Opinion
No. 07-982.
Filed January 15, 2008.
Randolph County Nos. 05 JY 88-89.
Appeal by respondent-mother from orders entered 15 June 2007, nunc pro tunc 23 May 2007, by Judge William M. Neely in Randolph County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 December 2007.
Erica Glass, for petitioner-appellee Randolph County Department of Social Services; Pamela Newell Williams, for Guardian ad Litem. Charlotte Gail Blake for respondent-appellant.
Respondent-mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to S.M.F. and J.M.F. On appeal, respondent-mother argues: (1) the trial court erred by finding that grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 to terminate her parental rights; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that termination was in the best interests of the juveniles. We affirm.
The Randolph County Department of Social Services ("DSS") first became involved with respondent-mother's family in October 2004, after their case file was transferred from Delaware. On 3 March 2005, law enforcement was called to the juveniles' day care. Respondent-mother had arrived to pick up the children by motor vehicle and appeared intoxicated with "slurred speech, staggered gait and general incompetent behavior." Respondent-mother tested negative for alcohol, but refused any drug screening. DSS and law enforcement transported respondent-mother and the children home. The children's father appeared at the home shortly thereafter, also appearing to be intoxicated. The father was arrested and taken to jail for a probation violation, failure to appear, criminal impersonation, and endangering the welfare of a juvenile while driving while impaired. The juveniles were left in respondent-mother's care. On 8 March 2005, both parents tested positive for cocaine.
On 2 April 2005, law enforcement and DSS were called to the home after the parents became involved in a domestic violence dispute. Respondent-mother was observed to have an abrasion over her eye, bruising on her head, neck, and legs, and a "general unkempt appearance." DSS removed the children from the home due to unsafe and unsanitary conditions in the home. The juveniles appeared dirty and the parents refused to provide diapers or clothing for either child. The parents refused to cooperate with DSS or make a safe plan for the children, and were without any alternative child care arrangement. On 4 April 2005, DSS filed a petition alleging that S.M.F. and J.M.F. were neglected and dependent juveniles. DSS assumed custody of the children by non-secure custody order. Upon the filing of the petition, respondent-mother sought assistance and alleged that she and the father had an altercation resulting in bruising to her head and neck. Law enforcement and DSS were called to the home. Respondent-mother again appeared to be intoxicated. Respondent-mother refused to protect herself or the children by leaving the residence, and she denied that any domestic violence occurred. However, respondent-mother later admitted to law enforcement and DSS that domestic violence had in fact occurred.
On 8 November 2005, the parents consented to an adjudication based on the facts alleged in the petition that the children were neglected in that they lived in an injurious environment. The court made additional findings regarding substance abuse and domestic violence. The court continued custody of the children with DSS and authorized placement in foster care. Furthermore, the court ordered that respondent-mother: (1) obtain a clean, stable and sanitary living environment; (2) attend supervised visitation with the children; (3) maintain stable employment; (4) obtain a substance abuse assessment and comply with all recommendations; (5) submit to random drug screens; (6) successfully complete parenting classes; and (7) comply with any treatment recommendations made by mental health providers.
On 14 December 2006, DSS filed petitions to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights. DSS alleged three grounds for termination: (1) that respondent-mother had neglected the juveniles within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15)(2005), and pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2005); (2) that respondent-mother had willfully left the juveniles in foster care for more than twelve months without showing that reasonable progress under the circumstances had been made in correcting those conditions that led to the removal of the juveniles, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2); and (3) that respondent-mother was incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the juveniles, such that the juveniles were dependent within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101, and that there was a reasonable probability that such incapability would continue for the foreseeable future in that respondent-mother had a history of substance abuse, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6).
Hearings were held on the petition to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights on 25 April and 23 May 2007. The trial court concluded that grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (6). The court further concluded that it was in the juveniles' best interests that respondent-mother's parental rights be terminated. Respondent-mother appeals.
We first consider respondent-mother's arguments that the trial court erred by finding that grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 to terminate her parental rights.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 sets out the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. A finding of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to support a termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). "The standard of appellate review is whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law." In re D.J.D., D.M.D., S.J.D., J.M.D., 171 N.C. App. 230, 238, 615 S.E.2d 26, 32 (2005).
Here, the trial court concluded S.M.F. and J.M.F. were neglected juveniles. "Neglected juvenile" is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) as:
A juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is not provided necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare; or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law.
The trial court based its conclusion that respondent-mother neglected the juveniles on findings related to her failure to successfully complete substance abuse treatment and persistent drug abuse. Tasha Hall, a DSS Social Worker, testified regarding respondent-mother's drug screening. Based on her testimony and other evidence in the record, the trial court made the following findings:
[Respondent-mother] failed to successfully complete substance abuse treatment. . . . [Respondent-mother] tested positive for illegal substances on May 12, 2005, June 8, 2005, July 26, 2005, August 17, 2005, November 1, 2005, December 22, 2005, February 2, 2006, March 2, 2006, April 19, 2006, May 31, 2006, June 21, 2006, August 30, 2006, November 1, 2006, January 17, 2007, February 21, 2007, February 28, 2007. [Respondent-mother] produced diluted results on June 15, 2006[,] and October 13, 2006.
[Respondent-mother] has failed to submit to random drug and alcohol screens, either hair or urine, on the dates and times requested. She failed to comply with requests for testing on May 4, 2005, June 15, 2005, October 5, 2005, October 26, 2005, December 21, 2005, December 28, 2005, and October 18, 2006.
The above findings are each supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
Respondent-mother contends that there is no evidence that her drug addiction has had an adverse impact on her children, citing In re Phifer, 67 N.C. App. 16, 312 S.E.2d 684 (1984), for the proposition that her mere status as an addict is not support enough to adjudicate her children as neglected. Id. at 26, 312 S.E.2d at 690. However, the holding in Phifer was that the risk of future harm, as opposed to a showing of harm that has already occurred, is not sufficient grounds for termination standing alone. Id. at 25, 312 S.E.2d at 689. In this case, the court did not simply dub respondent-mother an addict and conclude that the children were neglected, nor did it base its adjudication solely on hypothetical future behavior. Here, not only did the court adjudicate the children neglected with respondent-mother's consent, based at least in part on her drug use, but it also described the direct impact of her addiction on the juveniles in its original order adjudicating the child neglected, wherein it stated that the physical condition of their home was such that it was unsafe and unsanitary for the juveniles to continue to remain in the home. The floors were strewn with food and clothing with no clear paths from room to room. The juveniles appeared unclean and the parents refused to provide any diapers or clothing for either of the juveniles.
To address her drug abuse issues and prevent further neglect, the trial court required respondent-mother to attend drug treatment and submit to random drug screens. However, out of over thirty random drug screens, respondent-mother only tested negative on seven occasions, and was still using cocaine until at least February 2007, shortly before the termination hearing. The trial court found that respondent-mother's "continued abuse of illegal substances evinces the likelihood of repetition of neglect if [the juveniles] were returned home." Based on the clear, cogent and convincing evidence in the record and accordant findings, the trial court was free to conclude that respondent-mother neglected the juveniles, and that there was a probability of repetition of neglect. See In re C.T. R.S., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 643 S.E.2d 23, 28 (2007) ("[w]here the child has not been in the care of the parent, the court must consider the probability that the child would be neglected should the child be returned to the parent's care"). Accordingly, we hold that sufficient grounds existed for termination of respondent-mother's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1).
Since grounds exist pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) to support the trial court's order, the remaining grounds found by the trial court to support termination need not be reviewed by the Court. Taylor, 97 N.C. App. at 64, 387 S.E.2d at 233-34. Respondent-mother lastly argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it was in the best interests of the juveniles to terminate her parental rights. We are not persuaded.
"The trial court has discretion, if it finds that at least one of the statutory grounds exists, to terminate parental rights upon a finding that it would be in the [juvenile's] best interests." In re Nesbitt, 147 N.C. App. 349, 352, 555 S.E.2d 659, 662 (2001). Factors to consider in determining the juvenile's best interests include: (1) the age of the juvenile; (2) the likelihood of adoption; (3) the impact on the accomplishment of the permanent plan; (4) the bond between the juvenile and the parent; (5) the relationship between the juvenile and a proposed adoptive parent or other permanent placement; and (6) any other relevant consideration. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2005). The court is to take action "which is in the best interests of the juvenile" when "the interests of the juvenile and those of the juvenile's parents or other persons are in conflict." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1100(3) (2005). As a discretionary decision, the trial court's disposition order will not be disturbed unless it could not have been the product of reasoning. In re J.B., 172 N.C. App. 747, 751, 616 S.E.2d 385, 387, affirmed per curiam, 360 N.C. 165, 622 S.E.2d 495 (2005).
The trial court's detailed findings of fact reveal that the trial court considered the factors required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). The trial court made specific findings referencing the birthdate of each of the children. Regarding the likelihood of adoption and the relationship between the minor children and their potential adoptive parents, the trial court found:
The minor [children] remain? in a licensed foster home that desires to adopt [the children] and [the children are] doing well in that home. [They] ha[ve] been in this home since December 16, 2006. The home has three bedrooms. The minor [children] attend ? daycare. [They are] healthy. [They are] bonded to the foster parents. After June of this year, the minor [children] will be home-schooled as the foster Mother is a stay-at-home Mother.
Additionally, regarding the bond between S.M.F. and respondent-mother, the trial court found that the juvenile's "cognitive life has been outside the home of [respondent-mother]." The trial court further found that termination of respondent-mother's parental rights "would not result in an unnecessary severance of the relationship between [respondent-mother] to the minor [children]." Based on the findings of fact made by the trial court after an extensive termination hearing, we can discern no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and ARROWOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).