2007); In re Grant, 364 B.R. 656, 663 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2007); In re Frederickson, 368 B.R. 825, 829-30 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.2007)(in dicta); In re Luton, 363 B.R. 96, 101 (Bankr.W.D.Ark. 2007); In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290, 305 (Bankr.D.Nev.2007): In re Cushman, 350 B.R. 207, 212-13 (Bankr.D.S.C.2006); In re Girodes, 350 B.R. 31, 35 (Bankr.
Sept.6, 2007) (2007 WL 2683837); In re Mancl, 375 B.R. 514, 517 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.2007) (minority view produces arbitrary results that penalize debtors and creditors), rev'd, 381 B.R. 537, 539 (W.D.Wis.2008); Lanning, No. 06-41037, 2007 WL 1451999, *6, n. 25; In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290, 298 (Bankr. D.Nev.2007) (minority view is a detriment to debtors and creditors). It is doubtful that such results are what Congress intended, as they appear to be just the opposite of what is indicated by the scant legislative history.
See In re Rezentes, 368 B.R. 55, 61-62 (Bankr.D.Haw.2007) ("I conclude that, for purposes of calculating projected disposable income, debtors may deduct the local standard housing expense or their actual housing expense, whichever is less."); In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290, 309 (Bankr.D.Nev.2007) ("For better or worse, Congress referred to the IRS National and Local Standards in Section 707(b)(2)(A). To understand what requirements this incorporation imposes would seem to require courts to look at how the IRS defines these categories, and how the IRS calculates those expenses.
The phrase "projected disposable income" appears without definition in five other subsections of the Code including, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(15)(B), 1222(a)(4), 1225(b)(1)(B), 1225(b)(1)(C) and 1322(a)(4). See In re Pak, 378 B.R. 257, 264 n. 7 (9th Cir. BAP 2007); In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290, 297 (Bankr. D.Nev.2007). Only section 1129(a)(15)(B) refers back to the definition of "disposable income" in section 1325(b)(2).
The decisions are listed chronologically. They include: In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. 718 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); In re McGuire, 342 B.R. 608 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006); In re Lara, 347 B.R. 198, (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); In re Wiggs, 2006 WL 2246432 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); In re Oliver, 350 B.R. 294 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006); In re Carlin, 348 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006); In re Harris, 353 B.R. 304 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2006); In re Devilliers, 358 B.R. 849 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2007); In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2007); In re Ceasar, 364 B.R. 257, 2007 WL 777821 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2007); In re Howell, 2007 WL 1237832 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007); In re Pampas, 369 B.R. 290, 2007 WL 1485352 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2007); In re Ross-Tousey, 368 B.R. 762, 2007 WL 1466647 (E.D. Wis. 2007). The following courts have found in favor of the debtors on this issue: In re Naslund, 359 B.R. 781 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2006); In re Swan, 2007 WL 1146485 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Chamberlain, 369 B.R. 519, 2007 Wl 1355894 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007); In re Armstrong, 2007 WL 1724955 (Bankr. E.D. Wa. 2007).
In the Ninth Circuit there are two cases that have come down on the side of denying a Chapter 13 debtor the automatic allowance and two that would allow it, notwithstanding that no lien or lease payment is actually owed. Compare In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290 (Bankr.D.Nev.2007) and In re Carlin, 348 B.R. 795 (Bankr.D. Or.2006) with In re Swan, 368 B.R. 12 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2007) and In re Naslund, 359 B.R. 781, 789-790 (Bankr.D.Mont.2006). Moreover, as Judge Weissbrodt observed in Swan, there is no discernable majority view which has emerged nationally, with (as of this writing) eleven opinions holding that a debtor cannot deduct an ownership expense for a vehicle owned free and clear and fifteen, including Swan, that go the other way and permit an automatic allowance.
In the Ninth Circuit there are two cases that have come down on the side of denying a Chapter 13 debtor the automatic allowance and two that would allow it, notwithstanding that no lien or lease payment is actually owed. Compare In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290 (Bankr.D.Nev.2007) and In re Carlin, 348 B.R. 795 (Bankr.D. Or.2006) with In re Swan, 368 B.R. 12 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2007) and In re Naslund, 359 B.R. 781, 789-790 (Bankr.D.Mont. 2006). Moreover, as Judge Weissbrodt observed in Swan, there is no discernable majority view which has emerged nationally, with (as of this writing) eleven opinions holding that a debtor cannot deduct an ownership expense for a vehicle owned free and clear and fifteen, including Swan, that go the other way and permit an automatic allowance.
FN10. In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290, 300 (Bankr.D.Nev.2007) (explaining that “[a]lthough apparently straightforward, as with much of BAPCPA, the text Congress used plausibly lends itself to at least two different interpretations of what exactly ‘applicable commitment period’ means”). FN11.
Ross, 375 B.R. at 441 (citing In re Jass, 340 B.R. 411 (Bankr.D.Utah 2006)); In re Edmondson, 363 B.R. 212 (Bankr.D.N.M.2007); In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290 (Bankr.D.Nev.2007), as well as In re Meek, 370 B.R. 294, 303 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2007); In re Arsenault, 370 B.R. 845, 852 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2007); In re Watson, 366 B.R. 523, 531-32 (Bankr.D.Md.
Instead, courts have in a variety of ways held that "projected" modifies "disposable income" in § 1325(b)(1)(B), requiring a forward looking inquiry to determine what a debtor's "projected disposable income" will be during the pendency of the Chapter 13 plan. See, e.g., In re Kibbe, 361 B.R. 302, 312-14 (1st Cir. BAP 2007); In re Pak, 378 B.R. 257, 264 (9th Cir. BAP 2007), abrogated by In re Kagenveama, 541 F.3d 868; In re Lanning, 380 B.R. 17, 24-25 (10th Cir. BAP 2007); In re Wilson, 2008 WL 619196, *13, 2008 Bankr.LEXIS 769, *47-48 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. 2008); In re Briscoe, 374 B.R. 1, 16 (Bankr.D.D.C. 2007); In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290, 297-300 (Bankr.D.Nev. 2007); In re Jass, 340 B.R. 411, 415-16 (Bankr.D.Utah 2006); In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. at 723; In re Fuller, 346 B.R. 472, 485 (Bankr.S.D.Ill. 2006). Courts on this side of the divide reason that Congress's placement of the word "projected" in § 1325(b)(1)(B) was intentional and, further, that it was done to give "projected disposable income" a different meaning from "disposable income" as defined by § 1325(b)(2).