The State Bar agrees with Mance that a public reprimand is consistent with prior discipline imposed in cases alleging violations of Rule 1.1, citing In the Matter of Detling, 289 Ga. 256 (710 S.E.2d 566) (2011) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing a review panel reprimand for a violation of Rule 1.1 where an attorney negligently issued an opinion letter attesting that he possessed no knowledge that might materially affect the business's right to carry on business or its financial condition despite knowledge that the business's principal faced federal criminal charges, where attorney lacked dishonest motive and had a good reputation, and where no actual injury occurred, and where attorney had no prior disciplinary history); In the Matter of Smart, 303 Ga. 156 (810 S.E.2d 475) (2018) (imposing a review panel reprimand where attorney defaulted under a notice of discipline seeking review panel reprimand and alleging violations of Rules 1.1, 1.2 (a), 1.3, and 1.4, and where attorney, who had no prior disciplinary history, was not diligent in representation of client and client's son before Georgia Department of Education, selfishly misled client about his lack of diligence, and hearing officer dismissed proceeding with prejudice as a result of attorney's misconduct). Although the lawyers in Detling and Smart had no prior disciplinary history when a review panel reprimand was imposed for their Rule 1.1 violations, and Mance does have a prior confidential disciplinary infraction, we nonetheless conclude that a public reprimand is the appropriate discipline given the unique facts and circumstances in this case.

See, e.g., In the Matter of Jordan , 305 Ga. 35, 823 S.E.2d 257 (2019) ; In the Matter of Smart , 303 Ga. 156, 810 S.E.2d 475 (2018). While the State Bar supports Tuggle’s request for a reprimand, having reviewed the record, we conclude that Tuggle’s petition for voluntary discipline should be rejected. Of particular concern is the fact that Tuggle has failed to accept any sort of financial responsibility for the losses caused by his conduct or to provide concrete information as to what amount of restitution is due.

Although the State Bar supports Kirby’s request for the imposition of a Review Board reprimand, we find that the cases on which it relies are not sufficiently similar: they did not involve the lengthy pattern of misconduct present here. See In the Matter of Smart, 303 Ga. 156, 810 S.E.2d 475 (2018) (Review Panel reprimand for violations of Rules 1.1, 1.2 (c), 1.3, and 1.4 based on defaulting attorney’s neglect of one client’s matter before the Georgia Department of Education that resulted in matter being dismissed with prejudice); In the Matter of Brown, 296 Ga. 439, 768 S.E.2d 456 (2015) (Review Panel reprimand for violation of Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 (d) in representing one client in post-conviction criminal matter); In the Matter of Free, 290 Ga. 75, 717 S.E.2d 480 (2011) (Review Panel reprimand for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16 (d), and 8.1 in connection with neglect of one client’s criminal manner); In the Matter of King, 289 Ga. 457, 712 S.E.2d 70 (2011) (Review Panel reprimand for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 (c) and (d) in connection with abandonment of one client’s civil matter); and In the Matter of Jones-Lewis, 287 Ga. 581, 697 S.E.2d 836 (2010) (Review Panel reprimand for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.16, and 9.3 in connection with neglect of si