to the consequences of an error implicating the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant, the court concluded that the failure to give a copy of the report to the mother was a structural error and reversible per se. (Id. at pp. 554-559.)
Appellant’s reliance on Judith P. is unavailing. In the first place, Judith P. has since been questioned for its reliance on criminal cases, in light of our Supreme Court’s subsequent decision criticizing case law that analogized criminal cases to dependency cases. (In re Sabrina H., supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1420, fn. 14, referring to In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 58-59.) In addition, while Judith P. was concerned with a legislative requirement under section 366.21, the requirement to provide an assessment report is found in a rule of court (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(c)).
Moreover, Judith P. is distinguishable from the matter at hand. Judith P. pertained to a requirement under section 366.21 to provide a report prepared for a pre-permanency 12-month status review hearing, pursuant to section 366.21. At issue here, by contrast, is the report prepared for a permanency hearing under section 366.26. This distinction – as the court in Judith P. itself emphasized – is critical. The court in Judith P. explained: “The fact that our case involves a prepermanency planning hearing, while In re Angela C. [supra] is a permanency planning case, is an important distinction. The cases are clear that the interests of the parent vis-à-vis the minor are stronger and the burden of proof is on DCFS, not the parent, at the prepermanency planning stage,” while at the section 366.26 hearing it is up to the parent to show that an exception applied to overcome the presumption that adoption was the best permanency plan. (Id. at p. 554, fn. 13.) In Judith P., the error implicated the mother’s right to reunification and ability to visit her children; in Angela C., the mother’s reunification rights had already been terminated. (Ibid.) Here as well, appellant had no reunification rights as he approached the section 366.26 hearing.
Notwithstanding the failure to provide the adoption assessment report 10 days before the hearing, appellant had notice of the section 366.26 hearing, appeared at the hearing with counsel, was available to testify, had the opportunity to produce evidence, call witnesses, and cross-examine the social worker, and could have requested a copy of the adoption assessment report before the hearing or timely filed a written request for a continuance. Under the circumstances, the error was not so fundamental to the fairness of the proceeding as to constitute structural error. (See, e.g., In re Angela C., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 394-395.)
Appellant fails to establish reversible error in the failure to provide the adoption assessment report in compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 5.725(c).
C. Termination of Parental Rights Without a Finding of Unfitness
Appellant argues that his due process rights were violated because the court terminated his parental rights without making a finding of parental unfitness. He is incorrect.
“California’s dependency scheme no longer uses the term ‘parental unfitness,’ but instead requires the juvenile court make a finding that awarding custody of a dependent child to a parent would be detrimental to the child.” (In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1211.) This finding, by clear and convincing evidence, satisfies the parent’s relevant due process right. (Id. at pp. 1210-1212.)
In the matter before us, the court found that appellant was “a noncustodial parent who has not requested custody of the child.” He displayed no interest in participating in the court proceedings, neither sought nor was offered reunification services, did not have unsupervised visitation with S.P., and made little or no effort in providing his contact information to the agency. Moreover, the court expressly found at the dispositional hearing, by clear and convincing evidence, that placing S.P. with appellant would be detrimental to her physical health, safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being. The due process requirement was therefore met. (In re P.A., supra, at pp. 1210-1212 [rejecting father’s claim that the juvenile court had terminated his parental rights without finding him unfit, where the court had found at the dispositional hearing that placing the child with the father would be detrimental to the child and denied reunification services to the father].)
Appellant argues that his attorney could not have known any of these facts because she did not receive the reports chronicling them, and was therefore not in a position to rebut them at the section 366.26 hearing. However, the fact that appellant showed no interest in the dependency proceedings, never sought any services, did not have unsupervised visits, and made essentially no effort to be in contact with CFS, were all known by and available from appellant himself.
Appellant fails to demonstrate reversible error.
Appellant goes so far as to declare that the juvenile court judge indulged in a “highly biased prejudgment of the case” because it “unequivocally expressed its view that [appellant’s] counsel could not glean from the file any grounds for arguing against termination of [appellant’s] parental rights sufficient to change the court’s decision.” Appellant misrepresents the record. The court merely stated that presumed father status – an object of the continuance appellant had sought – would not have made a difference in the disposition, because of the overwhelming evidence that adoption was the appropriate permanent plan. In any event, now that appellant and his appellate counsel do have the case file documents, appellant’s continued failure to come up with “any [legitimate] grounds for arguing against termination of [appellant’s] parental rights” confirms the juvenile court’s observation was, in fact, spot-on.
III. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur. JONES, P. J., BRUINIERS, J.