Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County No. 02CEJ601841. David Gottlieb, Judge.
Kelly Babineau, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Catherine Tennant Nieto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Cornell, Acting P.J., Dawson, J. and Kane, J.
INTRODUCTION
S.G. was found to come within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), in that he committed a home invasion robbery, residential burglary, and trespass. S.G. contends there was insufficient evidence to support the findings that he committed robbery and burglary. He also contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We will affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In the early morning hours of February 13, 2008, Denise Olivas, Michael Mills, and Secondido Rodriguez were renovating Olivas’s newly purchased home. At approximately 3:30 a.m., they heard a knock on the door. Olivas asked who was there and, after an individual responded, she opened the door and saw S.G. and his brother, Bo.
S.G. asked Olivas, “You remember me?” Olivas was wondering what they were doing at her home so early in the morning when she heard a shotgun being made ready to fire. Olivas slammed the door and yelled at Mills to run, stating, “They are going to get us.” Olivas and Mills ran to her room; S.G. and Bo ran into the room and shoved Olivas to the floor.
As Olivas was kneeling on the ground, Bo pointed a shotgun at her head and both brothers demanded she give them all her money. Olivas asked for some time, but Bo pointed the shotgun directly into her face while S.G. yelled, “Hurry. Hurry up and get that. I don’t have time for this. Hurry up.” Olivas gave them $900 she had just received from her income tax refund. The bothers also demanded jewelry and Olivas gave them items she valued at approximately $2,000.
After Olivas turned over the money and jewelry, S.G. demanded more, stating, “This ain’t it. I want it all. Give it all to me now.” Olivas responded that they had taken everything she had. Bo continued to point the shotgun at Olivas while S.G. again demanded more items from Olivas. Olivas told the brothers once again that they had everything.
S.G. and Bo ran out of the room; Olivas waited a few seconds then ran to the front door. She could not lock the door because it had been busted open and was barely hanging on one hinge. Olivas went to the back of the house and crawled out a window. She ran to a neighbor’s house and called 911.
When police arrived, Olivas, Mills, and Rodriguez gave statements to the officers. Mills commented, “I can’t believe Bo and [S.G.] would do that to us.” After the police left, Olivas went back to the neighbor’s house to use the phone. Olivas heard noise coming from her house, looked out, and saw Bo and S.G. inside her house with two girls. Bo and S.G. were passing buckets of paint through a window to a third girl standing outside. Olivas telephoned 911 again.
When officers arrived for the second time, they showed Olivas a photographic lineup. Olivas identified Bo immediately. After reviewing the photographs for about 20 seconds, Olivas identified S.G. She identified the three females after police apprehended the girls.
S.G. was detained when he was walking toward his mother’s house. Olivas identified him as one of those who had broken into her home. Fresno Police Officer Art Rodriguez spoke to S.G. while S.G. was handcuffed and sitting on the curb, telling him he wanted to talk about an incident that occurred several days earlier. S.G. responded, “I didn’t commit no robbery.” After waiving his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda), S.G. denied any involvement in the robbery and burglary at Olivas’s house.
On February 20, 2008, a section 602 petition was filed against S.G. At the trial on the petition, S.G. denied any involvement in the robbery and burglary at Olivas’s house. He claimed he was home asleep at the time of the incident.
The juvenile court found true the allegations that S.G. had committed a home invasion robbery, residential burglary, and trespass. At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered S.G. committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Juvenile Justice.
DISCUSSION
S.G. contends the evidence was insufficient to support the robbery and burglary convictions because Olivas’s identification of him as one of the perpetrators was unreliable. S.G. also contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel did not move to suppress his statement, “I didn’t commit no robbery.”
I. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Convictions
S.G. contends the evidence was insufficient to support the robbery and burglary convictions because Olivas’s identification of him as one of the perpetrators was “inadequate, confusing, and unreliable.” S.G.’s contention is not supported by the record and amounts to nothing more than a request that this court reweigh the evidence and reassess the credibility of witnesses.
When asked to decide the sufficiency of evidence, an appellate court reviews the entire record and determines whether there is substantial evidence that could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; accord, Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) Substantial evidence is that evidence which is “reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (Johnson, at p. 578.) An appellate court must “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citations.]” (People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421,425.) The appellate court does not reweigh the evidence (People v. Culver (1973) 10 Cal.3d 542, 548 (Culver)), reappraise the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve factual conflicts, as these are functions reserved for the trier of fact (In re Frederick G. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 353, 367 (Frederick G.)). This standard applies to juvenile adjudications as well as criminal convictions. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.)
In this case, the evidence discloses that Olivas readily recognized Bo and S.G. when she opened the door to her home because she had met them before the incident. Olivas had purchased jewelry from Bo and previously had met S.G. Olivas also testified that she was able to get a good look at S.G. during the robbery and could see his face clearly. Olivas easily identified S.G. in the photographic lineup after taking a mere 20 seconds to review the photographs.
A few days after the robbery, Olivas was in a police car with Detective Manuel Romero. She was able to identify S.G. when she saw him walking towards their vehicle. Romero confirmed Olivas’s account. Romero also testified that when he interviewed Olivas immediately after the robbery, Olivas told him the suspects were Bo and his brother.
S.G. asserts that Officer Marshall Chun testified Olivas was unable to identify him when questioned by Chun after the incident. Olivas testified regarding her statements to Chun and maintained that she told Chun she knew the perpetrators were Bo and his brother, but did not know the brother’s name.
When the juvenile court assessed the evidence, it concluded that Chun’s testimony either was not a very accurate representation of what transpired in the interview or Olivas had been so scared and jittery that there was “some communication gap.” The juvenile court noted (1) Olivas had seen S.G. prior to February 13 on more than one occasion; (2) Olivas had seen S.G. clearly the night of the robbery and burglary, first when he initially broke into her home and the second time when he was burglarizing the home; (3) Olivas readily had identified S.G. from photographs and when she saw him walking on the street; and (4) Olivas’s version of her statements and ability to identify S.G. was supported by Romero’s testimony.
The testimony of a single witness is sufficient for proof of any fact. (In re Gustavo M. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1485, 1497.) That the juvenile court found Olivas and Romero credible witnesses, and gave less weight to Chun’s testimony, is within its prerogative as the trier of fact. This court does not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses. (Frederick G., supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 367; Culver, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 548.)
II. S.G. Received Effective Assistance of Counsel
S.G. also contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel did not move to suppress his comment, “I didn’t commit no robbery.” S.G. contends counsel should have moved to suppress this statement because it was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. We disagree.
In this case, Officer Rodriguez contacted S.G. after S.G. was handcuffed and sitting on the curb. There is no dispute that S.G. was in custody at the time he made the statement. The issue is whether the statement was made as a result of custodial interrogation. (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648.) As set forth in Miranda, volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 478.)
Officer Rodriguez testified that he walked up to S.G., identified himself, and told S.G. he wanted to talk to him about an incident that had occurred several days earlier. Officer Rodriguez testified that S.G. then spontaneously stated, “I didn’t commit no robbery. I had no involvement in a robbery.” Officer Rodriguez further testified that S.G.’s statement caught him by surprise and, from the expression on S.G.’s face, it surprised him as well. Officer Rodriguez had not posed any question prior to the remark from S.G.
Officer Rodriguez stated that after making this comment, S.G. was silent. Officer Rodriguez conducted a personal history interview of S.G. to determine whether S.G. could understand his rights. After determining S.G. was able to understand his rights, Officer Rodriguez advised him of his Miranda rights. After he finished reading the advisement, Officer Rodriguez asked S.G. if he wanted to talk and S.G. indicated he did. At that point Officer Rodriguez started asking questions.
The case of In re Robert D. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 180 is substantially similar to S.G.’s case. The juvenile in Robert D. was in custody and driven to a sheriff’s station. Once inside the station, the juvenile was informed that he was under arrest for a stabbing at a carnival and an additional charge of trying to kick a deputy would be brought. The juvenile responded, “‘I know I stabbed the guy at the carnival, but your beef is chicken shit.’” (Id. at p. 183.) The appellate court upheld the juvenile court’s determination that the statement had not been coerced and was admissible because it was “spontaneous and volunteered.” (Id. at p. 185.)
Here, the record does not compel the conclusion that S.G.’s statement was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. There was substantial evidence that S.G.’s statement was volunteered and not in response to custodial interrogation. The spontaneous nature of S.G.’s statement, which was not in response to any question being posed, supports a conclusion that the statement was volunteered and its admission would not violate Miranda. Therefore, any attempt by S.G.’s counsel to suppress the statement would have been fruitless.
Accordingly, S.G. has failed to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.