In passing on an earlier taxpayer challenge of our tax laws premised on an alleged violation of the foregoing State constitutional provision, we structured our analysis on Supreme Court precedent, particularly Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973). See In re Simpson Manor, Inc., 57 Haw. 1, 548 P.2d 246 (1976). And Lehnhausen was quoted tohe following effect:

Arguably, the expansive judicial approach to tax dispute jurisdiction has yet to see its ultimate end. The Hawaii Supreme Court in In re Simpson Manor, Inc., 57 Haw. 1, 548 P.2d 246 (1976), implied "that circuit courts do have equity jurisdiction to hear excise tax disputes prior to payment of the disputed taxes where the taxpayer can show that prior payment `would destroy its business, ruin it financially and inflict loss for which it would have no adequate remedy at law'." Id. at 3, 548 P.2d at 248 (quoting Hawaii Meat Co. v. Kondo, Civ. No. 24475, (1st Cir., decided Apr. 22, 1969).

The final assessment represents the culmination of an administrative procedure in which a taxpayer is first informed of a proposed assessment and given an opportunity to file an administrative protest before the assessment is finalized. See generally Matter of Simpson Manor, Inc., 57 Haw. 1, 7, 548 P.2d 246, 250 (1976) (describing the procedure as it relates to due process). As discussed in greater detail below, the GET is a tax assessed "based on the privilege or activity of doing business within the State and not on the fact of domicile."

Accordingly, the question presented is not whether the circuit courts have no jurisdiction to hear tax appeals. Our precedents indicate that to a limited extent they do. See In re Simpson Manor, Inc., 57 Haw. 1, 3, 548 P.2d 246, 248 (1976) ("[C]ircuit courts do have equity jurisdiction to hear excise tax disputes prior to payment of the disputed taxes where the taxpayer can show that prior payment would destroy its business, ruin it financially and inflict loss for which it would have no adequate remedy at law." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

osit amount equal to tax plus interest); Jensen v. State Tax Comm'n, 835 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah 1992) (requiring taxpayers to deposit the full amount of taxes before seeking review violates the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution, as applied to the plaintiff who could not afford such deposit); see also North Port Bank v. State, 313 So.2d 683, 687 (Fla. 1975) (statute requiring tax or deposit, or posting bond, "if construed literally . . . would deny to Appellant access to the courts specifically granted by the Constitution"); Wisconsin Real Estate Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 198, 138 N.W. 642, 645 (1912) (prepayment requirement does not deny "certain remedy for all injuries" guaranteed by Wisconsin Constitution because it only applies to claims of procedural error or defect). But see Howell v. State, 282 Ala. 464, 213 So.2d 199, 201 (1968); Bystrom v. Diaz, 514 So.2d 1072, 1075 (Fla. 1987); Lakefront Realty Corp. v. Lorenz, 19 Ill.2d 415, 167 N.E.2d 236, 241 (1960); In re Simpson Manor, Inc., 57 Haw. 1, 548 P.2d 246, 251 (1976); City of Lowell v. Marden Murphy, Inc., 321 Mass. 597, 74 N.E.2d 666, 668 (1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 850, 68 S.Ct. 354, 92 L.Ed. 420 (1948); State ex. rel. Souders v. District Court, 92 Mont. 272, 12 P.2d 852, 854 (1932); Cole v. State, 294 Or. 188, 655 P.2d 171, 173 (1982); Moore v. Langton, 92 R.I. 141, 167 A.2d 558, 566 (1961); Claggett v. Dep't of Revenue, 464 N.W.2d 212, 213-14 (S.D. 1990).See generally Brazosport Sav. Loan Ass'n v. American Sav. Loan Ass'n, 161 Tex. 543, 342 S.W.2d 747, 752 (1961) (granting court jurisdiction, under art. I Sec. 19, over declaratory action appealing administrative decision); Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 449 (noting that art. I, Sec. 13 bars unreasonable restrictions against the right to bring statutorily-created right of judicial review).

See e.g., In re Tax Appeal of Simpson Manor, Inc., 57 Haw. 1, 548 P.2d 246 (1976). IV. THE EFFECT OF HRS § 237-40(d).

In any event, the Hawai`i Supreme Court has long ago decided that this is a permissible condition of a tax appeal. In re Simpson Manor, Inc., 57 Haw. 1, 548 P.2d 246 (1976) (appeal from a general excise tax assessment). III. CONCLUSION