Opinion
Nos. H12-CP04-009696-A, H12-CP04-009697-A, H12-CP04-009698-A
January 9, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I. STATEMENT OF CASE
On November 21, 2005, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, ("DCF"), filed a petition pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Callie T. and Harry B. to their children, Shafari B., Nasser B., and Malikah B. Trial of this matter took place before this court on September 20th, 21st and November 3, 2006 at the Regional Child Protection Session at the Middlesex J.D. Respondent father failed to appear.
On November 6, 2000 through probate court, respondent father was removed as the natural guardian for Shafari and respondent mother was affirmed sole natural guardian. On April 8, 2004, DCF invoked a 96-hour hold and removed Shafari, Nasser and Malikah from their home because they had been left alone.
On April 12, 2004, DCF filed a motion for an ex parte order of temporary custody which was granted by the court (Bentivegna, J.) on that day. On April 12, 2004 DCF filed neglect and uncared for petitions. On April 16, 2004 the order of temporary custody was sustained by agreement and specific steps were signed by respondent mother and respondent father and reviewed, accepted and approved by the court (Wollenberg, J.) as preliminary specific steps. On August 24, 2004, respondent father entered a plea of stand silent. On September 9, 2004, respondent mother entered a no contest plea to the allegation of conditions injurious and the children were adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF. The respondent father agreed with the no contest plea. Specific steps were again signed by the mother on September 9, 2004 and reviewed, accepted and ordered as final specific steps by the court (Wollenberg, J.).
On November 9, 2005, respondent mother filed a motion in opposition to the petitioner's permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption. On December 20, 2005, the court, (Dannehy, J.) consolidated this motion with the termination of parental rights trial. On January 25, 2006, respondent mother filed a Motion to Revoke Commitment and Transfer of Guardianship of the minor children to the maternal grandmother. On September 20, 2006 after hearing testimony and reviewing all evidence submitted, this court denied the Motion to Revoke Commitment and Transfer Guardianship. The court's bench ruling was transcribed and signed by the court in accordance with Practice Book Section 64-1(a). The court's decision on whether to terminate the parental rights of respondents will also include whether to approve the petitioner's permanency plan in light of respondent mother's objection to the plan. The children have been in foster care since they were removed on April 8, 2004.
This court finds that notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the provisions of the Practice Book. The court further finds that the Middletown Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters Division, has jurisdiction over the pending matter and that no action is pending in any other court affecting custody of the children. After due consideration, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and hereby terminates the parental rights of the respondent parents.
II. ISSUES
The statutory ground alleged by DCF in its petition to terminate the parental rights of the respondents is that the children, Shafari B., Nasser B. and Malikah B. were found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the children (General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)). The petitioner also seeks approval of its permanency plan for the minor children which is termination of parental rights and adoption.
The respondent mother contests the termination of her parental rights and opposes the petitioner's permanency plan of termination and adoption. Respondent mother acknowledges that she is presently not capable of parenting her children however, mother claims that she can rehabilitate herself sufficiently within a reasonable period of time to parent the children.
A) SHOULD THE RESPONDENTS' PARENTAL RIGHTS BE TERMINATED ON THE STATUTORY GROUND SET FORTH IN GENERAL STATUTES § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(I)? B) SHOULD THE PETITIONER'S PERMANENCY PLAN OF TERMINATION AND ADOPTION BE APPROVED?
III. FINDINGS OF FACTS
At trial, the petitioner introduced the neglect social study, addendum to the neglect social study, termination of parental rights social study, addendum to the termination of parental rights social study, service provider records, and other documentary evidence, and the testimony of DCF social worker Lakita Ransom and Joy Burchell, licensed clinical social worker and therapist for Shafari B. Respondent mother introduced certificates of completion of the mother's support group and parenting classes held at York Correctional facility, and the testimony of maternal grandmother, Diane C. The child's attorney did not introduce exhibits or testimony. The credible evidence admitted at trial supports the following finding of facts by clear and convincing evidence.
A. RESPONDENT MOTHER — CALLIE T.
1) Mother, Callie T. was born on May 6, 1978 and is 28 years old.
2) Mother was born to Diane C. and Archie B.
3) Mother has four siblings.
4) Mother and her four siblings were raised in the greater Hartford area.
5) Mother and her siblings are close.
6) The highest level of education completed by mother is 11th grade.
7) Mother does have a work history which consists of Bradlees, East Hartford Hardware, JC Penneys and K-Mart.
8) Mother has not been employed in over three years in part due to an injury she sustained to one of her eyes.
9) Mother received disability benefits in the amount of six hundred fifty dollars per month, as a result of partial blindness in one eye, until she was incarcerated in August 2005.
10) Mother is seeking to have her Social Security benefits reinstated.
11) Mother has never been married.
12) Mother has a significant criminal history that consists of a disorderly conduct charge, assault charges, risk of injury, threatening, multiple violations of probation, breach of peace, interfering, failure to appear and multiple larceny 6 charges.
13) Mother was incarcerated at York Correctional Institute in Niantic, Connecticut for a violation of probation until October 11, 2006 when she was released to Neon, a halfway home.
14) Mother was arrested on June 24, 2005 for larceny 6 which resulted in a violation of probation.
15) Mother was incarcerated in August 2005. (Testimony of Lakita Ransome, 9/21/06.)
16) Mother's maximum release date is January 2008.
17) Mother has applied for an early release date.
18) Mother gave birth to her fourth child, Terrence Blue, Jr. on April 20, 2006. Terrence Blue, Sr. is the father of this child.
19) The New London probate court granted custody of Terrence Blue, Jr. to maternal grandmother.
20) Mother has a history with the Department dating back to December 1998.
21) Mother received services from the Department from December 1998 until November 2000 due to issues involving domestic violence. Mother received case management services, parenting classes, parent aide services, domestic violence counseling and urine screens through probation during this time.
22) In November 2000 father was removed as a natural guardian for Shafari and mother was affirmed sole guardian for Shafari.
23) Mother's most recent involvement with DCF began on or about March 25, 2004 when an anonymous caller reported that mother called requesting services for a fourteen-year-old cousin who had sexually abused her five-year-old daughter. The caller was concerned that mother was not requesting services for her daughter.
24) An investigation concluded that Shafari was sexually abused by her sixteen-year-old cousin, Kareem.
25) During her forensic interview at St. Francis Children's Center, Shafari disclosed penile/vaginal penetration, digital/penetration and penile/facial contact by her cousin.
26) Maternal grandmother was the legal guardian of the sixteen-year-old cousin at the time he sexually abused Shafari.
27) The sexual abuse occurred at maternal grandmother's house.
28) On April 4, 2004 mother reported to the police that she feared for her safety and the safety of her children because of threats made by her family and cousin Kareem for reporting the sexual abuse perpetrated on Shafari.
29) On April 8, 2004, the DCF social worker assigned to the case, discovered Shafari, Nasser and Malikah were home alone when she telephoned and Shafari answered the phone. After discovering the children were home alone, the social worker went to the home. She arrived at the home at 5:10 p.m.
30) When the social worker arrived at the home, Shafari was wearing only her underpants, Nasser was naked with dried feces on his buttocks and upper left thigh and Malikah was wearing a blanket sleeper. Her diaper was saturated.
31) DCF social worker invoked a 96-hour hold at 5:23 p.m. and left with the children from the home at 6:00 p.m.
32) The children were provided food and clothing and placed in DCF licensed foster homes.
33) Mother did not contact the DCF hotline until April 9, 2004 at approximately 7:39 a.m.
34) On April 12, 2004 DCF obtained an ex parte order of temporary custody (Bentivegna, J.). Neglect petitions were also filed on this date.
35) On April 12, 2004, the court (Bentivegna, J.) found that reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the children were not possible.
36) On April 16, 2004 the order of temporary custody was sustained by agreement and specific steps were reviewed and signed by the mother and approved by the court (Wollenberg, J.) as final specific steps.
37) On September 9, 2004 the children were adjudicated neglected after mother entered a nolo plea to conditions injurious.
38) On September 9, 2004 the children were committed to the Department.
39) Father remained silent but agreed with the plea, adjudication and commitment.
40) Respondent mother re-reviewed and resigned specific steps on September 9, 2004.
41) The court re-approved the steps and re-ordered the steps as final steps which became a part of the disposition of commitment entered on September 9, 2004.
42) On January 27, 2005, the court (Wollenberg, J.) found that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with mother.
43) On January 27, 2005, and December 6, 2005, the court (Wollenberg, J.) maintained commitment of the children to DCF.
44) On January 27, 2005, the court (Wollenberg, J.) found by clear and convincing evidence that continued efforts toward reunification with the father, Harry B. was no longer appropriate.
B. SPECIFIC STEPS
45) In accordance with the specific steps approved on September 9, 2004 as final specific steps, respondent mother was ordered to keep all appointments set by or with DCF; cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or announced, and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.
46) Mother was ordered to keep the children's whereabouts and her whereabouts known to DCF, her attorney and the attorney for the children.
47) Mother was ordered to participate in parenting classes and individual counseling.
48) Mother was ordered to submit to a substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention.
49) Mother was ordered to submit to random drug testing.
50) Mother was ordered to cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing.
51) Mother was ordered to obtain and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan as approved by DCF to avoid further domestic violence incidents.
52) Mother was ordered to sign releases authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings before the court.
53) Mother was ordered to secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.
54) Mother was ordered not to engage in substance abuse.
55) Mother was ordered not to have any further involvement with the criminal justice system and to cooperate with the office of adult probation and to comply with the conditions of probation.
56) Mother was ordered to advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household; maintain the children within the State of Connecticut for the duration of the case except for temporary travel out of state with the authorization of DCF or the Court in advance.
57) Mother was ordered to visit the children as often as DCF permits.
58) Prior to the April 8, 2004 removal of the children, mother was referred for a mental health assessment at Intercommunity Mental Health Group.
59) Mother was referred to Intercommunity Mental Health on March 1, 2004 shortly after she was arrested on larceny and assault charges.
60) The intake assessment of March 1, 2004 revealed mother had been sexually abused as a child and at age 18, mother was attacked by a gang of people which resulted in severe injuries.
61) Mother reported having flashbacks as a result of the sexual abuse and gang attack.
62) Mother was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic with delayed onset.
63) Mother and father have a history of domestic violence.
64) In accordance with the specific steps ordered, mother underwent a substance abuse evaluation and screening on December 29, 2004 at ADRC.
65) ADRC did not recommend drug treatment since mother tested negative for all substances, however a mental health assessment was recommended.
66) In accordance with specific steps ordered and the recommendation of ADRC, mother began her first session with Intercommunity Mental Health on September 28, 2004.
67) Mother continued with bi-weekly sessions at Intercommunity Mental Health through April 18, 2005.
68) Mother was last seen by her counselor at Intercommunity Mental Health on April 18, 2005.
69) Mother had not completed counseling as of April 18, 2005.
70) Mother felt she did not need any further mental health treatment.
71) It was at this time mother began a relationship with her youngest child's father, Terrence Blue, Sr.
72) Mother's counselor tried to contact mother on 4/29, 5/16, 5/24 and 6/3.
73) On June 3, 2005 mother did return counselor's call and sounded very down. Mother reported that she had completed the parenting program. Mother assured that she would reschedule her appointment.
74) Mother did not reschedule an appointment.
75) On July 1, 2005 a letter was sent to mother from her counselor allowing mother 30 days to contact Intercommunity Mental Health to re-engage in counseling.
76) Mother did not rescheduled and she was discharged from Intercommunity Mental Health.
77) Mother missed 6 out of 7 appointments that were scheduled for a medication assessment.
78) Mother did not believe she needed medication.
79) As of November 3, 2006, the last trial date, mother still does not believe she needs medication.
80) According to mother's counselor, mother's mental health goals were not adequately met.
81) Mother failed to comply with the mental health treatment recommendations of Intercommunity Mental Health.
82) On October 13, 2006, mother was released from York Correctional Institute. Mother resides in Waterbury, CT at Neon Women and Children's Program which is a halfway house.
83) As of October 2006, mother began receiving counseling services at Neon.
84) Mother was referred to Project SAFE Outreach and Engagement in January 2005 for services to assist mother in parent education and to help mother obtain housing. Mother was also referred to the Village for Families and Children for parenting. (Petitioner's Exhibits #7, #27.)
85) Mother was homeless at the time of intake at Project Safe.
86) Project Safe referred mother to the Housing Authority and other housing services for housing assistance. Mother did not follow through with the housing referrals.
87) Prior to her incarceration in August 2005, mother had been compliant with parenting classes.
88) On July 13, 2006 mother received certificates of completion of "Parenting from a Distance" and "Mother Support Group" while incarcerated at York Correctional Institution.
89) Mother took courses toward her GED while incarcerated at York.
90) Mother has not obtained her GED.
91) As of October 2005, mother refused to sign releases to allow DCF to speak with service providers and to mother's assigned probation officer.
92) Mother lost her section 8 housing certificate in September 2004 for failing to make herself available for a housing inspection.
93) Mother's living arrangements between April 2004 and May 2005 were transient. Mother moved between the homes of friends and family members.
94) In approximately May 2005, prior to her arrest in June, mother obtained a two-bedroom apartment in East Hartford.
95) Mother failed to comply with the requirement that she secure and maintain adequate housing since mother was arrested and therefore unable to maintain the apartment she found.
96) Mother, as of November 3, 2006, the last trial date, was unemployed.
97) Prior to mother's incarceration, DCF social worker, Lakita Ransome, suggested mother obtain a permission to work letter from the Social Security Administration. Mother did not follow through on this suggestion.
98) In light of mother's June 24, 2005 arrest which resulted in her incarceration, mother failed to comply with the requirement that she have no further involvement with the criminal justice system.
99) Prior to her incarceration in August 2005, mother did visit her children. Mother's visits with the children during this time were sporadic to non-existent. Mother would have errands to run and would make excuses for not visiting. (Testimony of Lakita Ransome, 9/20/06.)
100) Mother had visits with the children once a month while incarcerated at York Correctional Institution. The visits were hourly and were supervised by DCF.
101) As of October 2006, mother began having supervised visits with the children at Neon.
102) As of September 13, 2006, mother had approximately eleven monthly supervised visits.
103) The children love their mother and have a bond with their mother.
104) Pursuant to specific steps signed by mother in September 2004, she was ordered to comply with services to address her mental health, homelessness, criminal conduct and parenting issues.
105) While mother has complied with some of the steps ordered, as of November 3, 2006, she has failed to comply with many of the steps. Mother failed to complete her counseling at Intercommunity Mental Health, mother failed to secure and maintain adequate housing, and legal employment, and she continued to engage in criminal activity which resulted in incarceration.
B. RESPONDENT FATHER — HARRY B.
106) Respondent father, Harry B. was born on March 13, 1968.
107) Father was raised in Hartford with his six siblings.
108) Father completed tenth grade at Hartford High School.
109) Father acquired his GED.
110) Father has a history of domestic violence with mother.
111) Father has a significant criminal history involving Assault 3, Sex Assault 3, Reckless Endangerment and Possession of Marijuana convictions.
112) On November 6, 2000, Probate Court removed father as the natural guardian of Shafari B.
113) Father has five other children other than the children who are the subject of this petition.
C. SPECIFIC STEPS
114) Specific steps for father were signed by father and approved and ordered by the court (Wollenberg, J.) on April 16, 2004.
115) In accordance with the specific steps, father was ordered to do what mother was required to do as outlined in paragraphs 45-57 except that father was not required to obtain mental health counseling.
116) Father attended and completed substance abuse and parenting classes.
117) Father failed to keep in contact with DCF on a regular basis.
118) Father has sporadic contact with DCF.
119) Since the beginning of the case in April 2004, father attended only one administrative case review out of 5.
120) As of January 2006, father was living in Hartford and unemployed (Petitioner's Exhibit #7).
121) Father has not been in contact with DCF since June 2006.
122) As of September 13, 2006 DCF did not know whether father was employed, involved with services or had housing.
123) Father failed to respond to multiple letters sent by DCF inquiring of his whereabouts and his desire to visit with his children.
124) Father has not seen his children since June 27, 2006.
125) Father's visits with the children were choppy and inconsistent.
126) Father failed to appear for trial on this matter on September 20th, 21st and November 3rd, 2006.
127) While father has complied with some of the specific steps, he has failed to comply with a number of steps. Father has failed to keep in contact with DCF and make his whereabouts known to DCF. Father has failed to regularly visit with his children. Father has failed to inform DCF if he is employed or has housing. Father has failed to inform DCF whether he is receiving services.
128) There was no credible evidence introduced to demonstrate that father engaged in domestic violence counseling.
D. CHILDREN — SHAFARI B., NASSER B., MALIKAH B.
129) Shafari B. was born on December 15, 1996 and is the oldest of the three children who are the subject of this petition.
130) Shafari has been in DCF care since removal from her mother's home in April 2004, more than two years.
131) Since being placed in DCF care, Shafari has been in four foster homes, the most recent placement took place in March 2006 at which time she was placed in the same foster home with her two siblings, Nasser B. and Malikah B.
132) Shafari is in second grade at Simpson Waverly School in Hartford, CT.
133) Shafari is a bright yet quiet little girl.
134) Shafari was sexually abused by her cousin in March 2004.
135) Shafari was referred to counseling as a result of the sexual abuse.
136) Shafari began counseling with Joy Burchell, LCSW in April 2005.
137) Ms. Burchell initially began counseling Shafari once per week and then beginning in June 2006 she began treating Shafari twice a week.
138) Ms. Burchell presently treats Shafari twice per week.CT Page 569
139) Ms. Burchell diagnosed Shafari with ADHD, sexual abuse of a child Axis I, adjustment disorder with disturbance of emotional misconduct and rule out PTSD.
140) Ms. Burchell opined that Shafari exhibits symptoms consistent with PTSD such as mood swings, nightmares, daytime and nighttime wetting and depression.
141) The focus of Ms. Burchell's initial treatment of Shafari involved Shafari understanding that the sexual abuse was not her fault, empowering herself, increasing her self-esteem, implementing a safety plan and dealing with any other emotional trauma.
142) According to Ms. Burchell, Shafari has done well in treatment. Shafari does not feel guilty or responsible for the sexual abuse and she is strong enough now such that she would tell someone.
143) Shafari's behavior did stabilize initially in that she understood that what happened to her was not her fault.
144) Shafari's behavior began to get out of control again in the spring of 2006.
145) Shafari's sessions with Ms. Burchell increased in June 2006 to twice a week due to Shafari's temper tantrums, violent and out of control behavior and outbursts.
146) Shafari also began struggling academically and was assessed in May 2006 via a PPT assessment. It was determined that she was in need of special education services.
147) Ms. Burchell associates the escalation of Shafari's out of control behavior with moving into her fourth foster home in March 2006 with her siblings and the birth of her baby brother in April 2006.
148) Shafari's behaviors are also tied to not knowing what will happen to her and the lack of permanency.
149) According to Ms. Burchell, Shafari liked the foster home she lived in just prior to her current foster home. Shafari bonded with the previous foster mother and referred to that foster mother as "mom."
150) Shafari is parentified in that she feels she has to take care of her siblings and take on the role of the parent.
151) According to Ms. Burchell, Shafari had to "grow up quick" and it is very difficult for her to step outside of the parent role.
152) Shafari's temper tantrums, and out of control and disruptive behavior are probably due to the sexual abuse perpetrated upon her as well as her placement in four foster homes.
153) Shafari has no sense of permanency. She has stated that she wants to "live with her grandmother or anyone who wants to adopt me." (Testimony of Joy Burchell) (Emphasis added).
154) Shafari has stated that she does not want to live with her siblings because they "get her into trouble." (Testimony of Joy Burchell.)
155) In approximately August of 2006, Shafari attempted to suffocate her younger sibling Nasser by placing a pillow over his face. Shafari did not know why she did this to Nasser. She stated that she wanted to see what would happen. She wanted to see if he liked it. Shafari only stopped because she heard someone coming.
156) In September 2006, Shafari was placed on the medication Concerta to deal with her outbursts, temper tantrums and out of control behavior.
157) Since being placed on Concerta, Shafari's behavior is under control, she is interacting better with her siblings, her therapy is more productive and her outbursts and temper tantrums have reduced.
158) Shafari had a second psychiatric appointment with Dr. Schmerler on September 25, 2006.
159) As of November 3, 2006, Shafari has done an incredible and consistent job with maintaining her focus and is consistently participating in class.
160) Shafari has little to no tantrums during the day while on the medication.
161) Shafari has been recognized as "student of the day."
162) Shafari has also improved at home in that she is able to sit still, not get into everything and is more respectful.
163) Shafari is able to express herself more since she is able to focus for longer periods of time.
164) According to Joy Burchell, Shafari's therapist, Shafari did very well when she was placed in respite care without her siblings.
165) Ms. Burchell opined that placing Shafari in a home with young children could be potentially dangerous without complete and adequate supervision.
166) Shafari's foster mother is starting to handle Shafari and understands that Shafari needs complete, adequate and constant supervision.
167) Ms. Burchell is not sure that the foster mother can keep up with Shafari's needs. The foster mother does have a medical condition, however she has been making every effort to keep up with Shafari.
168) The foster mother is a single parent who has three adult children of her own.
169) The foster mother is willing to adopt all three children if they become available for adoption.
170) According to Ms. Burchell it takes a lot to keep up with Shafari.
171) Shafari responds very well to positive reinforcement.
172) Shafari needs consistency and structure.
173) Ms. Buchell opined that the best plan for Shafari is to terminate the parental rights of mother and father so that she can be free for adoption.
174) Shafari needs permanency and adoption will provide this.
175) Permanency is urgent for Shafari right now.
176) Ms. Burchell opined that Shafari's need for permanency far outweighs Shafari not wanting to be with her siblings.
177) Ms. Burchell opined that the optimal permanency plan for Shafari right now is a therapeutic pre-adoptive home.
178) Ms. Burchell opined that if the medication stabilizes Shafari's behavior, she can remain in her current placement.
179) Ms. Burchell opined that it is best for Shafari to remain in the current placement until a therapeutic pre-adoptive home is found for her.
180) Nasser was born on March 16, 2002 and is four years and ten months old.
181) Nasser is a friendly and personable boy.
182) Nasser has been in DCF care since removal from his mother's home in April 2004.
183) As of November 3, 2006, Nasser had been placed in four foster homes.
184) Nasser is in a Headstart school readiness program in Hartford.
185) Nasser, like Shafari was displaying tantrums and defiant behaviors.
186) Nasser has improved significantly since his placement in February 2006 with his two siblings, Shafari and Malikah.
187) Prior to his most recent placement in February 2006, Nasser had been in multiple placements which was a contributing factor in causing his out of control behaviors.
188) In May 2006 Nasser underwent a PPT, and since that time his ability to express himself improved and he is able to be redirected when his behavior gets out of control.
189) The foster mother is dedicated to all three children and works diligently with Shafari, Nasser and Malikah.
190) Nasser has bonded with the foster mother, is happy in his current placement and does not want to leave.
191) Nasser is medically and dentally up to date and does not have any medical issues at the present time.
192) Malikah was born on February 4, 2003 and is 3 years and eleven months old.CT Page 574
193) Malikah is in the Headstart school readiness program with her older sibling Nasser.
194) Malikah is a sweet, bubbly and intelligent little girl who is extremely friendly to anyone she encounters.
195) Malikah, like her siblings have been in DCF care since removal from her mother's home in April 2004.
196) Malikah is placed in the same foster home as her siblings.
197) Malikah has bonded with her foster mother and has adjusted well to her current placement.
198) There have been some reports of Nassar and Malikah having tantrums, engaging in defiant behaviors, acting aggressive toward children and not following directions, particularly after supervised visits with family members. However, the children overall have continued to do well in their current placement.
E. RELATIVE RESOURCES
199) The respondent mother's three sisters have a history with DCF, and two of the three sisters do not have custody of their children.
200) Respondent mother suggested a cousin as a possible resource for the children, however the cousin never followed through with contacting DCF.
201) Diane C. is the maternal grandmother ("MGM") of Shafari, Nasser and Malikah.
202) MGM testified that she wants to adopt her grandchildren.
203) MGM resides in a single-family home with her husband and two grandchildren, Terrence Blue, Jr. and Anthony Mickins.
204) MGM's home has four bedrooms and she has resided at this home for approximately ten years.
205) MGM has had custody and guardianship of Anthony Mickins since approximately 2004.
206) MGM obtained custody and guardianship of Terrence Blue, Jr. through the New London Probate Court.
207) Terrence Blue, Jr. was born to respondent mother on April 20, 2006.
208) MGM is employed.
209) MGM has a history with DCF.
210) Shafari was sexually abused by a cousin of whom MGM had custody and guardianship.
211) Shafari was sexually abused in MGM home.
212) MGM visits with the children have not been consistent.
213) MGM did not visit the children in 2005.
214) MGM's first visit with the children after mother was incarcerated in August 2005, was in January 2006.
215) MGM visited the children in March 2006 and then in August 2006.
216) MGM did not visit in April 2006.
217) MGM presently visits with the children monthly.
218) Relative resources from respondent father were investigated.
219) Paternal aunt is single and has four children.
220) Paternal aunt has a history with DCF.
221) DCF has concerns with paternal uncle due to an arrest of paternal uncle's spouse.
IV. LEGAL DISCUSSION A. ADJUDICATION
"The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent . . . [As such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 231, 764 A.2d 739 (2001); In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 200, 662 A.2d 107 (1995).
The termination of parental rights is governed by statute. General Statutes § 17a-112. In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must prove a ground alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1992); In re Teresa S., 196 Conn. 18, 29, 491 A.2d 355 (1985); Practice Book § 32a-3(b), 35a-7. Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); In re Karrlo K., 44 Conn.Sup. 101, 106, 669 A.2d 1249 (1994), aff'd, 40 Conn.App. 73, 668 A.2d 1353 (1996).
Termination of parental rights trials proceed in two stages: the adjudication and the disposition. The adjudicatory stage involves the issue of whether the evidence presented establishes by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds as of the date the petition was filed or last amended. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 264, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984). "Pursuant to Practice Book § 33-3(a), [now P.B. § 35a-7] in deciding the adjudicatory phase of the hearing for the termination of parental rights, the trial court's inquiry is limited to the events and facts preceding the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights [or last amendment]." In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 357, 776 A.2d 487 (2001). However, "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) (emphasis in original); see In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002).
If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court proceeds to the disposition stage. The court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. Procedurally, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases is heard at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), supra 194 Conn. 258; State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000); In re Emmanuel M., 43 Conn.Sup. 108, 113, 648 A.2d 904, (1993), aff'd, 35 Conn.App. 276, 278, 648 A.2d 881, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915, 648 A.2d 151 (1994); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. 598, 602, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987).
The court's function as the fact finder "is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, 505 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808, 508 A.2d 769 (1986). The court may consider direct and circumstantial evidence. In re Cheyenne A., 59 Conn.App. 151, 158-59, 756 A.2d 303, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 940, 761 A.2d 759 (2000); see also In re Juvenile Appeal (85-2), 3 Conn.App. 184, 193, 485 A.2d 1362 (1985). "The same evidence certainly can establish more than one ground for termination." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 16, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993). The standard of proof in a termination action is clear and convincing evidence. Practice Book § 32a-3. "The burden of persuasion . . . in those cases requiring a showing of clear and convincing evidence proof is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist." Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Ass'n., 170 Conn. 520, 537, 368 A.2d 125 (1976).
"It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). "It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any expert testimony . . . the trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party or the other." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Caressa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 782, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). "Although expert testimony may be accorded great weight when it is offered, there is no requirement for expert testimony in termination of parental rights cases." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 400, 852 A.2d 643 (2004).
The ground alleged in the petition as to both respondents is that the children Shafari, Nasser and Malikah were found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the respondents failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time considering the age and the needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). "In order to terminate a parent's parental rights under § 17a-112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); (2) termination is in the best interest of the child; General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(2); and (3) there exists anyone of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 17a-112(j)(3)." In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 628, 847 A.2d 883 (2004).
(I) Location and Reunification § 17a-112(j)(1)
In order to terminate parental rights, DCF must first prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory element requiring "reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such efforts are not appropriate." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1). In accordance with § 17a-112(j)(1), "the department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ebony, 68 Conn.App. 342, 348, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002).
"Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Mariah S, 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000). "[R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 349. The department has "a continuing duty to make reasonable efforts." In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 644, 809 A.2d 1119 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003). But "[t]he department is required only to make `reasonable efforts.' It is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." In re Anthony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 735 A.2d 893 (1999). In addition, "making no efforts to reunify a parent and his or her child may be reasonable in certain circumstances . . ." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 645.
"Reunification efforts generally consists of visitation and, where appropriate, other rehabilitative services such as evaluations, testing, counseling, therapy, education, medical care, parenting classes and housing assistance." In re Destiny Q., Superior Court, Child Protection Session at Middletown (November 19, 2001, Levin, J.). In evaluating the department's reunification efforts, the court may consider whether the department engaged the respondent, apprised him or her of the steps that had to be taken to achieve rehabilitation, and gave the respondent feedback on his or her progress in reaching that goal." In re Vincent, supra, 73 Conn.App. 645. The court may take into consideration whether the department met "its burden of making reasonable efforts to achieve reunification by engaging the respondent and making available services aimed at instilling in him [or her] healthy parental skills." Id., 647. The court may also assess whether "steps taken by the respondent presented the department with a window of opportunity during which reasonable efforts at reunification should have been made." Id., 644. The court may find that the efforts were reasonable even though the department made mistakes. In re Charles A., 55 Conn.App. 293, 297-98, 738 A.2d 222 (1999) ("The court is aware that [the department] has made mistakes in this case failing to treat [the respondent] as a victim of domestic violence . . . These mistakes, however, do not defeat the proposition that reasonable efforts at reunification were made. In the first instance, counseling services were provided. Other in home services were offered, but refused"). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In finding that DCF made reasonable efforts, the courts have given careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case. See, e.g. In re Destiny D., 86 Conn.App. 77, 83-84, 859 A.2d 793, cert. denied, 272 Conn. 911 (2004) (department provided regular visitation, rehabilitative services, counseling and therapy for children; respondent's performance in rehabilitative programs was disappointing, including erratic attendance, resistance to treatment recommendations, and positive drug tests; respondent also failed to sign releases for a period of time, so department unable to make additional referrals); In re Jonathan C., 86 Conn.App. 169, 180, 860 A.2d 305 (2004) (department provided numerous referrals for services, facilitated visitation, and provided therapy for both respondent and children); In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 479, 771 A.2d 244 (2001) (department offered respondent services over several years, including substance abuse evaluation and treatment, parenting skills classes, domestic violence counseling, a family reunification program, a psychological evaluation, and visitation; but she failed to avail herself of or participate meaningfully in those services by failing to attend many visits, and denying the fact that she needed to participate in counseling); In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 362-63 (respondents participated in services but continually relapsed and resumed abusing substances and alcohol, so department declined to pursue goal of reunification after children were removed; "[t]he dissolution of this family resulted from the failure of the department to provide services and assistance."); In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 350 (respondent's inability to overcome drug addiction and failure to comply with services "thwarted the department's efforts to reunify her and the child").
In the alternative, the court may also determine that the respondent was either unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. As previously noted, "the department is required only to make `reasonable efforts' . . . [i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." In re Anthony B., supra, 54 Conn.App. 476. The court may therefore find by clear and convincing evidence that "the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with the children, [and] [t]he respondent's subsequent failure to take advantage of those efforts establish her [or his] inability or unwillingness to benefit from those reasonable efforts." In re Alexander T., 81 Conn.App. 668, 676, 841 A.2. 274, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 924, 848 A.2d 472 (2004).
In finding that a respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from the department's reunification efforts, the courts have given careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case. In re Jonathan C., supra, 86 Conn.App. 178 ("[t]hroughout the duration of the department's involvement with the family, the respondent demonstrated a lack of cooperation and progress, and revealed an apathetic attitude toward the repeated and extensive reunification efforts that were made"). In making this determination, the court may consider whether "the respondent's positive step in participating in a treatment program demonstrated a degree of rehabilitation in itself." In re Vincent, supra, 73 Conn.App. 645 (trial court reversed because department did not make reasonable efforts when it decided not to engage in further efforts based on its prior experiences with respondent, although respondent took steps and was in a position to benefit from services; respondent had successfully completed long-term inpatient substance abuse treatment and counseling for anger management and depression, and no evidence of relapse in those areas). In addition, the court may consider whether the respondent "was unwilling or unable to formulate an appropriate plan for [child] . . ." Id., 647. "Expert testimony is not required to examine the respondent's history with the department and the trouble she has experienced in achieving rehabilitation to determine that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from the efforts of the department." In re Alexander T., supra, 81 Conn.App. 676.
The department's ability to provide services and visitation is limited when a respondent is incarcerated. "Because the respondent had at all times been in prison and in the custody of the commissioner of corrections, DCF was excused from providing her with reunification services other than visitation." In re Destiny Q., supra, Superior Court, Child Protection Session at Middletown; see also In re Roshawn P., 51 Conn.App. 44, 57, 720 A.2d. 1112 (1998) (together with other factors, the respondent's "frequent' periods of incarceration prevented the petitioner from offering him services"). A respondent's imprisonment, however does not, in and of itself, excuse DCF from providing her with visitation with his child. In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 372, 730 A.2d 106 (1999); see also In re Roshawn P., supra, 51 Conn.App. 58-59. However, the department is unable to provide visitation if there is an outstanding protective order. The petitioner alleges in its petition that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with mother and father and that mother and father are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. On January 27, 2005, the court (Wollenberg, J.) found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts to reunify the children with father were no longer appropriate. As previously discussed under the statute, a finding that reasonable efforts were made is not required if the court has determined, as in this case, that reasonable efforts are no longer appropriate. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. 286, 290-91, 784 A.2d 412 (2001). DCF also made reasonable efforts to locate father and did locate him and provided father with services. Although father did complete substance abuse and parenting classes there is no credible evidence that he addressed his domestic violence issues. As of January 2006 father was unemployed and living in Hartford. In addition, father has not visited with the children since June 27, 2006. Furthermore when father did visit the children his visits were inconsistent. Despite DCF's numerous letters to father inquiring of his whereabouts and his desire to visit his children, he failed to respond. Father has not been in contact with DCF since June 2006. Since the beginning of the case in April 2004, father has attended one out of five administrative case reviews. As of September 2006 DCF had still not heard from father and was unaware of father's whereabouts and whether or not he was employed. Father failed to appear at the' September 20th, 21st and November 3rd, 2006 trial dates.
The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made substantial efforts to reunify the children with mother in this case. Throughout DCF's involvement numerous referrals were made to service providers who could help mother address mental health issues as well as housing and parenting concerns. Mother failed to participate in most of the services offered. Although mother did participate in some services, she did not benefit from the services provided and failed to follow the recommendations of her counselor at Intercommunity Mental Health by completing her sessions. Mother attended several sessions at Intercommunity Mental Health, but dropped out of the program and was discharged as a result of her failure to attend scheduled sessions. Additionally, mother refused to sign releases in October 2005 which prevented DCF from speaking to service providers and mother's probation officer as well making additional referrals. Furthermore, the department's ability to provide mother with services and visitation became limited when mother was incarcerated. Visitation has been provided throughout the case. Mother's visits with her children prior to her incarceration were sporadic and not consistent. DCF referred mother to Project Safe in order to assist mother in obtaining adequate housing. Mother did not follow through with the housing referrals.
Under all the circumstances, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify both mother and father with the children and that as of the filing of the petition, the parents were unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
(ii) Parental Failure to Rehabilitate § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)
The petitioner alleges that respondents' parental rights should be terminated because they have failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). As Shafari, Nasser and Malikah were found to be neglected on September 9, 2004, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondents have achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render them able to care for the children. The court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
Section 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to "the parent of a child who (i) has been found by the Superior Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and such parent has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . ."
Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [Section 17a-112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . . Rehabilitation means to restore [a handicapped or delinquent person] to a useful and constructive place in society through special rehabilitation . . . The statute does not require [a parent] to prove precisely when she will be able to assume full responsibility for her child, unaided by available support systems. It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage the belief that at some future date, she can assume a responsible position in her child's life.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).
The court is mindful that parents are not required to be "able to assume full responsibility for a child, without the use of available support programs." In re Juvenile Appeal (84-3), 1 Conn.App. 463, 477, 473 A.2d 795, cert. denied, 193 Conn. 802, 474 A.2d 1259 (1984); In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 203, 504 A.2d 533, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 809, 508 A.2d 770 (1986). The fact that both parents would require continued services is not the basis of the court's determination that they have not sufficiently achieved rehabilitation. See In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 564, 718 A.2d 997 (1998) (trial court's finding that respondent failed to achieve rehabilitation was properly based on her inability to meet court-approved expectations, and not on her mental retardation); In re Jessica S., 51 Conn.App. 667, 672-74, 723 A.2d 356 (1999) (trial court properly found a failure to rehabilitate); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. 598, 606, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987) (trial court terminated parental rights not because of mental condition, but because of an inability to function as a parent). Here, respondents have demonstrated an inability to benefit from services.
"[I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Citations omitted.) In re Shyliesh M., 56 Conn.App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999). In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000); See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 63 (2001); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85, 784 A.2d 457 (2000).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that neither respondent mother nor respondent father have achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the children. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. at 354; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448.
Although specific steps were issued with regard to mother and father, the evidence clearly and convincingly indicates that they failed to fulfill them. As described above, mother failed to participate in most of the services offered. Although mother did participate in some services, she did not benefit from the services provided and failed to follow the recommendations of her counselor at Intercommunity Mental Health by completing her sessions. Mother dropped out of the program at Intercommunity Mental Health and was ultimately discharged from the program due to her failure to attend scheduled sessions. Mother had unresolved mental health issues that she needed to address. Mother was incarcerated in August 2005 for a violation of her probation. Mother refused to sign releases in October 2005 which limited DCF in speaking with mother's probation officer and service providers. Prior to her incarceration, mother failed to follow through on housing referrals. Mother's visits with her children prior to her incarceration were sporadic and inconsistent. The evidence showed that respondent father failed to rehabilitate in that he did not comply with many of the specific steps. Although father did complete a substance abuse program and parenting classes, there was no credible evidence that father dealt with his domestic violence issues. Furthermore, father's last visit with the children was in June 2006 and he has failed to respond to DCF's letters regarding employment, housing and his desire to visit with his children. The court concludes by clear and convincing evidence, that as of the adjudicatory date of November 21, 2005, respondents had not brought themselves into a position in which they could provide adequate care for the children. Father and mother did not engage in necessary counseling and other services. Thus, respondents did not demonstrate an ability to provide day-to-day care for the children.
The court must also consider whether events after the adjudicatory date establish "a degree of rehabilitation that is sufficient to foresee that the parents may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000); In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 749-50; 789 A.2d 1024 (2002) (acknowledging that the court could take facts into account from beyond the adjudicatory period in making its decision in the adjudicatory phase with regard to whether the degree of rehabilitation was sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time).
There was no change in father's circumstances after the adjudicatory date and he continued to be uninvolved in the children's life. Father still had not responded to any of DCF's correspondence regarding his employment, housing and desire to visit the children. Mother's conduct after the adjudicatory date did not improve much. Although mother was released to a halfway house in October 2006, she still remains without housing, is unemployed and not fully engaged in mental health treatment. Although mother has applied for an early release from the halfway house, as of November 3, 2006 mother's maximum release date is still January 2008.
Rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 479-80, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 231 (quoting In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000)). Mother's lack of engagement in services before her incarceration limited her ability to rehabilitate. Mother's release to a halfway house will further limit her ability to rehabilitate since her maximum release date is not until January 2008, and she still remains without housing and is unemployed. Furthermore, mother is not fully engaged in mental health counseling. It is therefore unforeseeable that mother can rehabilitate within a reasonable period of time. Likewise, it is not foreseeable that father can be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. Father's failure to contact DCF since June 2006 to advise DCF of his status regarding housing and employment, father's inconsistent visits with the children and his lack of contact with them since June 2006, and father's failure to appear for trial, clearly demonstrate father's inability to rehabilitate within a reasonable period of time.
Shafari, Nasser and Malikah are in great need of permanency. Shafari, in particular is in need of permanency in light of her significant special needs which resulted from the sexual trauma perpetrated upon her and the lack of permanency in her life. Given mother's and father's current inability to have the children placed with them, additional time would be unreasonable and detrimental to the children. Shafari, Nasser and Malikah have been out of mother's care and in DCF's care since April 2004. Here, for children who have been out of their mother's care for more than two years and in the care of DCF, and, who are now placed in a foster home where the foster mother wishes to adopt them and is committed to their needs and development, any additional time for rehabilitation of respondents even under the best of circumstances is not reasonable.
The court finds that the parents are not in a position to provide day-to-day care for the children or to assume a useful role in their life and that they have not achieved rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that they will be in such a position within a reasonable time. Thus, at the time of trial, respondents had not rehabilitated to the point where they were in a position to play a constructive role in the day-to-day care of the children.
The issue is not whether respondent mother and father have improved their ability to manage their own life, but rather whether they have gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the children. In re Shyliesh H., supra, 56 Conn.App. 180; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. All three children have specialized needs. Both Nasser and Malikah are very young. In addition, Nasser requires special education services. Shafari, on the other hand, requires extensive specialized care, due not only to her very young age, but also because she requires intensive therapy and medication to stabilize her behaviors and, because she requires special education services. Shafari also requires around the clock supervision due to her behavioral issues. Although Shafari is making progress in treatment, she continues the need to address behavioral issues resulting from her sexual trauma, her multiple placements, and issues regarding her permanency. Nasser and Malikah are adjusting well and will continue to do so as long as they continue to remain in their present placement.
All three children desperately need and deserve a safe, stable and nurturing environment. Expressing love for a child and visiting with a child occasionally is vastly different from being able to care for the particular needs of a child on a day-to-day basis, even with supports in place. As Judge Brenneman stated in In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), "[t]erminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying her a safe, permanent home with proven competent care-takers because her biological mother has tried hard but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for her." Here respondent parents have not made sufficient efforts to rehabilitate, and remain unable to provide the day-to-day care these children need within a reasonable time. The children now have a foster mother with whom they have thoroughly bonded. The foster mother is committed to the children and would like to adopt them. Although Shafari has behavioral problems that require around the clock supervision, the foster mother has committed herself to providing Shafari with the necessary care to address her issues. Furthermore, while the optimal placement for Shafari would be a therapeutic pre-adoptive foster home without her siblings, her need for permanency right now and to remain where she is far outweighs removal from her current placement. Additionally, Shafari has only recently been placed on medication which appears to have stabilized her behaviors and according to Ms. Burchell, Shafari's therapist, if her behavior continues to stabilize her current placement in the long term may be appropriate.
Thus, in its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that respondents remain unable to successfully parent the children and lack the ability to assume a responsible position in their lives within a reasonably foreseeable time. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proven respondents' failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).
B. DISPOSITION
As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including November 3, 2006, the date upon which the evidence in this matter was completed. " `If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.' [ In re Eden F., 250 Conn. at 689]." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 103, 758 A.2d 853 (2000). "In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a-112(k)]." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 528; 777 A.2d 695, (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833, 733 A.2d 298 (1999)). The seven factors "serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered." In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn.App. 104. The court considers each of them in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section. The court makes the following seven written findings:
(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the children by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the children with respondents, the court finds that DCF offered services including parenting education; substance abuse evaluation, testing, and treatment; mental health evaluation counseling and treatment; housing and employment and visitation. Respondent mother engaged in some services, but failed to engage in others. Respondent mother as of November 3, 2006, the last trial date in this matter, still does not have housing, is not employed, has not had a psychiatric medication assessment as previously recommended and is not fully engaged in mental health treatment. Respondent father did complete a substance abuse and parenting program but there is no credible evidence he addressed his domestic violence issues. Father has not visited the children or been in touch with DCF since June 2006. Father failed to show at any of the trial dates in this matter. Prior to her incarceration, mother's visits with the children were sporadic and inconsistent. Father's visits have also been sporadic and inconsistent, and more recently, through November 3, 2006, have been non-existent.
(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds as set forth above in detail, that DCF made such efforts.
(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds specific steps were ordered as to respondents mother and father. As set forth above in detail, both respondent mother and respondent father failed to comply with many of the specific steps. DCF has fulfilled its obligations to facilitate reunification of the family.
(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the children's parents, any guardian of such children's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the children for at least one year and with whom the children have developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the children do have an emotional bond with their mother. They were with their mother for a significant period of time before their removal. The children also have a bond with their maternal grandmother. There is no credible evidence that the children have a significant emotional bond with their father. The children do have a significant emotional bond with the foster mother, despite their multiple placements. The foster mother is providing the day-to-day physical, emotional, moral and educational support the children need. What is most important for all three children at this time is stability and permanency in light of the respondents' inability to provide them with a stable and permanent environment and, in light of their multiple placements. The foster mother is committed to the children and would like to adopt them.
(5) As to the age of the children, the court finds that Shafari, born on December 15, 1998 is eight years old; Nasser, born on March 16, 2002 is four years and ten months old; and Malikah, born on February 4, 2003 is three years and eleven months old. The court further finds that these children require stability of placement and continuity of care and that the children's attorney and Shafari's guardian ad item recommend termination.
Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The Appellate Court has also noted, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).
(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parents have maintained contact with the children as part of an effort to reunite the children with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the children; the court finds that respondent mother has maintained only a visiting relationship with the children and father has maintained no relationship with the children. The court further finds that respondents are unable to assume a responsible parental role in the children's lives. Giving them additional time would not likely enable them to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to be reunited. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1969); In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn. 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981).
(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by either parent, the child protection agency, foster parent or third parties. Further, while respondents' financial means were limited, economic factors did not prevent regular, continuing contact with the children.
With respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Callie T. and Harry B. to Shafari B., Nasser B. and Malikah B. is in the best interest of the children. Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for all three children particularly Shafari. These children have been out of mother's care and in DCF's care for over two years, during which time they have been in multiple placements. The children are now in a foster home where they are very well cared for by a foster mother who is fully committed to them. Shafari has had some problems in her current placement, however with medication and the continuous efforts and commitment of the foster mother, her behaviors are beginning to stabilize and improve. Mother and father are unable to assume a responsible parental role for these children. Although mother loves the children and would like to care for them, she has failed to engage in the services necessary for her to appropriately care for Shafari, Nasser and Malikah.
In view of the fact that respondent father failed to appear for trial, has not been involved in the children's lives in any significant way, is not a resource for the children, and has not maintained communication with the children, termination of his parental rights is in the children's best interest. In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the children's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the children's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment; their length of stay in foster care; the nature of their relationship with the foster mother and biological parents; the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents; and their genetic bond to respondents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced the children's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with their biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1059 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity). Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that termination of respondents' parental rights is in the children's best interest. With regard to permanency, the court considers the evidence and testimony introduced that the foster mother is committed to adopting all three children. The court also considers the testimony of Joy Burchell, Shafari's therapist. These children are entitled to a resolution, without delay, of the period of uncertainty as to the availability of respondents to serve as their parents by terminating respondents' parental rights. The court also notes that counsel for the children and guardian ad litem for Shafari support termination.
After considering the children's sense of time, their need for a secure and permanent environment, the need to avoid future placements, and the totality of circumstances, the court concludes that termination of parental rights of respondent mother and respondent father is in the children's best interest.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the parental rights of Callie T. and Harry B. to the children Shafari B., Nasser B. and Malikah B. are hereby terminated. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the children.
With regard to the permanency plan filed by petitioner on November 1, 2005 to which mother filed an objection on November 9, 2005, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and finds that such plan is in the best interest of Shafari, Nasser and Malikah. The court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan. The court further finds that it is in the best interest of Shafari, based upon the testimony of Joy Burchell, that a concurrent plan be implemented for Shafari which would include placement in a pre-adoptive therapeutic home in the event that her behavior does not stabilize in her current placement. A permanency plan shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.
Although this court on September 20, 2006 found that it was not in the best interest of the children to transfer their custody and guardianship to maternal grandmother, this court recognizes that they do have a bond with their maternal grandmother. This court further recognizes that the children have a bond with their mother as well. Therefore, this court believes it is in the best interest of the children that visitation with mother and maternal grandmother continue so long as it is therapeutically recommended. Visitation, if therapeutically appropriate, shall be supervised by DCF until such time adoption is finalized. Once finalized, visitation, if therapeutically appropriate shall be supervised by a third party/agency other than the pre-adoptive foster mother. DCF shall immediately schedule interactionals between mother and children and grandmother and children to determine if continued visitation is therapeutically appropriate.
Judgment may enter accordingly.