Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 53-002541
BUTZ, J.Abraham M. (appellant), the father of Sheila M. (the minor), appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) Proceeding in propria persona, appellant makes several contentions of alleged prejudicial error. For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the order.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 31, 2007, the Placer County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed an original juvenile dependency petition on behalf of the six-week-old minor. That petition, which named appellant as the presumed father of the minor, alleged in part the minor had suffered serious physical harm due to the failure of appellant and the minor’s mother to provide the minor with adequate food and medical treatment. According to the petition, the minor was admitted to the hospital suffering from severe dehydration and lack of adequate nutrition. The minor allegedly was not responsive, had irregular breathing, and her blood sugar and body temperature were “dangerously low.” The petition also alleged the minor was diagnosed with “severe failure to thrive due to severe [malnutrition].”
On January 3, 2008, the juvenile court appointed counsel to represent appellant. Thereafter, the court sustained an amended petition and adjudged the minor a dependent child. The minor was placed in a foster care home specializing in the care of medically fragile children.
In a report dated August 28, 2008, DHHS recommended termination of parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption for the minor. According to DHHS, despite her medical and developmental difficulties, the minor was an adoptable child. The report noted that “[m]any family members and family friends came forward for placement of [the minor] and most decided against pursuing placement when they were told the severity of her medical needs and the care that she needs.” The report also stated the minor was doing well in the home of her prospective adoptive parents.
Appellant visited the minor regularly during January 2008. However, visitation ended after appellant was arrested in late January and charged with child endangerment. According to DHHS, appellant’s relationship with the minor had “deteriorated to nothing and [the minor] does not know [him] to be her [caretaker] or her [parent] at all.”
At the October 24, 2008 section 366.26 hearing, appellant was represented by counsel. Appellant’s counsel asked that, if the minor was not adopted by her current caregivers, a maternal aunt be considered for adoptive placement of the minor. The court and counsel for DHHS both agreed with that request. Appellant stated he wanted time to discuss the proceedings with his counsel, and indicated a desire for custody of the minor.
At the conclusion of the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court rejected application of any statutory exceptions to adoption, including the beneficial relationship exception. The court found that no parental bond with the minor existed. The court also found it likely the minor would be adopted, and terminated appellant’s parental rights.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant’s brief consists primarily of a short narrative containing numerous factual assertions and some legal contentions, but with only general headings. Moreover, the brief contains no citation to authority in support of its claims or to the record. Appellant states in part that he “requests that this court reverse the juvenile courts [sic] order..., and remand with a directive that the juvenile court reunify the child with her own biological parents.”
Appellant’s self-representation does not excuse noncompliance with the rules on appeal. A party in propria persona is held to the standard of an attorney. (Cf. Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) Appellant’s brief violates California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), which requires not only separate statements of facts and argument, but also appropriate headings for the arguments made. As we have noted, appellant also fails to cite to the record for the factual assertions he makes. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)
We cannot presume error on appeal. (Lynch v. Birdwell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 839, 846.) The party challenging an order has the burden to show error by an adequate record. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) We presume that any orders complained of are correct on matters as to which the record is silent. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) In this case, appellant makes several apparent claims relating to factual matters, issues, and hearings occurring at various times before the section 366.26 hearing was conducted.
Appellant’s claims as to previous matters are not cognizable in this appeal. “An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders, for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.” (In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563.) Thus, appellant should have made the reunification and other related claims stated here, which pertain to prior orders, in appeals following the disposition and review hearings. (§§ 360, 395.)
II
Appellant suggests his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance to him in three respects. First, appellant faults his counsel for the latter’s failure to give him any advice. Next, appellant alleges his counsel failed to communicate with him generally. Finally, appellant argues, his counsel made no argument on his behalf.
In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant “must demonstrate that counsel failed to perform with reasonable competence, and that it is reasonably probable a determination more favorable to the [appellant] would have resulted in the absence of counsel’s failings.” (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 767; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 583-584; People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425.) When a claim of ineffectiveness is made on appeal, we examine the record to determine if there is any explanation for the challenged aspects of representation. If the record sheds no light on why counsel failed to act in the manner challenged, the case is affirmed “unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation....” (People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 426.) Ordinarily, the proper recourse to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is by a petition for writ of habeas corpus, rather than by direct appeal. (In re Darlice C. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 459, 463.)
In this case, appellant has failed to explain the basis for his claims that he did not receive advice from his counsel and that counsel failed to communicate with him generally. Moreover, appellant has not shown how he was prejudiced or how likely it was for him to prevail if counsel had acted differently. Finally, the record rebuts appellant’s claim that his counsel made no argument on his behalf. The record reflects that, at the section 366.26 hearing, counsel for appellant requested that a relative of the minor’s mother be considered for placement of the minor. The record is silent as to counsel’s reasons for acting or failing to do so. On this record, we will not presume ineffective assistance of counsel from a silent record. (People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 581.)
In sum, appellant has failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions.
III
Appellant argues the evidence was sufficient to establish the applicability of an exception to adoption.
Assuming appellant is referring to the beneficial relationship exception to adoption contained in subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) of section 366.26, we reject the claim. The reason for our conclusion is that the record contains evidence, in the form of the social worker’s report, that no relationship existed between appellant and the minor. That report also noted appellant had not seen the minor in many months.
The beneficial relationship exception requires a showing of regular contact with the minor. (§§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Here, as we have seen, appellant can make no such showing. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s ruling rejecting the exception was supported by substantial evidence. There was no error. (See In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 821-822.)
IV
Appellant claims DHHS failed to consider a relative for placement of the minor.
Section 361.3 contains the relative placement preference. As subdivision (a) of section 361.3 makes clear, the agency and juvenile court are charged only with according preferential consideration to the request of a relative for placement; there is no obligation simply to grant such a request on a specified showing. (In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 679-680.) Ordinarily, placement decisions are subject to the abuse of discretion standard. (In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108-1109.) The linchpin of the analysis is whether placement with a relative is in the best interests of the minor. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 321.) By statute, the social worker must document in social study reports efforts made to place a minor with a relative. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(8).)
Subdivision (a) of section 361.3 provides, in relevant part: “In any case in which a child is removed from the physical custody of his or her parents pursuant to Section 361, preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a relative of the child for placement of the child with the relative. In determining whether placement with a relative is appropriate, the county social worker and court shall consider, but shall not be limited to, consideration of all the following factors: [¶] (1) The best interest of the child, including special physical, psychological, educational, medical, or emotional needs. [¶] (2) The wishes of the parent, the relative, and child, if appropriate. [¶] (3) The provisions of Part 6 (commencing with Section 7950) of Division 12 of the Family Code regarding relative placement. [¶] (4) Placement of siblings and half siblings in the same home, if that placement is found to be in the best interest of each of the children as provided in Section 16002. [¶] (5) The good moral character of the relative and any other adult living in the home, including whether any individual residing in the home has a prior history of violent criminal acts or has been responsible for acts of child abuse or neglect. [¶] (6) The nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the relative, and the relative’s desire to care for, and to provide legal permanency for, the child if reunification is unsuccessful. [¶] (7) The ability of the relative to do the following: [¶] (A) Provide a safe, secure, and stable environment for the child. [¶] (B) Exercise proper and effective care and control of the child. [¶] (C) Provide a home and the necessities of life for the child. [¶] (D) Protect the child from his or her parents. [¶] (E) Facilitate court-ordered reunification efforts with the parents. [¶] (F) Facilitate visitation with the child’s other relatives. [¶] (G) Facilitate implementation of all elements of the case plan. [¶] (H) Provide legal permanence for the child if reunification fails. [¶]... [¶] (8) [¶]... [¶]... The court shall order the parent to disclose to the county social worker the names, residences, and any other known identifying information of any maternal or paternal relatives of the child. This inquiry shall not be construed, however, to guarantee that the child will be placed with any person so identified. The county social worker shall initially contact the relatives given preferential consideration for placement to determine if they desire the child to be placed with them. Those desiring placement shall be assessed according to the factors enumerated in this subdivision. The county social worker shall document these efforts in the social study prepared pursuant to Section 358.1.”
The issue for the juvenile court in this case was whether, considering the suitability of the homes of any relatives and the best interests of the minor, a placement with any interested relatives was appropriate. (§ 361.3, subd. (a); In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 321.)
The record reflects both the juvenile court and DHHS considered relatives for placement of this medically fragile minor. Due to the minor’s extremely fragile condition, it was necessary that she be placed in a home specializing in the care of such minors. Appellant does not allege that he objected to such a placement. In fact, at the section 366.26 hearing, appellant’s counsel asked the court that the maternal aunt be considered for adoption if the minor’s current placement ended. The court agreed to do so.
Appellant has failed to show error.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating appellant’s parental rights is affirmed.
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J. SIMS, J.