In re Shearin

31 Citing cases

  1. In re Zdravkovich

    831 A.2d 964 (D.C. 2003)   Cited 174 times
    Holding that, in a reciprocal matter, respondent "is not entitled to relitigate or collaterally attack the findings or judgment of the [original disciplining court]" and the infirmity of proof exception "is not an invitation to the attorney to relitigate in the District of Columbia the adverse findings of another court in a procedurally fair setting"

    See, e.g., In re Shearin, 764 A.2d 774, 777 (D.C. 2000); In re Benjamin, 698 A.2d 434, 440 (D.C. 1997). Put simply, reciprocal discipline proceedings are not a forum to reargue the foreign discipline. Here, Zdravkovich responded to the show cause order by filing a brief in which he argued both that he was denied due process in Maryland because he was unable to testify and that the Maryland decision suffers from an infirmity of proof.

  2. Conrad v. Dist. of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd.

    287 A.3d 635 (D.C. 2023)

    We therefore consider that point abandoned. Cf., e.g. , In re Shearin , 764 A.2d 774, 778 (D.C. 2000) ("[F]ailure to address an issue in the brief results in waiving the issue on appeal.") (internal quotation marks and parentheses omitted).

  3. In re Naegele

    225 A.3d 984 (D.C. 2020)   Cited 2 times

    In our reciprocal discipline matter, we accept findings made in connection with adjudication of misconduct by judicial tribunals in other states. In re Shearin , 764 A.2d 774, 777 (D.C. 2000). Moreover, making new fact-finding at this juncture would be at odds with the principle of not giving preclusive effect to findings made in a non-disciplinary proceeding in the originating jurisdiction.

  4. Smith v. United States

    169 A.3d 887 (D.C. 2017)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that the failure to collect evidence that had not been "formally seized as evidence by the government" violated Rule 16

    [p]oints not urged in a party's initial brief are treated as abandoned.... We follow this rule because the failure to raise an issue in one's brief prevents the opposing party from briefing the issue, and it prevents both this court and opposing counsel from preparing for its consideration.In re Shearin, 764 A.2d 774, 778 (D.C. 2000) (citations omitted).In extraordinary circumstances, of course, we could waive this limitation in order to pursue further review.

  5. Bartel v. Bank of Am. Corp.

    128 A.3d 1043 (D.C. 2015)   Cited 7 times
    Declining to affirm grant of summary judgment on alternative ground that trial court did not decide, no one had argued, and parties had not briefed

    With respect to Mr. Bartel's request for relief under section 28:3–312, the dissent would affirm on the ground that Mr. Bartel's sworn declaration of loss was deficient in two respects, because the declaration failed to allege both (1) that Mr. Bartel lost possession of the check and (2) that the loss of possession was not the result of a transfer by Mr. Bartel. As to the first asserted deficiency, however, the Bank did not raise either in the trial court or in this court the specific argument that the declaration failed to allege loss of possession. Affirmance on that ground therefore would not be appropriate. See, e.g., Linen v. Lanford, 945 A.2d 1173, 1180 n. 4 (D.C.2008) ("Generally speaking, matters not properly presented to a trial court will not be resolved on appeal.") (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Shearin, 764 A.2d 774, 778 (D.C.2000) (points not raised on appeal "are treated as abandoned").As to the second asserted deficiency, the Bank did argue that the declaration of loss was inadequate on the issue of transfer.

  6. In re Nosal

    112 A.3d 919 (D.C. 2015)

    Relying on the principles of collateral estoppel, which we have repeatedly held applicable in reciprocal discipline cases, we accept this ruling. In re Shearin, 764 A.2d 774, 777 (D.C.2000) (citation omitted) (“Under principles of collateral estoppel, in reciprocal discipline cases we generally accept the ruling of the original jurisdiction.”); accord In re Zdravkovich, supra, 831 A.2d at 969.

  7. In re Nosal

    112 A.3d 919 (D.C. 2015)

    Relying on the principles of collateral estoppel, which we have repeatedly held applicable in reciprocal discipline cases, we accept this ruling. In re Shearin, 764 A.2d 774, 777 (D.C.2000) (citation omitted) (“Under principles of collateral estoppel, in reciprocal discipline cases we generally accept the ruling of the original jurisdiction.”); accord In re Zdravkovich, supra, 831 A.2d at 969.

  8. Toomer v. William C. Smith & Co.

    112 A.3d 324 (D.C. 2015)   Cited 2 times

    We opt not to treat this point as abandoned, however. See In re Shearin, 764 A.2d 774, 778 (D.C.2000). As this argument was raised, fully briefed, and clearly addressed in the trial court, Smith was not prejudiced by Mr. Toomer's oversight in his appellate briefing.

  9. In re O'Hara

    101 A.3d 433 (D.C. 2014)

    This court has specific rules governing how a member in good standing may resign from the Bar. See D.C. Bar R. II, § 7. Mr. O'Hara never presented evidence to the Board that, prior to his criminal legal troubles, he had tried to resign from the Bar. Rather, as noted, he filed no opposition at all to Bar Counsel's recommendation to the Board that he be disbarred. “We have consistently held that an attorney who fails to present a point to the Board waives that point and ‘cannot be heard to raise it for the first time here.’ ” In re Shearin, 764 A.2d 774, 778 (D.C.2000) (quoting In re Ray, 675 A.2d 1381, 1386 (D.C.1996)).This court must disbar an attorney who has committed a crime of moral turpitude.

  10. In re O'Hara

    101 A.3d 433 (D.C. 2014)

    This court has specific rules governing how a member in good standing may resign from the Bar. See D.C. Bar R. II, § 7. Mr. O'Hara never presented evidence to the Board that, prior to his criminal legal troubles, he had tried to resign from the Bar. Rather, as noted, he filed no opposition at all to Bar Counsel's recommendation to the Board that he be disbarred. “We have consistently held that an attorney who fails to present a point to the Board waives that point and ‘cannot be heard to raise it for the first time here.’ ” In re Shearin, 764 A.2d 774, 778 (D.C.2000) (quoting In re Ray, 675 A.2d 1381, 1386 (D.C.1996) ).--------