Opinion
No. COA13–257.
2013-07-2
In the Matter of S.L.A.
Deputy County Attorney Rebekah R. Price for Petitioner Henderson County Department of Social Services. Sydney Batch for Respondent-father.
Appeal by Respondent from judgment entered 10 December 2012 by Judge Thomas McAvoy Brittain in Henderson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 June 2013. Deputy County Attorney Rebekah R. Price for Petitioner Henderson County Department of Social Services. Sydney Batch for Respondent-father.
Ellis & Winters LLP, by Kelly Margolis Dagger, for Guardian ad litem.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Respondent, the putative father of S.L.A. (“Sara”), appeals from a judgment terminating his parental rights. We affirm.
A pseudonym is used to protect Sara's identity and for ease of reading. N.C.R.App. P. 3.1(b).
On 17 March 2011, the Henderson County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed a juvenile petition alleging that Sara, a five-day-old infant, was neglected. DSS obtained nonsecure custody on that same day, and the trial court adjudicated Sara neglected in an order entered 5 May 2011. In a separate disposition order, the trial court continued custody with DSS and ordered Respondent to comply with specific requirements to achieve reunification.
On 28 August 2012, DSS filed a motion to terminate Respondent's parental rights on grounds of (1) neglect, (2) willfully leaving Sara in foster care for more than twelve months without showing reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to removal, (3) willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for Sara, and (4) failure to legitimate. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 7B–1111(a)(1)—(3), (5) (2011). Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order concluding that termination of Respondent's parental rights was justified based on the four grounds alleged by DSS. The trial court also concluded that it was in Sara's best interests to terminate Respondent's parental rights. Respondent gave timely notice of appeal.
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Sara's mother, but she did not appeal.
After a conscientious and thorough review of the record on appeal, the transcript from the termination of parental rights hearing, and all material in the underlying case file, Respondent's counsel filed a no-merit brief in which she “concluded that this appeal presents no issue of merit on which to base an argument for relief and ... is frivolous.” Pursuant to N.C.R.App. P. 3.1(d), counsel requested that this Court conduct an independent examination of the case. Counsel has also shown to our satisfaction that she advised Respondent of his right to file written arguments with this Court and provided Respondent with the documents necessary to do so. Respondent has not filed his own written arguments.
After carefully reviewing the transcript and record, we are unable to find any prejudicial error in the trial court's order. The trial court's findings of fact support at least one ground for termination, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in Sara's best interests. Accordingly, we find no prejudicial error in the trial court's order terminating Respondent's parental rights to Sara.
AFFIRMED. Judges GEER and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).