Opinion
No. COA11–1452.
2012-05-1
In the Matter of S.H. and A.H., Jr.
Office of the Wake County Attorney, by Deputy County Attorney Roger A. Askew, for Wake County Human Services, petitioner-appellee. Pamela Newell for guardian ad litem.
Appeal by respondent from order entered 6 September 2011 by Judge Margaret Eagles in Wake County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 April 2012. Office of the Wake County Attorney, by Deputy County Attorney Roger A. Askew, for Wake County Human Services, petitioner-appellee. Pamela Newell for guardian ad litem.
Harrington, Gilliland, Winstead, Feindel & Lucas, LLP, by Anna S. Lucas for father, respondent-appellant.
ERVIN, Judge.
Respondent–Father A.H., Sr., appeals from the trial court's order terminating his parental rights in S.H. and A.H., Jr. On appeal, Respondent–Father contends that the trial court erred by failing to address the extent to which the children should be placed with certain relatives and by failing to adequately consider the extent to which the children were adoptable. After careful consideration of Respondent–Father's challenges to the trial court's order in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's order should be affirmed.
We will refer to S.H. as “Scott” and A. H., Jr., as “Aaron” throughout the remainder of this opinion, with both names being pseudonyms utilized for ease of reading and to protect the juveniles' privacy.
I. Factual Background
On 22 January 2010, Wake County Human Services filed a petition alleging that Scott and Aaron were abused and neglected juveniles. On the same date, the court entered a non-secure custody order placing the children in the custody of WCHS. On 5 May 2010, the court entered an order determining that Scott and Aaron had been emotionally abused and neglected. After several permanency planning hearings, the court absolved WCHS from any further responsibility for attempting to reunify Scott and Aaron with Respondent–Father and approved a permanent plan of adoption for the children.
On 31 January 2011, WCHS filed a motion seeking the entry of an order terminating Respondent–Father's parental rights. A hearing concerning the termination motion was held on 18 August 2011. On 6 September 2011, the trial court entered an order terminating Respondent–Father's parental rights in Scott and Aaron pursuant to N .C. Gen.Stat. §§ 7B–1111(a)(1) and (a)(2). Respondent–Father noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's termination order.
II. Legal Analysis
A proceeding involving a request for the termination of a parent's parental rights is conducted in two stages. In re Blackburn, 142 N.C.App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001). During the adjudication stage, the petitioner has the burden of proving that at least one ground for termination exists by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1109(f). In the event that the court determines that one or more grounds for termination exist, it moves on to the disposition stage, at which it determines whether termination of the parent's parental rights would be in the child's best interest. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110(a). In making this “best interest” determination, the trial court must consider the factors enunciated in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110(a). The standard applied in evaluating appellate challenges to a trial court's dispositional order requires the reviewing court to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that a parent's parental rights be terminated. In re Brim, 139 N .C.App. 733, 745, 535 S.E.2d 367, 374 (2000). “A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are ‘manifestly unsupported by reason.’ “ Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 523, 631 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2006) (quoting Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 129, 271 S.E.2d 58, 63 (1980)). Respondent–Father's challenges to the trial court's termination order are focused exclusively on the trial court's dispositional decision.
In his first challenge to the trial court's dispositional decision, Respondent–Father argues that the trial court erred by terminating his parental rights in Scott and Aaron on the grounds that, despite the fact that WCHS had been provided with a list of potential relative placements for the children, it had made no effort to evaluate the appropriateness of any of these relative placements. We do not find this argument persuasive.
At the termination hearing, a social worker testified that WCHS had been unable to identify a relative who was ready, willing and able to provide appropriate care for Scott and Aaron. In addition, the social worker testified that WCHS possessed information to the effect that some of Scott and Aaron's paternal relatives had known of the abuse and neglect to which the children had been exposed, that these relatives had failed to take any action to protect Scott and Aaron from this abuse, and that any relatives who fell into this category should not be deemed potential placements for the children. Finally, the social worker stated that a list of relatives provided by the paternal grandmother could be considered as potential adoptive placements. Based on this testimony and other evidence in the record, the trial court found as a fact that:
43. That after the filing of the TPR motion, the grandmother emailed through her attorney a list of friends and relatives who may be considered as placement options for the children. The social worker testified that the agency, during the pendency of the underlying action, had made efforts to identify relatives but had not been able to identify a relative able and willing to care for the child. The worker called one of the relatives that was on the list provided by the grandmother and did not deem her an appropriate placement resource. Throughout this case, the Court has consistently found and concluded as a matter of law that WCHS has made reasonable efforts to place the children in a safe home. Relatives could be considered and evaluated as adoptive placements at this time.
In light of this evidence, as reflected in the trial court's findings, and the fact that the record does not contain any evidence tending to show that any of the individuals whose names appeared on the list of potential placements were ready to assume the responsibility for Scott and Aaron's care, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that WCHS had adequately evaluated potential relative placements and by proceeding to terminate Respondent–Father's parental rights despite the fact that WCHS had not made contact with all of the names shown on this list of potential relative placements.
Secondly, Respondent–Father contends that the trial court erred by terminating his parental rights in the children given that Scott and Aaron are older, have severe emotional and behavioral problems, and lack prospective adoptive placements. At the termination hearing, however, the social worker and the guardian ad litem both testified that Scott and Aaron were adoptable. Based upon this testimony, the trial court found as a fact that:
39. That the social worker, who has had extensive experience in working with children with special needs, testified that she has been a social worker for other children with severe emotional problems, some more severe than these minor children, who have been adopted. Both the GAL and the social worker testified that they believed the children will be adopted when they stabilize sufficiently.
As a result, given the existence of evidence that tends to undercut Respondent–Father's claim that Scott and Aaron are not adoptable, we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by deciding to terminate Respondent–Father's parental rights in the children. In addition, the applicable statutory provisions do not require the trial court to make a determination of adoptability as a prerequisite for finding that termination is in a child's best interest. In re M.M., 200 N.C.App. 248, 258, 684 S.E.2d 463, 470 (2009), disc. review denied,364 N.C. 241, 698 S .E.2d 401 (2010). As a result, Respondent–Father's second challenge to the trial court's order lacks merit as well.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we do not find either of Respondent–Father's challenges to the trial court's termination order persuasive. As a result, the trial court's order should be, and hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED. Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).