Opinion
1 CA-JV 23-0066
10-19-2023
IN RE DELINQUENCY OF S.N.
Janelle A. McEachern Attorney at Law, Chandler By Janelle A. McEachern Counsel for Appellant Mohave County Attorney's Office, Kingman By Deborah L. Herbert Counsel for Appellee
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County No. S8015JV202200086 The Honorable Aaron Michael Demke, Judge Pro Tempore
Janelle A. McEachern Attorney at Law, Chandler By Janelle A. McEachern Counsel for Appellant
Mohave County Attorney's Office, Kingman By Deborah L. Herbert Counsel for Appellee
Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
CATTANI, Judge
¶1 S.N. appeals from the $1,000 restitution order entered after she was adjudicated delinquent for misdemeanor assault. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 In January 2022, S.N. approached the victim in a breezeway on their high-school campus and began to hit her repeatedly, causing physical injury. The State filed a delinquency petition against S.N. alleging assault and disorderly conduct. Pursuant to a disposition agreement, S.N. admitted the assault charge and the State dismissed the disorderly conduct charge, although S.N. agreed to pay restitution for economic loss stemming from both of the original counts. The court accepted S.N.'s admission of delinquency and, consistent with the terms of the agreement, imposed 12 months of supervised probation.
¶3 As relevant here, the victim's father (as victim representative) requested approximately $4,400 in restitution. At the restitution hearing, he explained that a group of girls (including S.N.) had been bullying and harassing his daughter throughout the school year, and one of the girls even threatened to shank her. Only after the assault, however, did the victim change schools for her safety. Because she was not able to take a bus to the new school, the victim incurred the additional expense of driving to and from school each day. Her father testified that the additional cost for gasoline for one school year (exclusively for travel to school and back) was $4,320. He also testified that the victim had to purchase new sports equipment (provided for free at her old school) for $75.
¶4 The court ultimately ordered partial restitution in the amount of $1,000. The court found that the victim "only changed schools after she was assaulted by [S.N.]" and specifically disagreed with S.N.'s argument that the victim would have changed schools even without the assault. The court acknowledged that multiple other girls had been involved in the bullying but expressly based the restitution ruling only on the offenses charged against S.N. And after considering the nature of S.N.'s offense (as well as her age, physical and mental condition, and earning capacity), the court found the requested amount excessive and ordered partial restitution of $1,000.
¶5 S.N. timely appealed from the final restitution order. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8-235(A).
DISCUSSION
¶6 S.N. argues the juvenile court erred by assessing restitution because the victim's loss was caused by the environment of bullying and threats generally, not by S.N.'s delinquent acts. We review the restitution order for an abuse of discretion, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the ruling. In re Andrew C., 215 Ariz. 366, 367, ¶ 6 (App. 2007).
¶7 When a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent of an offense, the superior court must order the juvenile to make "full or partial restitution" to the victim of the offense after considering the juvenile's age, mental and physical condition, and earning capacity as well as the nature of the offense. A.R.S. § 8-344(A); see also Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(8) (victim's right "[t]o receive prompt restitution"). The restitution award provides compensation for economic loss that would not have been incurred but for, and was directly caused by, the juvenile's delinquent conduct without providing a "windfall" beyond the loss actually suffered. Andrew C., 215 Ariz. at 368, ¶ 9 (citing State v. Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. 27, 29, ¶ 7 (2002)); In re Ryan A., 202 Ariz. 19, 25, ¶ 27 (App. 2002); see also In re Erika V., 194 Ariz. 399, 400, ¶ 4 (App. 1999) (applying relevant legal principles of adult restitution to analysis of juvenile restitution). Expenses "incurred 'in an effort to restore the victim's equanimity'" may be recoverable, provided those expenses flow directly from the offense. State v. Quijada, 246 Ariz. 356, 369-70, ¶¶ 43-44 (App. 2019) (quoting State v. Brady, 169 Ariz. 447, 448 (App. 1991) (moving expenses)).
¶8 Here, the record supports the juvenile court's conclusion that the victim's increased expenses related to changing schools occurred because of, and flowed directly from, the assault (and charged disorderly conduct) by S.N. Although the victim's father described an atmosphere of bullying and referred to a prior verbal threat, he also stated that "we don't usually run from anything, ever." Only after the assault by S.N. did they decide that changing schools was necessary for the victim's safety. Moreover, the court reiterated that S.N. had not admitted other offenses like threatening or intimidating, and the court expressly based its restitution assessment on only the assault and disorderly conduct offenses charged against S.N. And the court properly considered the nature of the relevant offenses alone when reducing the amount of restitution awarded. See A.R.S. § 8-344(A).
CONCLUSION
¶9 We affirm.