Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. NJ13960A, B, C, Harry M. Elias, Judge.
IRION, J.
Elizabeth M. and F.M. (Father) appeal jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders under provisions of the Welfare and Institution Code sections 300 et seq.
Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.400(b)(2), we are required to protect the anonymity of the parties involved in an appellate proceeding concerning dependency, delinquency and certain Family Code proceedings. The use of initials or a generic term describing the party's relationship to the child or children in place of the party's first name does not indicate a lack of respect for, or desire to depersonalize, any person involved in this appeal.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
A
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Elizabeth and Father are the parents of three children, daughters S.M. and V.M., and son F.M. The children are now ages 14, 10 and 8 years old, respectively.
On June 18, 2008, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) detained the children in protective custody and filed petitions under section 300, subdivisions (d) and (j). The Agency alleged Father sexually abused S.M. in that he touched S.M.'s breasts, digitally penetrated her vagina and/or anus, attempted penile penetration of her vagina and caused S.M. to touch his penis with her hand. The Agency alleged V.M. and F.M. (together, siblings) were at substantial risk of sexual abuse.
The court detained the children and issued a no contact order between Father and S.M.
The jurisdictional and dispositional hearings were held on November 13, December 17, and 23, 2008. The court heard testimony from Catherine McLennan, supervisor for the child abuse program at Palomar Pomerado Health Child Center (Palomar), and the Agency's social workers Gail Pomare, Jessica Edwards, Jannee Stroika and Kris Bailey. The court admitted in evidence the Agency's detention, jurisdiction/disposition and addendum reports, a recorded interview of S.M. at Palomar, the social workers' curriculum vitae, the Agency's service logs, and a copy of S.M.'s physical exam dated June 13, 2008.
Unless otherwise specified, all subsequently referenced dates (month and day) occurred in year 2008.
The Agency's reports and testimony of social workers Jessica Edwards and Jannee Stroika show the following chronology:
On March 17 S.M., then 13 years old, told Elizabeth that Father would come into her room and touch her when Elizabeth was at work on a night shift. It was very difficult for S.M. to talk about the matter and Elizabeth did not question her further. Elizabeth asked Father to leave the home which he did the next day.
On March 19 S.M. told Elizabeth the touching started when S.M. was in third grade, three years earlier, and the last incident occurred before Thanksgiving 2007. Father would take off his clothes, lie on top of her and "have sex."
On March 21, at the urging of family members, Elizabeth contacted the police. Elizabeth related her conversations with S.M. to a police officer. The officer asked S.M. if what her mother had told him really happened, S.M. said "yes." Because S.M. was very timid, the officer did not question her further and made a referral to child protective services.
On April 1 Jessica Edwards, an Agency social worker, interviewed S.M. S.M. stated Father touched her "down there and up here," pointing to her vaginal area and chest. He touched the inside of her vagina. S.M. stated Father tried to have sexual intercourse with her. Father lay on top of her but she pushed him back. S.M. said Father touched her bottom. S.M. could not remember whether he made her touch his penis. The siblings denied abuse.
On April 3 S.M. was interviewed by a forensic specialist at Palomar. S.M. stated Father would hold her down and would try to put his penis in her vagina. On at least one occasion, he put her hand on his penis under his boxer shorts. S.M. stated Father put his finger "down there," referring to her vagina, and in "my butt hole." She said it hurt. S.M. was quiet, timid and soft-spoken. Palomar referred S.M. to counseling services.
Social worker Edwards did not believe there was a need for a voluntary services contract because Elizabeth was one of the most protective mothers Edwards had encountered in her 11 years as a social worker. Elizabeth was following through with recommended services for S.M. Edwards substantiated the referral for sexual abuse and closed the case.
Edwards received a referral on May 14 alleging S.M. was having contact with Father. S.M. said she saw Father four times when Elizabeth dropped off the siblings for visits. Father was scheduled to pick S.M. up after school that day for the first time.
Elizabeth told Edwards she knew Father could not live in the home but she did not realize the children could not see him. Elizabeth said S.M. told her that she had made up the allegations. In Elizabeth's presence, Edwards asked S.M. if she told Elizabeth she made up the allegations, S.M. shook her head "no." Edwards asked S.M. if she had told the truth when she said Father touched her, S.M. nodded her head "yes."
Edwards explained to Elizabeth she could not allow S.M. to have contact with Father or the Agency would have to open a case. On June 10 she sent a letter to Elizabeth to clarify the protective measures Elizabeth needed to take. Edwards substantiated the second referral for general neglect by Elizabeth and closed the case.
Social worker Stroika received a referral on June 12 alleging S.M. was having contact with Father and the family was moving in with him. Elizabeth and the children verified the allegations. S.M. reported that after Elizabeth told her the Agency would not allow her to see Father, S.M. told Elizabeth "those things did not happen." S.M. told Stroika she made up the allegations because Father would not let her go out with her friends.
Elizabeth stated that after S.M. denied abuse, Elizabeth thought it was permissible for the children to have contact with Father. Elizabeth said if she believed the abuse occurred, she would protect her daughter. Elizabeth intended to discontinue S.M.'s therapy because S.M. no longer needed it and it was too far away from their new home.
Stroika determined court intervention was necessary to protect the children and removed them from the home. She was concerned S.M. was under pressure to recant and the siblings were at risk. Sexual abuse was unpredictable by nature and the siblings were close to the age when S.M. said she was first molested.
Social worker Gail Pomare was assigned to the case on June 13 or 14. Pomare testified the children were at risk if they remained in the home because Elizabeth was not protective. Elizabeth allowed S.M. to have unsupervised contact with Father and intended to discontinue S.M.'s therapy. S.M.'s recantation was also a risk factor because it occurred "like it was almost a blackmail." F.M. was at risk of sexual abuse because he was the same age S.M. was when the abuse started. Pomare acknowledged a voluntary services contract might have been helpful had it occurred earlier.
Kris Bailey was the family's continuing services social worker. V.M. and F.M. were placed with the paternal grandparents, and S.M. was placed in a group home. Father had frequent supervised visits with the siblings. He was participating in weekly therapy and had completed a parenting program. His therapist recommended Father participate in group counseling for sexual perpetrators and a 12-step program.
Elizabeth was participating in weekly therapy and a parenting program. When Bailey spoke with her about participating in a parenting group for nonoffending parents, Elizabeth was adamant her daughter had recanted and the sexual abuse did not occur. Elizabeth's therapist stated Elizabeth "hit a wall" in therapy and did not believe the allegations were true.
Bailey stated the current assessment was very high risk because Elizabeth was not willing to protect and provide emotional support to S.M., and she was not willing to protect V.M. and F.M. from Father.
McLennan had testified as an expert witness approximately 20 times in California courts. McLennan was familiar with studies on recantation of sexual abuse. In cases in which there was corroborating physical evidence of sexual abuse, known as high probability cases, 23 percent of the children recanted their allegations. After an initial delay, a child feels guilty and morally culpable for the disruption to the family. They want the abusive behavior to stop but do not necessarily want the perpetrator punished or family life disrupted. Children are emotionally and financially dependent on adults that abuse them and cannot tolerate anger and rejection.
The parties stipulated that if S.M. were to testify she would continue to recant the allegation of molestation.
In extensive remarks, the court stated it had reviewed the recording of S.M.'s interview at Palomar in which she recounted incidents of sexual molestation. The court found that S.M.'s demeanor was credible and S.M. had motive to recant because she was losing contact with her family. McLennan's testimony was beneficial and insightful. The court determined the evidence showed S.M. was sexually molested and the sexual molestation presented a substantial risk of detriment to the siblings' emotional and psychological well-being.
The court sustained the petitions by clear and convincing evidence and removed the children from parental custody. (§§ 300, subds. (d), (j); 361, subd. (c)(1).) The court ordered the Agency to place the children together in a relative's home and found the Agency had made reasonable efforts to prevent the need for removal. The court ordered Father to have no visits with S.M. until visits were determined to be therapeutically appropriate, and gave the Agency discretion to increase visitation as appropriate, with the concurrence of minor's counsel.
B
DISCUSSION
Father challenges: (1) the jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (d); (2) the jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (j); (3) the orders removing the children from their mother under section 361, subdivision (c)(1); (4) the reasonable efforts findings; and (5) the order prohibiting Father from visiting S.M. until therapeutically appropriate.
Elizabeth does not challenge the jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (d) and Father's visitation order in S.M.'s case, but otherwise joins with Father's arguments. To the extent they inure to his benefit, Father joins with Elizabeth's arguments as to jurisdiction, removal and reasonable efforts.
1. Section 300, Subdivision (d)
Father argues the court erred when it found that S.M. was sexually abused as defined by section 300, subdivision (d). He contends S.M.'s reports of sexual molestation do not constitute substantial evidence because her reports were inconsistent and she recanted the allegations.
The Agency contends Father's arguments challenge S.M.'s credibility. The Agency points out that this court does not have the authority to weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of a witness or to resolve conflicts in the evidence. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53.) It acknowledges S.M. recanted the molestation allegations but asserts substantial evidence supports the reasonable inference S.M. was pressured to recant by the family's circumstances. Minors' counsel joins with the Agency's argument.
Section 300, subdivision (d) defines "sexual abuse" by reference to Penal Code section 11165.1. Penal Code section 11165.1 enumerates a list of actions constituting sexual assault and refers to other sections of the Penal Code. Here the Agency alleged Father touched S.M.'s breasts, digitally penetrated her vagina and/or anus, attempted penile penetration of her vagina and caused S.M. to touch his penis with her hand.
Penal Code section 11165.1 states that "sexual abuse" means sexual assault or sexual exploitation. " 'Sexual assault' means conduct in violation of one or more of the following sections: Section 261 (rape), subdivision (d) of Section 261.5 (statutory rape), 264.1 (rape in concert), 285 (incest), 286 (sodomy), subdivision (a) or (b), or paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 288 (lewd or lascivious acts upon a child), 288a (oral copulation), 289 (sexual penetration), or 647.6 (child molestation)." (Pen. Code, § 11165.1.)
We review the trial court's findings for substantial evidence. We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or resolve evidentiary conflicts. The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) "The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record." (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 652.)
The court was aware of the quality and character of S.M.'s descriptions of sexual molestation. Despite some variations in the statements, which at times were more explicit than at other times, the court noted the difference was not significant. S.M. consistently stated Father sexually molested her. The court heard all the evidence and could not find a motive for S.M. to lie about the molestation. The court stated S.M.'s demeanor during her interview at Palomar lent credence to her credibility.
We accept, as we must, the court's determination of credibility. (In re Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 228.) S.M.'s statements concerning the molestation are described in the Factual and Procedural Background, Part A, ante, and we need not repeat them here. The record permits the reasonable inference S.M.'s statements were not inconsistent but were clarified when she was interviewed by increasingly competent professionals.
With respect to S.M.'s motive to recant, the record shows at the time S.M. first recanted her allegations, Elizabeth had quit her full-time night shift job to be at home with the children. The family was dependent on Father for financial support and they were at risk of being evicted from their apartment. As the court noted, S.M. had a continuing motive to recant because she had been placed in a group home and was losing contact with her family. Based on the evidence that was before the court, the court reasonably could reject S.M.'s recantation of sexual molestation.
We conclude the record contains substantial evidence to support the court's findings that S.M. was a child described by section 300, subdivision (d).
2. Section 300, Subdivision (j)
Elizabeth and Father contend no evidence supports the finding that V.M. and F.M. were at substantial risk of being abused or neglected as defined by section 300, subdivision (j). They assert the court incorrectly interpreted section 300, subdivision (j) to encompass allegations of emotional harm based on sibling abuse. Elizabeth and Father argue the question before the court was not whether the siblings were at risk of any conceivable harm as defined by section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (d), (e) or (i), but whether they were specifically at risk of sexual abuse as defined in section 300, subdivision (d). The parents contend V.M. was not at substantial risk of sexual abuse and F.M., as a male child, was at no risk of sexual abuse.
The Agency contends substantial evidence supports the finding that Father's actions and Elizabeth's belief the sexual molestation did not occur presented a substantial risk of sexual abuse to the siblings and placed their emotional and psychological well-being at risk. Minors' counsel joins with the Agency's argument.
Section 300, subdivision (j) applies when: "The child's sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions. The court shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative in determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child."
We are not persuaded by the parents' argument that section 300, subdivision (j) limits the parameters of adjudication of the subject child to the same grounds on which the child's sibling is or has been adjudicated dependent, here, section 300, subdivision (d). Statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432.)
The Legislature and appellate courts have recognized that parental sexual abuse of a child may present a substantial risk of sexual abuse to the child's sibling. (See § 355.1, subd. (d); In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347.) Section 300, subdivision (d) does not limit its application to the child that has been sexually abused. Rather, by its plain terms, it applies to any child that is at substantial risk of being sexually abused. (§ 300, subd. (d).)
In the circumstances presented here, limiting the application of section 300, subdivision (j) to grounds of substantial risk of sexual abuse found under section 300, subdivision (d) would render section 300, subdivision (j) superfluous or redundant. This does not comport with long-established rules of statutory construction. (See, e.g., Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 931 [we avoid construction that render parts of a statute surplusage], State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1029, 1043 [statute is read with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is a part], Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Macri (1992) 4 Cal.4th 318, 326 [construction that makes sense of an apparent inconsistency preferable to one that renders statutory language useless or meaningless].) Rather, a court may find jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (j) if the child's sibling has been abused or neglected under one (or more) of the subdivisions enumerated in section 300, subdivision (j), and the child is at substantial risk of harm under any of those subdivisions. Further, the second (and last) sentence of section 300, subdivision (j) directs the court to consider a wide range of factors in determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child, and not only the risk factors that supported jurisdiction over the child's sibling.
We are not persuaded by the parents' argument that sexual abuse of a female child does not establish substantial risk of sexual abuse to a male sibling. This issue has been thoroughly discussed and rejected by appellate courts. (See In re P.A., (2006), 144 Cal.App.4th 1339 (P.A.); In re Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84 (Karen R.); In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177 (Rubisela E.).)
Elizabeth and Father rely on Rubisela E. That case does not assist them. Although the Rubisela E. court did not find substantial evidence to sustain findings of substantial risk to the male siblings of the sexually abused female child, that court stated: "We do not discount the real possibility that brothers of molested sisters can be molested... or in other ways harmed by the fact of the molestation within the family. Brothers can be harmed by the knowledge that a parent has so abused the trust of their sister. They can even be harmed by the denial of the perpetrator, the spouse's acquiescence in the denial, or their parents' efforts to embrace them in a web of denial." (Rubisela E., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 198.)
Appellate courts also have noted that when a parent's actions are sexually aberrant, both male and female siblings of the sexually abused child may be at substantial risk of abuse if left in the home. (Karen R., supra,95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 90-91; P.A., supra,144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.) "Although the danger of sexual abuse of a female sibling in such a situation may be greater than the danger of sexual abuse of a male sibling, the danger of sexual abuse to the male sibling is nonetheless still substantial." (Karen R., supra, at p. 91.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the findings V.M. and F.M. were at substantial risk of being sexually abused by Father and at substantial risk of harm as a result of Elizabeth's inability to adequately supervise and protect the children from sexual abuse, and the emotional and psychological consequences of sibling sexual abuse and divided loyalties. (§ 300, subds. (b), (d).)
Social workers Pomare and Stroika stated the siblings were at risk because they were approximately the same age and body build as was S.M. when Father started sexually molesting her. When a child has been sexually abused, any younger sibling who is approaching the age at which the child was abused, may be found to be at risk of sexual abuse. (P.A., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.) S.M. described anal digital penetration as well as vaginal digital penetration. Performing these acts on a young child is sexually aberrant, and places both V.M. and F.M. at substantial risk of being sexually abused. (Karen R., supra, at pp. 90-91; P.A., supra, at p. 1347.)
With respect to the court's findings that the siblings were at substantial risk of emotional and physical harm, the record shows that by mid-November Elizabeth had participated in therapy for approximately five months and adamantly believed Father's denials of sexual molestation. Elizabeth was not making progress in therapy and did not yet understand the dynamics of sexual molestation, recantation and S.M.'s need for emotional support. The court reasonably could infer the siblings were at substantial risk of emotional and psychological harm caused by their mother's denials, and this constituted a substantial risk of denial of regular care and increased the risk of sexual abuse to the siblings. (Rubisela E., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 198.) We conclude the court did not err when it found the siblings were children described by section 300, subdivision (j).
3. Removal
Elizabeth and Father contend the court erred when it removed the children from Elizabeth's care. They argue the Agency did not show, by clear and convincing evidence, there was a substantial danger to the children's well-being in her care. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) The parents further assert the court did not assess whether there were reasonable means to protect the children's physical health without removing them from parental custody. (Ibid.) Elizabeth maintains she is a protective parent, and the children love her and feel safe with her. Father concurs.
The Agency argues the jurisdictional findings constitute prima facie evidence the children cannot safely remain in the home. The focus of section 361, subdivision (c) is on averting harm to the child; the statute does not require the child to suffer actual harm before removal. (In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 536, citing In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 699.) The Agency points out that, despite the burden on the trial court to find that clear and convincing evidence requires the child's removal from the home, the reviewing court applies the substantial evidence standard, "giving full effect to the respondent's evidence, however slight, and disregarding the appellant's evidence, however strong." (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581.)
At the disposition hearing, the court cannot remove a dependent child from the home unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a substantial danger to the child's physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being, and there are no reasonable means to protect the child's physical health without removing the child from parental custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 528; In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282, 288.) The court may consider a parent's past conduct as well as his or her current circumstances when it determines whether a child may be safely maintained in parental custody. (In re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 461.)
We discussed, ante, the substantial danger to the children's physical health, safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being presented by Father's sexual abuse of S.M. and Elizabeth's inability at the time of the hearing to protect and support the children. The court also could consider Elizabeth's disregard of the social workers' advice on how best to protect her children from risk of sexual abuse. (In re S.O., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 461.) In view of Elizabeth's adamant denials that Father sexually abused S.M. and her lack of understanding about the dynamics of sexual abuse, we conclude the court did not err when it removed the children from the home.
4. Reasonable Efforts
The parents contend the court's reasonable efforts finding is not supported by substantial evidence. (§ 361, subd. (d).) They argue that once the Agency made the decision the children required the protection of the juvenile court, the Agency was required to make reasonable efforts to avoid the removal of the children. The parents state the Agency sent mixed messages to Elizabeth by twice closing the case instead of explaining the dynamics of recantation of sexual molestation to Elizabeth and offering voluntary services that should have included counseling, transportation services and referrals to public assistance to allow her to maintain housing for herself and the children.
The Agency contends the court did not err. The Agency argues it gave Elizabeth "several opportunities" to protect her children before initiating the dependency actions. After the children were detained, the Agency offered referrals for parenting classes, therapy and sexual offender parenting group programs for offending and nonoffending parent sexual offenders.
The court is required to determine at the detention and disposition hearings whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the minor from his or her home. (§§ 319, subd. (d)(1); 361, subd. (d); 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15); see also § 319, subd. (b); see generally 42 U.S.C. § 602 et seq.) "[R]easonable efforts" is "a directive whose meaning will obviously vary with the circumstances of each individual case." (Suter v. Artist M. (1992) 503 U.S. 347, 360 .)
Each child's case plan must "[i]nclude a description of the services offered and provided to prevent removal of the child from the home and to reunify the family." (45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g)(4); see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15); §§ 16501.1, subd. (f)(9), 16507, subd. (a).) Services include, but are not limited to, "a range of service-funded activities, including case management, counseling, emergency shelter care, emergency in-home caretakers, temporary in-home caretakers, respite care, therapeutic day services, teaching and demonstrating homemakers, parenting training, substance abuse testing, and transportation. These service-funded activities shall be available to children and their families in all phases of the child welfare program in accordance with the child's case plan and departmental regulations." (§ 16501, subd. (a)(1).)
Here the parties conflate the reasonable efforts finding required at the initial hearing, in which the court temporarily detained the children in protective custody, with the reasonable services finding required at disposition, in which the court removed the children from parental custody. (§§ 319, subd. (d)(1); 361, subd. (d).) Although the parents' concerns about the adequacy of the Agency's efforts prior to the detention hearing are not without merit, we conclude the issue is forfeited on appeal.
At the detention hearing on June 18, 2008, the parents did not object to the reasonable efforts finding. (M.L. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 520, 528.) They do not challenge that finding here. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); see In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 196 [dispositional order is first appealable order in dependency process]). Thus the parents have forfeited the issue whether the Agency made reasonable efforts to prevent removal before the Agency detained the children. (See In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222.)
After the court ordered the children detained at the initial hearing, the record shows the Agency offered or provided a range of services to the parents. The parents voluntarily participated in some services and declined others. We conclude there is substantial evidence to support the finding at the dispositional hearing the Agency made reasonable efforts designed to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the children from their home. (§ 361, subd. (d).)
5. Visitation
Father contends the court erred when it denied him visitation. He asserts he was denied "any right to visitation with his daughter, [S.M.], during reunification" and the error foreclosed the possibility of family reunification.
We are aware S.M. has instructed her appellate counsel to inform us that she would like to be able to see her father.
Visitation between a parent and a dependent child is an essential component of any reunification plan. (In re Alvin R., Jr. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972.) "Visitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child." (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) However, "[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child." (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).)
The court has broad discretion in fashioning visitation orders and the court's determination will not be disturbed on review absent a clear abuse of discretion. (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.)
We do not agree with Father's characterization of the visitation order as a complete denial of visitation. The order did not foreclose visitation during the reunification period but ordered visits take place under certain conditions. (In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1233.) The court clearly stated "Father can start to have contact with [S.M.], when it's therapeutically appropriate." The court gave the Agency the discretion to start to allow Father to have contact with S.M., with the concurrence of minor's counsel, and to work toward reduced supervision and increased visitation. This is set forth in the minute order of December 23.
In view of Father's ongoing sexual molestation of S.M. for three years and S.M.'s vulnerabilities, the visitation order is consistent with the well-being of the child. (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1).) The court did not abuse its discretion when it fashioned a visitation order to meet S.M.'s current needs and to allow the Agency to respond in a timely manner as S.M.'s needs change, without jeopardizing her well-being.
DISPOSITION
The findings and orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O'ROURKE, Acting P. J., AARON, J.