Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Super. Ct. No. JD223637)
SIMS, J.
J. H. and L. H., parents of the minor, appeal from orders of the juvenile court denying their petitions for modification and terminating their parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 388, 395; undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellants contend the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying their petitions for modification and substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that the minor was likely to be adopted. We affirm.
FACTS
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) removed two-year-old S. H. from parental custody in January 2006 based on allegations the parents failed to secure necessary medical care for the medically fragile minor and were not feeding her properly, resulting in a diagnosis of failure to thrive. The minor had a congenital condition characterized by benign tumors on her lymph glands and early treatment had resulted in insertion of a breathing tube through a tracheal stoma as well as a gastric feeding tube to supplement her nutritional intake.
According to the detention report, appellants had taken the minor to the hospital and told the doctors that the minor had pulled out her breathing tube a few hours earlier. The examining physicians concluded this could not be the case since the stoma was closing, which indicated the tube had been out of place for several days, and the minor was at risk of suffocation. DHHS investigation disclosed that appellants had not been using the feeding tube and formula provided for them for an extended period and the minor’s weight was so low for her height and age she was diagnosed as failure to thrive. The minor gained weight while hospitalized. A nurse assigned to the family felt the parents did not understand the extent of the minor’s needs and required care.
Prior to the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, L. H. left the state with the minor’s sibling to relocate in Wisconsin and be near supportive relatives. Appellants explained they had been trained in the minor’s specialized care and had provided proper care for her. The social worker, noting that the parents denied or minimized their problems, recommended a reunification plan which included therapy, parenting and substance abuse testing. A Wisconsin social worker declined to approve placing the minor with the mother and paternal grandparents due to concerns about the paternal grandparents and the lack of foster care facilities in the county where they lived. J. H. visited the minor sporadically and said he also intended to move to Wisconsin. The juvenile court adjudged the minor a dependent and adopted a reunification plan for appellants.
A progress report in June 2006 stated appellants, who were both in Wisconsin, had not returned to California to visit the minor and were unable to participate in services in Wisconsin due to lack of transportation. Appellants wanted to maintain contact with the minor but acknowledged they could not take care of her. DHHS recommended a permanent plan of guardianship for the minor.
The six-month review report recommended termination of services. The minor had been in the same placement for seven months and was doing well there. Appellants and the minor’s younger sibling all lived in Wisconsin. Appellants started, but did not complete, a parenting class, did not participate in therapy and had not visited the minor in several months. Appellants did not oppose guardianship. The juvenile court terminated services and set a selection and implementation hearing.
The assessment for the hearing stated the minor still had feeding and breathing tubes and was a client of Alta Regional services for as long as she needed the breathing tube. The current caretaker had recent upheaval in her life and DHHS recommended delaying guardianship until things settled down. The juvenile court ordered a permanent plan of long-term foster care with guardianship as a goal.
The administrative review report in June 2007 stated appellants had contact with the minor by letter and telephone with the last contact in May 2007. Guardianship remained the most appropriate permanent plan.
Both appellants filed petitions for modification (§ 388) seeking placement of the minor with them in Wisconsin. Both had completed a parenting class, had negative drug tests, had maintained stable housing and had transportation. The minor’s sibling was doing well in their care and they maintained telephone and letter contact with the minor. L. H. had arranged for medical insurance for the minor, looked into special education at a nearby school and located a specialist to treat the minor’s ongoing medical needs. Appellants both stated that they could care for the minor’s needs and had a support system available to them. The petitions alleged it would be in the minor’s best interest to be with her biological family. After a hearing, the court granted the modifications in part, ordering a report pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), but denying the placement change without prejudice.
The ICPC homestudy concluded appellants’ residence was safe and appropriate for the minor. However, the Wisconsin social worker was unable to make a recommendation on their ability to care for the minor’s medical needs, leaving that question to the California court.
At the review hearing in December 2007, DHHS requested a selection and implementation hearing to consider a permanent plan of guardianship. The foster mother was in court and, in response to the court’s inquiry of whether she was interested in adoption responded, “Absolutely. Absolutely.” The court set a selection and implementation hearing to consider both guardianship and adoption as potential permanent plans, finding the minor was specifically adoptable because of the foster mother’s express willingness to do so.
Both appellants again filed petitions for modification seeking placement of the minor. In addition to the information previously presented, L. H. relied upon the positive information in the ICPC homestudy. Prior to the hearing, appellants met with a clinical nurse specialist who questioned them and confirmed that appellants were knowledgeable about the fundamental aspects of the minor’s tracheostomy care. The nurse was unable to assess appellant’s ability to apply the information because the minor was not present at the meeting.
At the hearing, J. H. testified in accordance with the factual basis stated in his petition, explaining the services he had done, the contact he had with the minor over the last two years, his employment and his current stability. He acknowledged most of the contact with the minor was telephonic although there had been sporadic visits. He testified he had learned how to care for the minor’s needs before the family moved to California and had suctioned the minor’s breathing tube as needed during visits. He further testified the minor no longer had a feeding tube because she was eating well enough without it. He continued to deny the allegations of the originating petition. He stated he had not completed any of the case plan prior to leaving California.
L. H. also testified about services she had done and arrangements made for the minor’s return. She had visited the minor when possible and maintained telephonic contact with her. She stated that returning to parental custody was in the minor’s best interest because it was important for the minor to be with family and appellants wanted to resume the responsibility of caring for her. She also denied the allegations of the originating petition.
The court took the matter under submission, noting that appellants had not done any counseling as required by the case plan. The court denied the petitions for modification, ruling appellants had not met their burden. The court found that while there was some change in circumstances in that appellants had stabilized and done some services, they had not completed the plan and continued to deny responsibility for the minor’s removal. Further, even assuming there was a showing of changed circumstances there was no adequate showing that the proposed order was in the minor’s best interests. The court also found that, absent counseling, there was no reason to believe appellants would be able to meet the minor’s special needs over time. Additionally, the court found there had been little parent-child contact, the minor was stable and doing well in her placement, and it was not in her best interests to move her.
According to the assessment for the selection and implementation hearing, appellants had returned to California and were visiting the minor monthly. The assessment detailed the minor’s medical problems and ongoing care. The minor was developmentally on track except for speech delays occasioned by her tracheostomy, displayed no emotional or behavioral problems, and had a strong positive parental bond with her foster mother. The minor had been in this placement for two years. The foster mother was a licensed foster parent and had been cleared on both the criminal and welfare background checks. The foster mother had applied for an adoption homestudy, which was in the process of being completed, and was to attend adoption classes in the near future. The minor was assessed as specifically adoptable due to her multiple medical needs, which required a specially trained caretaker.
At the selection and implementation hearing appellants testified they returned to California to increase their interaction with the minor and had been visiting monthly. The visits were positive and the minor had interacted with her younger sibling. The juvenile court observed that the assessment did not state that the foster mother had said she wanted to adopt the minor but the evidence in the report was that she, in fact, was willing to do so. The court reiterated that the foster mother had filed an adoption application, her homestudy was in progress, she was completing adoption classes, was a licensed foster parent with a clean record, had cared for the minor’s special needs for two years and had a strong bond with the minor. The court concluded it was clear that the foster mother wanted to adopt the minor. Finding no exceptions to the preference for adoption as a permanent plan, the court terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellants contend the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying their petitions for modification because the evidence established both a change in circumstances and that the proposed order was in the minor’s best interests.
A parent may bring a petition for modification of any order of the juvenile court pursuant to section 388 based on new evidence or a showing of changed circumstances. “The parent requesting the change of order has the burden of establishing that the change is justified. [Citation.] The standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Michael B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1698, 1703.) Determination of a petition to modify is committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and, absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion, the decision of the juvenile court must be upheld. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.) The best interests of the child are of paramount consideration when the petition is brought after termination of reunification services. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) In assessing the best interests of the child, the juvenile court looks not to the parents’ interests in reunification but to the needs of the child for permanence and stability. (Ibid.; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)
Section 388 provides, in part: “Any parent . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of the court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court. [¶] . . . [¶] If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order, recognition of a sibling relationship, termination of jurisdiction, or clear and convincing evidence supports revocation or termination of court-ordered reunification services, the court shall order that hearing be held . . . .”
Assuming appellants adequately demonstrated changed circumstances, we agree with the juvenile court that they did not show that the proposed order was in the minor’s best interests.
Appellants moved to Wisconsin where they had the support of their relatives and engaged in some services. They established only that they were able to care for the minor’s healthy sibling and that relief from the demands of the minor’s care had allowed them to stabilize their own lives. However, as the juvenile court pointed out, they continued to deny responsibility for the minor’s removal and had not engaged in the recommended therapy which was designed to increase their insight into the problems which existed when the minor was detained. The simple fact of their knowledge of how to care for the minor had not translated into ability to do so on a day-to-day basis in the past. Without showing a better understanding of their issues and tools to cope with them, the court was justified in concluding the minor’s interests were not served by return to appellants.
Additionally, two years had passed since detention. Half of the minor’s life had been spent with a devoted foster mother in whose care the minor thrived. The minor was bonded strongly to the foster mother who had provided, and who would continue to provide, a stable and nurturing environment whether through adoption, guardianship or long-term care. In contrast, the minor’s bond to appellants had attenuated to the level of friendly visitors. Given the minor’s special medical needs, the existence of a parental bond was important in providing her stability. No abuse of discretion appears.
II
Appellants also challenge the juvenile court’s finding that the minor was adoptable arguing that the minor was not generally adoptable and the foster mother’s desire to adopt was not enough to establish adoptability.
“If the court determines, based on the assessment . . . and any other relevant evidence, by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c).)
Determination of whether a child is likely to be adopted focuses first upon the characteristics of the child. (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) In this case, of course, the minor’s medical condition and extensive care required to manage it meant that she was, as the social worker assessed, specifically rather than generally adoptable. In such cases, to find the minor is likely to be adopted, there must be a prospective adoptive parent who is presently willing to adopt. (Id. at p. 1650.) When a child is specifically adoptable, inquiry into the existence of a legal impediment to adoption by the prospective adoptive parents may be relevant at the section 366.26 hearing. (Ibid.; Fam. Code, § 8600, et seq.) In the case of a child who will need specialized care for an extended period of time, it may also be appropriate for the juvenile court to inquire whether the prospective adoptive parents can meet the child’s ongoing needs. (In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1062.)
No impediments are apparent here. The foster mother unequivocally expressed to the court her willingness to adopt, although this expression was not reiterated in the social worker’s report. Additionally, the foster mother moved forward toward adoption by filing an application, participating in an adoptive homestudy and taking classes. The foster mother was a licensed foster parent with clear criminal and child welfare records, was well bonded to the minor and had demonstrated the ability to care for the minor’s special needs for the last two years. Ample evidence supported the juvenile court’s conclusion that the minor was specifically adoptable by her current caretaker. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.)
Appellant contends the adoption assessment was not adequate for the juvenile court to properly determine whether any impediments to adoption by the prospective adoptive parent existed.
Deficiencies in the assessment go to the weight of the evidence “and if sufficiently egregious may impair the basis of a court’s decision to terminate parental rights.” (In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 413.)
Here, unlike the cases relied upon by appellants, there was an assessment. The assessment had sufficient evidence about both the minor and the foster mother from which the court could make the finding that the minor was specifically adoptable by the current caretaker.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J., NICHOLSON, J.